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Abstract 
This thesis examines access to justice in summary criminal proceedings by 
considering the ability of defendants to play an active and effective role in the 
proceedings. Summary proceedings are those which takǯ
courts, and are decided by lay magistrates or a ȋǯourts) 
without a jury. The study uses ethnographic fieldwork to explore the 
structural/cultural intersection of public services by considering both the effects of 
structural changes in criminal proceedings in magistrates' courts and the agency of 
the courtroom workgroup.  
While the cultural practices of magistratesǯ courts have always tended to 
exclude defendants from active participation in the process, I argue that the 
structural influences of neoliberalism, in terms of demands for ever more efficient 
practices and emphasis on individual responsibility as a function of citizenship, have 
exacerbated the inability of defendants to participate in the process of prosecution. I 
also observe that, for a number of reasons, the professional workgroup has tended to 
absorb and adapt to, rather than resist, the neoliberalisation of summary criminal 
justice. Thuǡǯ
court proceedings perpetuates the marginalisation of defendants. Further, in light of 
neoliberalism's preference for market based approaches to government, there is 
little political motivation to address the identified problems of access to justice. 
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Introduction 
The genesis and aims of the thesis 
As a relatively newly qualified solicitor practising criminal defence work in ǯ government 
initiative designed to encourage efficient case progression, I recall my then employer 
warning me that governments were always trying to change something in the ǲǳǤ
years in criminal defence practise, which are just shy of a decade, I have seen 
numerous changes to summary criminal procedure which appear to undermine 
traditional adversarial principles. However, I have also seen little meaningful 
resistance to such changes. Instead, advocates tend to adapt their working routines 
to accommodate change. As a lawyer, the changes troubled me but there appeared to 
be little ability to resist change while maintaining a service for clients. As an 
academic, I sought to consider possible explanations for these changes and their 
impact on access to justice. This thesis is therefore about access to justice in 
magistrates' courts in light of the neoliberal political agenda that has emerged since 
the late 1970s in the UK.  ǯcourts are where all criminal prosecutions enter the judicial 
system. They process summary-only charges1 and either way offences2 if ǯǡ-only 
cases3 to be dealt with at the Crown court. Magistrates also commit either way 
                                                          
1 Those which carry a maximum penalty on conviction of six months imprisonment 
2 ǯ 
3 Offences which are considered too serious to be dealt with in the summary court 
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offences to the Crown court when their sentencing powers are considered 
insufficient. Given that all criminal defendants make their first appearance in the ǯǡsions are made for all those 
accused of crimes, save for defendants who have been charged with murder, in 
which case the magistrates have no powers except to send the case directly to the 
Crown court.4  
Despite the fact that all criminal cases begin in the ǯǡǲǳǡ5 ǯ
in academic research. While recent works have considered the way in which 
neoliberal demands for regulation and efficiency have resulted in greater 
marginalisation and penalisation of those who come into contact with the agencies 
of criminal justice,6 none of those studies consider the interaction of structural 
changes brought about by neoliberalism with the cultural factors surrounding the 
agency of the ǯcourtroom workgroup. This thesis therefore investigates 
that structural/cultural intersection by considering the impact of neoliberal policies 
on ǯhow this intersection 
affectǯǤǡ
and criminal justice appears to have concentrated on processes of criminalisation 
rather than the procedures to which accused people are subject once they become 
                                                          
4 Sections 114 and 115 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, SI 2010 No.145 (c.18) 
5 Bell B and Dadomo C, 'Magistrates' Courts and the 2003 Reforms of the Criminal Justice System' (2006) 
14(4) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 339; 341 
6See, for example, Bell E, Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011), Squires P and Lea 
J, 'Introduction: Reading Loic Wacquant - Opening Questions and Overview' in Squires, P and Lea, J 
(eds),Criminalisation and Advanced Marginality. Critically Exploring the Work of Loic Wacquant (The 
Policy Press 2012); Bell B and Dadomo C, 'Magistrates' Courts and the 2003 Reforms of the Criminal 
Justice System' (2006) 14(4) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 339 
  
13 
 
involved in the judicial process. The majority of significant studies of summary 
criminal justice were conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s,7 which means that it 
is both original and timely to conduct a study of courtroom activities following the 
neoliberal political turn. 	ǡǯȋ
contrast with the 1970s and early 1980s) are legally represented and, despite the 
fact that there have been significant changes to the provision of legally aided 
representation in summary criminal proceedings, there exists a paucity of research 
on criminal legal aid.8  As Kemǡǲ ? ? years there has been 
little empirical research into the take-up of legal advice and representation in police ǯǤǳ9 This thesis therefore aims to partially address the ǯ
particular.  
ǯ Ǯ ?
an abstract philosophical idea. The concept of justice is difficult to define and is 
socio-culturally situated, and would merit discussion as a topic in its own right. For ǡǮǯ
understand and effectively participate in summary criminal proceedings. I have 
considered the ways in which the neoliberal political turn has either facilitated or 
                                                          
7 See, for example, Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976), McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, 
the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981) and Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in 
the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
8 Kemp, V. Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011; 3 
9Kemp, V. Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011;15 
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hindered defendants' ability to play an active role in summary criminal proceedings ǲjustice should not only be done, but 
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to ǳ10 by all participants in the 
process. Article six  of the European Convention on Human Rights highlights the 
importance of defendant participation in the criminal justice process by requiring 
that case papers are served and interpreters and free legal advisors are present 
(when necessary) so that the defendant is able to understand the proceedings. The 
ability to understand the process affords the defendant the option to participate in 
the proceedings in a meaningful way, regardless of whether he or she wishes to 
exercise that option. If a defendant is marginalised from participation in the process 
because he or she does not understand the proceedings, the defendant appears to be 
unjustly treated by state authorities and the legitimacy of state-imposed punishment 
is questionable. As Tyler notes, defendants themselves are more likely to comply 
with sanctions imposed by criminal courts if they consider the procedure to be fair.11 
As a result of the number of cases that they process, summary criminal courts 
have always been required to adopt efficient working practices, meaning that 
defendants have historically been marginalised from effective participation in the 
proceedings for a number of reasons.12 The need to deal with cases efficiently has 
encouraged the development of co-operative working practices among advocates 
which has facilitated the creation of professional networks that share efficient case 
                                                          
10 R -v- Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER Rep 233  
11 Tyler T, 'What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures' (1988) 22(1) Law and Society Review 103. 
12 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976); Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the 
Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
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progression as a common goal.13 Representation levels are now higher than when 
earlier significant studies of summary criminal justice were conducted which, along 
with increased demands for efficiency, has strengthened professional networks and 
encouraged (albeit not explicitly) practices which continue to marginalise 
defendants and prevent effective participation in the proceedings. Such practices 
include references to law and procedure in implicit terms and the business 
imperatives of defence advocates in the face of reduced legal aid payment rates for 
criminal defence work.  
Neoliberalism and criminal justice  
Since earlier studies of summary criminal justice took place, successive 
governments have espoused neoliberal ideology in relation to the pursuit of a 
flexible, free market that requires minimal state intervention. Somewhat 
paradoxically, state intervention in, and regulation of, the criminal justice system has 
steadily increased since the early 1980s. There has been a welter of legislation which 
creates new offences, amends sentencing provisions or dictates how proceedings 
ought to be conducted. Ward argues that neoliberalism has resulted in 
transformations to criminal justice that can be celebrated for modernisation and 
efficiency but can also be criticised for drastically altering the delivery of criminal 
justice and reducing it to its bare bones.14 Ward further notes that there is not much 
                                                          
13 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203. 
14 ǡǮǮǯ-Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
British Journal of Criminology 341 
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academic work which connects such alterations to criminal justice procedure within 
the courts to neoliberalism.15  
The incoming Conservative government of 1979 was able to capitalise on 
three factors in order to justify increasingly intrusive regulation of criminal 
proceedings. The first of those was the crisis of criminology and the apparent failure 
of welfarist approaches to reduce crime. The second was an ideological favouring of 
processes of individualism, responsibilisation and consumerism, which have created 
divisions in society meaning that those who do not participate in the market in 
accordance with a neoliberal agenda are pushed further towards the margins of 
society. These groups are labelled as undeserving of all but the most basic forms of 
state assistance. This Ǯotheringǯ process occurs as a by-product to neoliberal culture. 
The third issue of significance is the desire to reduce state expenditure by 
encouraging efficient working practices via corporate management techniques. 
These three approaches enable governments to justify removing or undermining 
rights afforded to defendants via the adversarial system. Growing concerns about ǯdesire 
for efficiency and the withdrawal of state supported assistance to those agencies 
involved in criminal case progression. This procedurally punitive turn is also 
reflected in austerity measures via restrictions on the availability of publicly funded 
representation. 
In order to examine the impact of neoliberalism on access to justice I have ǯǯ
                                                          
15 ǡǮǮǯ-Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ? ?
British Journal of Criminology 341 
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Ǣǯǡ
professionals working within them, operate; how political influences interact with ǯ
ability of defendants to participate in the proceedings. ǯor market inspired techniques of 
managerialism encouraged greater regulation of summary criminal justice in order 
to promote further efficiency. The culture of summary criminal courts has always 
tended to marginalise defendants from active participation in the process but I argue 
that demands for efficiency (and cost cutting) have exacerbated those processes of 
marginalisation. However, such processes of marginalisation are less likely to be 
regarded as ethically problematic to a political agenda that encourages individual 
responsibility, in which the criminal is master of his or her own fate and, 
consequently, is not entitled to more than minimal state support.  
I also argue that, as a result of the strong workgroup culture that operates in ǯrts, there has been little resistance to the implementation of 
neoliberal policies.  The solidarity that exists among members of the court 
workgroup means that they tend to co-operate rather than act in antagonistic ways, 
despite the adversarial nature of the proceedings. This co-operation coincides with ǯ
working relationships and a good reputation with court personnel. Lawyers seemed 
to blame problems that they face on externally imposed policy, but they did not 
collectively resist those changes. This could result from the fact that they operate 
(and have been trained) in a system which is permeated with liberal bureaucratic 
principles which favour speedy case progression and high rates of early guilty pleas 
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but retain some due process protections, at least in name.16 These principles 
encourage procedures that facilitate volume processing and efficiency, to which co-
operative working practices are useful. As relative latecomers to feature in summary 
criminal proceedings (see above), defence lawyers appear to take the view that co-
operation, as opposed to resistance, will be in their long term business and, by 
default, client interests. Furthermore, the competitive nature of the structure of 
criminal defence services discourages firms from working together to collectively 
resist policies which challenge their work. 
It is clear that paradoxical relationships exist in the process of summary criminal 
prosecution. Firstly, during the twentieth century, the state came to recognise that 
the presence of publicly funded defence advocates could improve the appearance of 
legitimacy in the criminal justice process. Governments later noticed that the 
presence of advocates actually improved courtroom efficiency and so the availability 
of legally aided representation was expanded. As neoliberalism became the 
dominant political discourse in the UK, governments gave precedence to the idea 
that lawyers could improve efficiency, instead of their ability to enhance legitimacy. 
At the same time, the executive became increasingly distrustful of the use of 
professional discretion in public services. This meant that government strategy 
focused on the idea of increasing efficiency while concerns about access to justice 
were neglected. This has affected the way in which criminal justice policy has 
developed. ǯǡ
relationships with government (upon which they depend for funding) and their 
                                                          
16 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976) 
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relationship with their clients. While, to ensure their continued existence, lawyers 
must follow procedures imposed by government they are also aware, as is 
demonstrated in chapters four, five and six, that those procedures might undermine 
their clientǯǤreliant on good relationships with their clients 
to ensure that their businesses are prosperous. Defence solicitors are therefore 
placed in a positon which requires them to manage both the needs of their clients 
and the needs of government, who are likely to have opposing views about how 
cases should be dealt with.  
I therefore argue that neoliberalism's preference for mangerialism, combined 
with a strong and stable workgroup culture, exacerbates the inability of defendants 
to properly play a role in the process of summary criminal prosecution. However, 
the study is situated in time and place and so I do not make strong claims about the 
generalisability of the results. My argument is inductive in that, although I start with 
some basic premises and a particular understanding of the background from my 
time in practice, I work from detailed empirical data to draw conclusions about 
access to summary criminal justice in the area of study. I suggest that the 
conclusions may have broader applicability in light of findings contained in similar 
studies, but recognise there may be features of the local court culture and practices 
that limit their generalisability. Further research would be required to test this.  
Method 
x The case study 
The resǯǤ
The case study method entails a focus on a specific organisation or community and 
  
20 
 
ǲǳǤ17 As 
such, the findǲǳǡ18 which is 
likely to provide at least indications of what is happening in other court areas. While 
it is important to acknowledge that local practices and procedures may result in 
behavioural variation, many of the trends previously noted in other case studies, 
such as those conducted by Young19 and Carlen,20 demonstrate that common themes 
exist. Many of my findings resonate with previously identified themes, which 
indicates that this case study has thǯ
processes as a whole.  
The reason for the focus on east Kent was pragmatic. To try and examine a 
national cross-ǯ
parameters allowed by this project. There are 42 criminal justice areas across 
England and Wales21 which are further divided into 144 local justice areas.22 ǡǯǡǡ ? ?criminal 
case.23 
East Kent is a local justice area24  that runs to the east coast of Kent from 
Canterbury and incorporates courts in Canterbury, Margate, Folkestone and Dover. 
In east Kent, the average time taken to process a criminal case is 22 weeks, very 
                                                          
17 Bryman A, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2012); 66 
18 Bryman A, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2008); 71 
19 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203. 
20 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
21 Ministry of Justice, Transforming legal aid: delivering a more credible and efficient system (Ministry of 
Justice CP14/2013, 2013) 
22 --'Criminal Cases' (2012) <www.openjustice.gov.uk/courts/criminal-cases/> accessed on 21 June 2015. 
23 --'Criminal Cases' (2012) <www.openjustice.gov.uk/courts/criminal-cases/> accessed on 21 June 2015. 
24 ǲǯǳȋ--
'Criminal Cases' (2012) <www.openjustice.gov.uk/courts/criminal-cases/> accessed on 21 June 2015) 
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close to the national average.25 Dover houses the HMCTS East Kent Administration 
Centre and operates largely as an occasional (Saturday and Bank Holiday) court, 
which also deals with trials and revenue and customs matters alongside the 
enforcement of financial orders. The remaining three courts process all other types 
of summary criminal cases and initial appearances in relation to those matters that 
will ultimately be dealt with in the Crown court. Between January and September  ? ? ? ?ǡǯ ?ǡ ? ? ?ǡ
motoring matters.26 There are 11 firms which provide legally aided criminal defence 
representation in the east Kent area and one CPS office based in Canterbury. I have 
practised as a defence advocate in east Kent for nine years and, consequently, have a 
good understaǯ
procedural changes that have occurred, as well as knowledge about how to access 
documents and people who could usefully contribute to the research. 
x The national and local context 
 The Ministry of Justice, of which the Legal Aid Agency is part, classifies local 
justice areas as urban, rural or London.27 Rural areas tend to cover large 
geographical spaces, with scattered populations, a higher concentration of criminal 
defence service providers and an average legal aid spend of £4.6 million per year.28 
Urban areas are inclined to be more geographically concentrated and are at the 
lower end of legal aid market concentration, with an average criminal legal aid 
                                                          
25 --'Criminal Cases' (2012) <www.openjustice.gov.uk/courts/criminal-cases/> accessed on 21 June 2015. 
26 Ministry of Justice. 'FOI-88467' (2014) <http://www.gov.uk/.../excluding-road-traffic-cases-number-
adult-criminal-cases-at-specific-magistrates-courts> accessed on 9 September 2013. See appendices one ǯǤ	ȋǮ	ǯȌǡssible to obtain similar data for 
other LJAs as no similar FOI has been made for other areas of the country.  
27 Ministry of Justice, Transforming Legal Aid: Delivering a More Credible and Efficient System (Ministry of 
Justice CP14/2013, 2013) 
28 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement  of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014) 
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spend of £13.4 million per year.29 London represents the extreme of urban areas as 
it has the highest level of market fragmentation coupled with the highest criminal 
legal aid spend per area at £13.8 million per year.30 ȋǮǯȌ
classifies Kent as an urban area, and does not subdivide the county further.31  
There exists, therefore, some inconsistency in the way that justice areas are 
categorised. The LAA designates procurement areas broadly on the basis of county 
boundaries. HMCTS further subdivides counties into local justice areas, which are 
mentioned above. Police forces further subdivide data on a different basis, according 
to districts within the policing area.32 The lack of consistency in the way that areas 
are categorised and, consequently, the way that data is gathered means that a truly 
comparative analysis between local justice areas requires a significant amount of 
local knowledge about the division of court areas within counties and knowledge of 
which policing districts fall within each local justice area. As a result, it has not been 
possible to conduct a comparative analysis in this thesis, and, indeed, that was not 
aim of this work. 
Generally, the more urban the area, the greater the level of fragmentation in 
the criminal legal aid provider market. The least fragmented area is Hampshire, 
where the top eight firms conduct almost 100 per cent of the work.33 Predictably, 
Central London is the most fragmented market where the top eight providers only 
conduct between 20 and 30 per cent of the market share of work.34 There are 62 
                                                          
29 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement  of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014) 
30 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement  of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014) 
31 Ministry of Justice, Transforming Legal Aid: Delivering a More Credible and Efficient System (Ministry of 
Justice CP14/2013, 2013) 
32 See, for example Home Office. 'Crime in Canterbury District compared with crime in other similar areas' 
(2015) <http://www.police.uk/kent/275/performance/compare-your-area/> accessed on 16 July 2015. 
33 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement  of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014) 
34 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement  of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014) 
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criminal legal aid procurement areas, of which Kent has the 46th most fragmented 
market, where the top eight firms conduct about 50 per cent of criminal legal aid 
work.35 Unfortunately, statistics held by the Legal Aid Agency refer to the 
procurement areas (the entirety of Kent as one unit) while HMCTS statistics refer to 
local justice areas, of which Kent has three. Data produced in relation to Kent as 
whole is much more readily available than data in relation to local justice areas 
because HMCTS information is held on their Performance Database, which is 
unpublished material and only available upon request under the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000.36  
 When the empirical research for this thesis was conducted, there were 
approximately 1600 firms providing publicly funded criminal defence services 
nationally.37 However, the number of legal aid providers was not distributed evenly, 
with PA Consulting noting that more than 50 per cent of criminal legal aid firms 
were in nine regions; London, Greater Manchester, West Midlands, West Yorkshire, 
Thames Valley, Lancashire, Merseyside, South Wales and Hampshire.38 Research by 
KPMG does however note that Kent operates with a relatively high number of active 
criminal defence service providers comparative to its criminal legal aid spend.39 In 
the year to end September 2013 Kent had the fifteenth largest criminal legal aid 
spend of 62 procurement areas nationally.40 
                                                          
35 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement  of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014) 
36 ǯǮ' <http://data.gov.uk/dataset/her-
majestys-courts-and-tribunals-service-hmcts-performance-database> accessed on 17 July 2015. 
37 Ministry of Justice,  Transforming Legal Aid: Delivering a More Credible and Efficient System (Ministry of 
Justice CP14/2013, 2013) 
38 PA Consulting, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. Assessment of the Financial Impact of the Proposed Fee Reductions 
on Criminal Legal Aid Law Firms (2013) 
39 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014).  
40 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014). 
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 Some of those figures may be explained by some of the demographic features of 
Kent and the South East of England. In mid-2013, the South East was the area with 
the largest population in England and Wales, followed by London, the North West, 
the East and the West Midlands.41 Kent as a whole features in the top five areas of 
the country experiencing police recorded violent crime and criminal 
damage/arson42 and is also generally positioned in the top half of the country in 
relation to rates of other types of recorded crime.43 An analysis of population 
statistics44 and police recorded crime45 suggests that Kent has quite a high per capita 
crime rate across the three local justice areas, particularly for violent crime and 
criminal damage/arson.  
Kent has three local justice areas; north, mid and east Kent. Of those areas, 
east Kent police forces recorded the highest crime rates to year end of March 2015.46 
During that period police in east Kent recorded 316.36 crimes per thousand 
residents, mid Kent police forces recorded 265.74 cases per thousand residents and 
                                                          
41 Office for National Statistics. '2011 Census, Population Estimates by Single Year of Age and Sex for Local 
Authorities in the United Kingdom' (2013) <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-
census/population-estimates-by-single-year-of-age-and-sex-for-local-authorities-in-the-united-
kingdom/index.html> accessed on 24 June 2015. 
42 Office for National Statistics. 'Police Recorded Crime by Offence Group and Force Area, English Regions 
and Wales, Number of Offences, Year to December 2014' (2015) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcmper cent3A77-373433> 
accessed on 24 June 2015.   
43 Office for National Statistics. 'Police Recorded Crime by Offence Group and Force Area, English Regions 
and Wales, Number of Offences, Year to December 2014' (2015) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcmper cent3A77-373433> 
accessed on 24 June 2015.   
44 Office for National Statistics. '2011 Census, Population Estimates by Single Year of Age and Sex for Local 
Authorities in the United Kingdom' (2013) <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-
census/population-estimates-by-single-year-of-age-and-sex-for-local-authorities-in-the-united-
kingdom/index.html> accessed on 24 June 2015. 
 
46 Home Office. 'Crime in Canterbury District Compared with Crime in Other Similar Areas' (2015) 
<http://www.police.uk/kent/275/performance/compare-your-area/> accessed on 16 July 2015. 
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north Kent police recorded 145.78 crimes per thousand residents.47 The following 
points should however be noted. 
North Kent area comprises two districts (Medway and Dartford/Gravesham) 
while mid and east Kent each consist of five districts. North Kent is a geographically 
smaller area than the other two local justice areas. Further, Thanet (Margate area) 
disproportionately ǯcontributes to 28 
per cent of the recorded crime rate and has the highest level of recorded crime of all ǯ.48 Thanet, according to the poverty map, which was 
produced using information from the indices of multiple deprivation,49 indicates that 
Thanet contains some of the most deprived areas in the country. While the indices of 
multiple deprivation suggest that Kent ranks at 103 of the 150 most deprived areas 
nationally,50 the deprivation (in terms of places that are either the most deprived in 
the country or experience greater than average levels of deprivation)51 exists in 
pockets towards mid and east Kent, such as Sittingbourne and the Isle of Sheppey 
(mid Kent) and Thanet, Dover and Folkestone (east Kent).52 
The area comprising mid Kent consists of Tunbridge Wells, Tonbridge and 
Malling, Sevenoaks, Maidstone and Swale. The first three of these areas have low or 
very low levels of deprivation53 and also rank lowest in Kent police crime records. 
                                                          
47 Home Office. 'Crime in Canterbury District Compared with Crime in Other Similar Areas' (2015) 
<http://www.police.uk/kent/275/performance/compare-your-area/> accessed on 16 July 2015. 
48 Home Office. 'Crime in Canterbury District compared with crime in other similar areas' (2015) 
<http://www.police.uk/kent/275/performance/compare-your-area/> accessed on 16 July 2015. 
49 Church Urban Fund. 'Poverty Map' <http://www.cuf.org.uk/poverty-england/poverty-map> accessed 
on 16 July 2015. 
 
51 Church Urban Fund. 'Poverty Map' <http://www.cuf.org.uk/poverty-england/poverty-map> accessed 
on 16 July 2015. 
52 Church Urban Fund. 'Poverty Map' <http://www.cuf.org.uk/poverty-england/poverty-map> accessed 
on 16 July 2015. 
53 Church Urban Fund. 'Poverty Map' <http://www.cuf.org.uk/poverty-england/poverty-map> accessed 
on 16 July 2015. 
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ǡǯin the county 
by Swale (Sittingbourne, the Isle of Sheppey and Faversham), which accounts for 27 
per cent of crime in the local justice area.54 As noted above, Swale contains several 
areas which either experience more deprivation than average or contain some of the 
most deprived areas in the country.  
Despite servicing areas of relatively high deprivation, particularly in 
Medway,55 north Kent experienced the lowest recorded crime rate in the Kent 
procurement area.56 Given that it is geographically the smallest local justice area in 
Kent, I suggest that this apparent anomaly could be explained by factors such as 
population size, although I have not been able to gather population data for each 
district within the local justice area.  
In essence, crime statistics, demographic data and deprivation data suggest 
that Kent as a whole suffers relatively high crime rates per capita and that it contains 
several areas which are either some of the most deprived in the country or 
experience more deprivation than average. Predictably, there appears to be a 
correlation between crime rates and levels of deprivation, with higher crime rates 
being found in areas experiencing greater levels of deprivation. This pattern appears 
to be particularly noticeable in east Kent. It seems therefore that, while Kent is a less 
densely populated area than some urban areas such as Greater Manchester, the West 
                                                          
54 Home Office. 'Crime in Canterbury District Compared with Crime in Other Similar Areas' (2015) 
<http://www.police.uk/kent/275/performance/compare-your-area/> accessed on 16 July 2015. 
55 Church Urban Fund. 'Poverty Map' <http://www.cuf.org.uk/poverty-england/poverty-map> accessed 
on 16 July 2015. 
56 Home Office. 'Crime in Canterbury District Compared with Crime in Other Similar Areas' (2015) 
<http://www.police.uk/kent/275/performance/compare-your-area/> accessed on 16 July 2015. 
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Midlands and Yorkshire,57 police recorded crime rates are comparatively high.58 This 
means that there is a relatively high per capita crime rate and provides some 
explanation as to why Kent features in the top quarter of criminal legal aid 
expenditure across the procurement areas.59 East Kent local justice area accounts for 
43 per cent of crimes across Kent per thousand residents,60 as well as containing 
several regions which experience high levels of deprivation. 
x The empirical research 
The empirical research consisted of observations followed by semi-
structured interviews. I obtained ethical approval for the research from Kent Law ǯAdvisory Group. The purpose of the observation and ǲǥh a view ǳ61 beyond my own 
experience as a defence advocate. While I am familiar with court proceedings and 
tactics employed in summary criminal cases in the area of study, it was important to 
empirically explore the effects of those procedures as viewed by advocates on both 
sides of the adversarial process.  
Baldwin notes that the substantial advantage of observing criminal courts is 
that they are open to the public and so no difficulties arise in obtaining access for 
                                                          
57 Office for National Statistics. '2011 Census, Population Estimates by Single Year of Age and Sex for Local 
Authorities in the United Kingdom' (2013) <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-
census/population-estimates-by-single-year-of-age-and-sex-for-local-authorities-in-the-united-
kingdom/index.html> accessed on 24 June 2015. 
58 Office for National Statistics. 'Police Recorded Crime by Offence Group and Force Area, English Regions 
and Wales, Number of Offences, Year to December 2014' (2015) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcmper cent3A77-373433> 
accessed on 24 June 2015. 
59 KPMG LLP, Ministry of Justice Procurement  of Criminal Legal Aid Services: Financial Modelling (2014) 
60 Home Office. 'Crime in Canterbury District Compared with Crime in Other Similar Areas' (2015) 
<http://www.police.uk/kent/275/performance/compare-your-area/> accessed on 16 July 2015. 
61 Bryman A, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2008); 369 
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research.62 As is demonstrated by studies conducted by, among others, Carlen63 and 
McBarnet,64 observation of court processes can assist in uncovering the nature of 
relationships between court personnel and patterns of workgroup behaviour.65 ǲǡǡǳ66 from the proceedings (akin to defendants), my 
previous experience working in these courts allowed me to understand the nuances 
of court personnel behaviour. Conducting observations also allowed me to step back 
from my ordinary involvement in summary criminal procedures to make a 
preliminary assessment of the behaviour of advocates and defendants in court.  In 
addition, observations allowed me to focus the interviews on particular topics that 
required further exploration. 
I conducted the equivalent of 20 days of observation (five days in each court) 
between October 2012 and February 2013, during which time I observed the daily 
practices of the east KeǯǤ
of the proceedings using an observation template which is set out in appendix three, 
and the notes were typed up at the end of each day as a diary. Participants in the 
process were not named, but I noted the date and Court house to enable me to 
consider any emerging patterns. I was aware that this might enable certain members 
of Court staff to be identifiable to their colleagues so I verbally advised the actors of 
my presence and role, and that I might publish the results. There was a risk that, by 
                                                          
62 Baldwin J, 'Research on the Criminal Courts' in King, R and E Wincup (eds), Doing Research on Crime 
and Justice (Oxford University Press 2000). 
63 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
64 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981). 
65 Baldwin J, 'Research on the Criminal Courts' in King, R and Wincup, E (eds), Doing Research on Crime 
and Justice (Oxford University Press 2000). 
66 Baldwin J, 'Research on the Criminal Courts' in King, R and Wincup, E (eds), Doing Research on Crime 
and Justice(Oxford University Press 2000): 245 
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my presence, the usual rhythm of working life would be affected and that the 
participants may have altered their behaviour. However, the fact that I was 
effectively a participant observer did, I think, minimise that risk, as is discussed 
further below. 
Of the 183 cases observed, the vast majority of defendants were represented; 
only 40 appeared without some form of representation. The ways in which 
defendants were represented is discussed in chapter six. Nineteen per cent of cases 
observed were dealt with by a district judge while the remainder were conducted by 
magistrates. Legal advisers and prosecutors were always present at each hearing 
observed. I did not record the details of the professional court personnel at each 
appearance for the sake of attempting to preserve anonymity. I cannot therefore say 
how frequently each individual prosecutor, defence advocate or legal adviser 
appeared in my observation sample. Guilty pleas were entered in 41 per cent of 
cases. Not guilty pleas were entered in 27 per cent of cases. No pleas were entered in 
31 per cent of cases because, for example, the defendant did not attend, the case was 
listed for a pre-trial administrative or procedural hearing, or because the hearing 
considered the seizure of property. In the remaining cases, mixed pleas were entered 
(different pleas were entered to separate charges on the same charge sheet or 
summons).  The types of hearings observed were as follows: 
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Hearing type Percentage observed 
Sentencing 37 
Adjournments 14 
Case Management 14 
Trials 2 
Defendant fails to attend; warrant 
issued 
8 
Breach of bail 3 
Property seizure 2 
Other* 21 
* This can include hearings regarding applications for further evidence or to move the trial and applications to 
vary bail. 
The fact that sentencing hearings were the most frequent type of case ǯǡplea or 
following trial, is high. Trials appear to be an infrequent occurrence but it must be 
noted that there were frequently several courtrooms sitting in a single courthouse, 
one of which usually dealt with trials at the same time as another courtroom was 
conducted pleas, sentencing and directions hearings. The relatively high number of Ǯǯhearings could suggest that there is scope for more negotiation and provision 
of information by the parties outside the courthouse. That said, the number of 
simple adjournments did not give the appearance of being particularly frequent 
despite the relatively high percentage of adjournments recorded. Adjournments 
tended to occur when the Probation Service required more time to prepare a Pre-
Sentence Report because particular assessments needed to be made, such as 
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suitability for accredited courses. It did not feel as though courts were wasting time 
as cases appeared to be processed quickly. As is noted above, magistratesǯcourts in 
east Kent take an average of 22 weeks to process a case while the national average is 
21 weeks. There was no discernible difference in the way each of the four courts 
conducted their business.  
  As well as generating data in its own right, observation allowed the ǯ
environment. By combining observation and interviews, I was able to notice things 
which the interviewee may take for granted. The semi-structured nature of the 
interviews still however meant that there was freedom to discuss each topic in 
broader terms. I was also conscious that I wanted to avoid imposing my own views 
and experiences on interviewees, which meant that a degree of openness in question 
formulation was necessary, while also seeking data on particular subjects. Semi-
structured interviews were appropriate because the focus of the research was quite 
clear but they do also allow for some flexibility which was necessary when inviting 
someone to discuss their own experiences. This method allowed the interviewee to 
discuss issues which were of particular importance from his or her point of view and ǤǮ-ǯǯ
responses, which was important to limit interviewer bias. The interview schedule 
can be found in appendix four. 
I used a purposive sampling strategy for my interviews. My research 
questions and parameters provided the guidelines about which categories of people 
needed to be the centre of attention67 Ȃ ǯand legal 
                                                          
67 Bryman A, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2008); 416 
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advisers in east Kent. The Ministry of Justice, however, would not allow me access to 
consult court clerks/legal advisors,68 and so interviews were conducted solely with 
prosecutors and defence advocates.  
While my study is about the impact of neoliberal policy interventions in 
summary criminal courts on access to justice for defendants, I decided not to 
interview defendants themselves, but rather to interview advocates who had 
experience of the changes. I also drew inferences about the effects for defendants 
from the observation data. The reason for not interviewing defendants, aside from 
the fact that such interviews would have been both practically and ethically more 
difficult to manage, was that practitioners are able to make comparisons before and 
after reform and can identify the particular effects of specific interventions. 
Defendants, by contrast, are unlikely to be able to compare any experience that they 
might have had pre- and post-reform and are unlikely to know the detailed nature of 
policy interventions. While some defendants might have had long term experience of 
the processes of summary criminal justice, and may have been able to identify some 
changes (assuming that their memory was clear), they would not have the 
knowledge required to be able to make the necessary comparison for my analysis. 
Furthermore, there is no relevant pre-reform ǯ
experiences of summary criminal justice in their own words which could have been ǯǤǡ
would not, on balance, have produced the necessary data to answer my research 
                                                          
68 I was aware that I would need permission from HMCTS to interview Court staff and so I emailed the 
Head of Crime Directorate at HMCTS to explain the status, nature and purpose of the research. HMCTS ǯ
implementation of policy. Further, HMCTS was not prepared to release Court legal advisers from their 
daily duties to participate in the interview process. Consequently, HMCTS refused my request to 
interview Court clerks and legal advisers. 
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questions. As such, obtaining interview data from members of the courtroom 
workgroup provided the best information for analysis. I nevertheless recognise that ǯ entirely different picture 
of the process. 
 As ǯ
ability to participate in the proceedings, the advocates selected for interview must 
have had experience of summary criminal proceedings both before and after the 
reintroduction of means testing for publicly funded representation, which was 
confirmed at the time of interview. My recruitment strategy was to write to all 35 
defence lawyers and all 18 Crown prosecutors based in east Kent in Winter/Spring 
2013 (bar my own colleagues Ȃ a further five solicitors) and those interviewed were 
those who responded positively to my enquiry. I accept that this will not necessarily 
be a representative sample and will provide indicative rather than generalisable 
findings. I decided that I would not interview solicitors from my own firm as I felt ǯ
conduct an impartial interview. I also did not want to upset or encroach on 
designated hierarchical patterns in my office. In essence, I was too close to the 
material, and risked upsetting work roles too much, to be able to conduct an 
appropriate analysis of the data that would have been produced. I did however send 
letters of invitation to all other summary court advocates based in the area at that 
time, and interviewed those who volunteered, and gave informed consent, to assist. I 
did not have to seek any further permission to interview those professionals, who, 
by their role, are expected to behave independently in accordance with their own 
professional rules of conduct. Crown prosecutors did however initially appear more 
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reluctant to be interviewed and I am aware that some interviewees spoke to their 
managers before agreeing to participate. Despite this initial reluctance, I was 
eventually able to interview a very slightly higher proportion of prosecutors than 
defence advocates. Interviews were recorded via a Dictaphone to be transcribed.  
I interviewed 19 advocates (12 defence lawyers and seven prosecutors) 
between May and July 2013. There can be particular difficulty in interviewing 
colleagues generally, where the roles of the participants can cause some anxiety. The 
researcher has an advantage in terms of the research material, which may unsettle 
the ordinary dominant/subordinate role.69 I was therefore careful to ensure that the 
purpose of the interview and safeguards were properly explained.70 What may 
become apparent in conducting insider-research is that while straightforward 
anonymity may offer protection in terms of outside readerships, other colleagues 
may be able to identify the respondents from other information contained in the 
research. It is hoped that, by limiting the personal information elicited (gender, age, 
etc. were not recorded), confidentiality can be afforded greater protection. 
x Data analysis 
In analysing the data I made use of mid-range theories which "represent 
attempts to understand and explain a limited aspect of social life."71 The relevant 
theories are about hǯ
influence access to justice for criminal defendants. I have considered how a ȋǯȌ
information and behaves in their working environment and thus I have tried to 
                                                          
69 Bell J, Doing Your Research Project (Open University Press 2010). 
70 I decided that the best way to safeguard participants was by anonymising their replies in interview and 
sending them transcripts to approve prior to conducting the data analysis. 
71 Bryman A, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2008); 7 
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ǲǤǳ72 ǯǲ-upon 
patterns of action that were themselves products of negotiations between the ǳǤ73 This understanding allows us to appreciate the ǯǤǡǲal 
agencies, particularly between prosecutors and defence solicitors, when they seek to ǳ74 so that the impact of a 
range of influences can be considered. I therefore attempt to consider both the 
structural (politically motivated initiatives) and cultural (workgroup behaviour) ǯǤ 
Given that I have taken a qualitative approach, I conducted a thematic analysis 
of the data.75 I thoroughly read and re-read the field notes and transcripts to identify ǲǳ 76 which were then used to Ǥǡǲ
accounts from interview can only be understood in the context of the interview and ǮǯǤǳ77 On this point, it is 
important to acknowledge my own role as practitioner-researcher/participant-
observer. Undoubtedly I hoped to find advocates acting with the utmost integrity to 
defend their clients and uphold both the law and due process provisions. I am also 
                                                          
72 Weber M, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (Free Press 1947); 88 
73 Bryman A, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2008); 19 
74 Kemp, V. Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011; 15 
75 Lange B, 'Researching Discourse and Behaviour as Elements of Law in Action' in Banakar, R. and 
Travers, M (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005); 194 
76 Bryman A, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2008); 554 
77 Bano S, ''Standpoint', 'Difference' and Feminist Research' in Banakar, R. and Travers, M (ed), Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005); 103 
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however acutely aware of the ways that defence advocates feel that professional 
decision making has been constrained by rules of criminal procedure that have been 
introduced in the early twenty-first century. No doubt I feel somewhat protective 
towards my colleagues, who, in fairness, acknowledged that patterns of behaviour ǯs. 
My role as practitioner also had significant advantages. I was able to gain 
access to interview prosecutors Ȃ which I do not believe has been done in previous 
studies. I do not doubt that this was partly as a result of my familiarity with the 
courts I was examining. I think that I was viewed as a familiar and trusted face Ȃ 
someone who was already a member of the workgroup and could consider the ǯǤǡ
interviews, that I was seen as someone who would be able to understand whatever 
concerns were raised, and who would share genuine concerns about the system 
rather than as a passive but interested third party. This meant that I was able to 
examine the issues from both sides of the adversarial coin. As Kemp says, it is 
important that the effects of policy are understood, especially at a local level and on ǮǯǤ78 
Participants also commented that they did not feel a need to be on their best 
behaviour when they saw me conducting observations in court, which they 
acknowledged they would have felt if a stranger was present. I had a similar 
experience to Flood, who said:  
                                                          
78 Kemp, V. Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
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ǲ
belonging to a particular groupǥ
was perceived as harmless and enabled me to observe things that I might not Ǥǳ79  
Further, while the presence of a participant observer can result in reactive 
effects, several advocates (both prosecuting and defending) commented that, 
although my presence as observer was unusual, they did not pay a lot of attention to ǮǯǮǯǤ
that, as well as benefitting from my own knowledge of how courts work, I was able 
to observe usual, as opposed to moderated, courtroom behaviour. This point does, 
however, have to be balanced against the risk of over-identification with the 
research subjects. It is therefore important for the researcher to retain reflexivity 
about his/her role and recognise potential bias that the role entails. I do however 
argue that some of my findings have been generated specifically as a result of my 
familiarity with the proceedings, particularly in chapter five. My position in the field 
meant that I was familiar with particular uses of language and procedures, which 
meant that I could recognise issues in the empirical data that may not be recognised 
by non-participant observers.  
Chapter outline 
This thesis contains six chapters Ȃ three which discuss the theoretical and 
background literature and three which analyse the findings of the empirical 
research. The first two theoretical chapters set out the political and cultural issues ǯǤ
                                                          
79 Flood J, 'Socio-Legal Ethnography' in Banakar, R and Travers, M (ed), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal 
Research (Hart Publishing 2005); 43 
  
38 
 
together in an analysis of changes to the availability of legally aided representation 
in summary criminal proceedings.  It was clear from those chapters that the central 
issues affecting the presentation of summary criminal justice were increased 
demands for efficient case management, austerity measures and the networks 
operating among the courtroom workgroup.   
It was possible to identify similar issues when I analysed the empirical data 
and so I structured the chapters in such a way that there is a  chapter dealing with 
the socio-political issues arising from neoliberalism and an empirical analysis 
chapter which considers the impact of those issues, a chapter discussing the 
influence of workgroup culture and an empirical analysis chapter dealing with how 
advocates have integrated law into the workgroup, and a chapter discussing 
administrative changes to legal aid coupled with an empirical analysis of the effects 
of those changes. The common themes which run throughout the thesis are the 
influence of neoliberalism in terms of demands for efficiency via managerial ǡǯǮǯscope 
to challenge initiatives which undermine the ability of defendants to participate in 
summary criminal proceedings.  
Chapter one deals with the political agenda and structural changes that have 
informed recent approaches to criminal justice. In this chapter I argue that 
neoliberalism became the dominant political agenda in the UK as government 
responded to crisis in the welfare state. Neoliberal governments capitalised on that 
crisis by arguing that public services were inefficient and that free market principles 
could deliver such services more effectively. The criminal justice system, while 
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remaining part of the state, was also subject to increasingly intrusive, managerial 
forms of regulation. That regulation was designed to improve efficiency in the 
criminal justice process. Furthermore, the preference for market based techniques of 
governance encouraged a culture of responsibilisation and individualisation in 
which state support became viewed as a crutch for those who were unable or 
unwilling to participate in the effective operation of the market. This led to the ǮǯǡǤ 
Chapter two ǯǤ
consider the findings of studies that demonstrate how defendants were marginalised 
at a time when only a small number of defendants were legally represented. I then 
compare these findings to more recent studies which consider the nature of 
courtroom workgroup culture, particularly given the increasingly professionalised ǯroceedings. I argue that practises which marginalised 
defendants in the 1970s persist today, and that there are two factors which 
exacerbate such marginalisation; tǯǯǤǯ
proceedings. 
In chapter three I reflect on how changing political agendas have influenced 
the development of legally aided representation in summary criminal proceedings. I 
chart the early development of criminal legal aid before considering how neoliberal 
approaches to legal aid have demanded ever greater efficiency at reduced cost. I 
argue that a flawed belief in the value of market based approaches has led to a 
system of publicly funded representation which is fragile, reduces the number of 
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people able to access legally aided representation and has had a detrimental effect 
on the quality of representation that defendants are able to access. 
The following three chapters consider the findings of my empirical research. 
In chapter four I examine how demands for efficiency detailed in chapter one have 
affected the ability of defendants to participate effectively in the proceedings. I argue 
that, while external demands for efficiency did disrupt the courtroom workgroup as 
described in chapter two, the workgroup largely absorbed and facilitated the 
changes encouraged by policy initiatives rather than resisting them. I suggest that 
the high degrees of co-operation exhibited by members of the workgroup allowed 
efficiency drives to become ingrained in the culture of the workgroup and that these 
processes have exacerbated the marginalisation of defendants while maintaining the 
relative stability of the local workgroup.  
Chapter five details an unexpected outcome from the research. It has ǯh resort to 
legal provisions.80 Instead, I found that the law permeates summary criminal 
proceedings but is used in routinised ways and referred to in implicit terms so that 
the frequent references to law made by court personnel would be difficult for a non-
lawyer to identify. Neoliberal polices and legislation designed to improve efficiency 
at reduced cost have increased the legalisation of proceedings while the courtroom 
workgroup culture has adapted to such provisions and made them part of the 
routine business of summary criminal proceedings. As such, both of those factors 
have a role in intensifying the inability of defendants to effectively participate in the 
proceedings. 
                                                          
80 Darbyshire P, Sitting in Judgement: The Working Lives of Judges (Oxford: Hart 2011). 
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The final data analysis chapter examines the effect of changes to legal aid 
provisiǯǤ
restrictions in the availability of legally aided representation and the bureaucratic 
nature of the application process have caused relationships between court personnel 
and defendants to become more strained. That strain results from solicitors being 
more prone to risk-taking behaviour in terms of whether or not they will be paid, 
which affects the level and quality of representation that defendants receive. 
Further, solicitors appear to feel somewhat aggrieved that low remuneration rates ǯ
into decision making at what they consider to be a premature stage in the 
proceedings. I also argue that the bureaucratic nature of the legal aid application 
process both causes delay and excludes defendants from participation in the 
proceedings at an early stage.  
Conclusion 
On the basis of the above analysis, I conclude that the inability of defendants 
to effectively participate in summary criminal proceedings has intensified after 
neoliberal techniques of governance became politically popular. As governments 
have, in recent decades, made ever more urgent demands for greater efficiency in 
the criminal justice system, the culture of summary justice has adapted to political 
intervention in such a way that defendants are further marginalised from the 
proceedings. While workgroup culture has always had the effect of casting 
defendants as dummy players,81 managerial demands for efficiency, the increased 
                                                          
81 In 1976, Carlen described defendants as ǮǯǮǯǡǡ
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legalisation of proceedings and changes to criminal legal aid introduced by 
neoliberal governments have intensified that marginalisation as such initiatives have 
been absorbed into the day-to-day practices of summary criminal proceedings.  
The second important feature of the neoliberal political agenda is the ǮǯǯǤ
othering of marginalised groups. The withdrawal of state support - including due 
process protections that were traditionally afforded to defendants Ȃ is not ethically 
problematic to a political agenda which encourages people to take responsibility for 
their own inability to participate in the market. As such, there is little political 
motivation to address the problems experienced by criminal defendants.  
As noted above, the findings of this research displayed consistency with 
studies of courtroom culture which predated the neoliberal turn, as well as studies 
which have considered the effects of managerialism on public services and the ǮǯǤ	ǡ
conclusion, that the analysis and findings of my empirical study may be applicable to 
summary criminal justice beyond east Kent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
are unable to actively exercise a role in procedures because they lack the skills necessary to fully engage 
with the nuances of the proceedings (Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976)). 
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Chapter 1: Neoliberalism and Criminal Justice 
Introduction 
Neoliberalism is a complex and often contradictory set of political practices 
that tend to substitute economic market rationalities for welfare rationalities and, in 
the UK at least, have typically developed as a result of crises.82  Neoliberalism is not ǲǡǥ
understanding ourselves and the political Ǥǳ83 I take this as the 
starting point from which to analyse access to justice in summary courts.   In this 
chapter I explore neoliberal philosophy to expose its complexities and 
contradictions as it operates within a particular arena; magǯǤǯ
to examine ǲǥǡǡǤǳ84   
I argue that structural approaches to criminal justice fell into disfavour as  ? ? ? ?ǡǯ
Conservative party to craft policies which drew on neoliberal ideas in an attempt to 
provide appropriate responses to public concerns, and that these policies were 
continued, albeit with different emphases, by New Labour and the Coalition 
government.   
My argument is that there have been two significant consequences of 
neoliberalisation for access to justice in summary criminal courts. Firstly, the 
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Thatcher government promoted a market based ethos of individualisation and 
responsibilisation, which justified reductions in welfare provision and restrictions Ǯǯǡincluding defendants. Some prominent 
sociologists and criminologists refer to this group as the precariat,85 a term that I 
shall use here. As a consequence of the neoliberal conception of the criminal both as 
an outsider and as having made a rational choice to be a criminal, more severe ǡǤǲ
of de-ǥǤǳ86 because such groups are no loǲǮǯǤǳ87  
Secondly, following Thatcherite discourse which presented public services as 
costly and ineffective, the subsequent New Labour government developed a culture 
of audit which placed the demands of efficiency and case management above the 
needs of defendants. This move prioritised economy and efficiency over traditional 
adversarial criminal justice principles.  
These two outcomes highlight some of the contradictions of neoliberalism. 
Free market principles are favoured, which justifies a roll back of state provision. 
However the social dislocation which results from that roll back requires 
                                                          
85 See, for example, Wacquant L, Punishing the Poor. The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Duke 
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
justice and regulation: the 'freedom' perspective' in Smith, G. Seddon, T  and Quirk, H (eds), Regulation 
and Criminal Justice: Innovations in Policy and Research (Cambridge University Press 2010); 61 
87Lea J and Hallsworth S, 'Bringing the State Back In: Understanding Neoliberal Security' in Squires, P and 
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management via interventionist, regulatory initiatives and punitive practices in the 
criminal justice process. As such, I argue that neoliberalism manifests itself in the 
policies that are applied at local level in order to effect that management.   
I begin by examining the evolution of neoliberal political ideas from the mid-
1940s. I will demonstrate how neoliberalism developed in response to crisis and 
became the dominant political agenda in the UK. I will then argue that a 
responsibilisation strategy led to the increased social marginalisation of defendants.  
Subsequently, I consider how the preference for market based practices led to the 
rise in popularity of managerialism and explain how this affected the criminal justice 
system. However, I am conscious that caution needs to be exercised to avoid 
overemphasising the influence of neoliberalism and hence I argue that other aspects 
of summary criminal justice also need to be considered before we can fully evaluate 
how neoliberalism has impacted upon summary criminal courts. 
The development of neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism developed in response to philosophical, sociological and 
economic concerns about collectivism and socialism.88 In 1937, the American Ǯǯ
would require minimal state intervention.89 Hamann later argues that neoliberalism 
developed as a critical response to interventionist forms of governmentality.90  
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The development of neoliberalism slowed once war broke out in 1939.91  
However, shortly after World War II, a group of economic theorists, journalists, 
publishers and think tank executives met near Geneva and formed the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, funded by economic institutions such as the Foundation for Economic 
Education.92 °ǲ-ǥǳǤ93  
One prominent neoliberal economist and member of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, Friedrich Hayek, was of the view that, because no agreement could be 
reached about how the allocation of state resources could alleviate the harmful 
effects of the market, there was not an appropriate basis for states to intervene in 
such outcomes.94 Neoliberals believe that the market is the best forum for co-
ordinating economic activity as the market represents choice and competitive 
economic efficiency,95 but they also accept that a degree of state intervention is 
necessary.96 Firstly, the state may need to intervene to create the conditions within 
which the market will operate. Those institutions which are governed by neoliberal ǲ characterised by strong private property 
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ǡǤǳ97 Once those frameworks have been created the 
state should avoid the regulation of business which would stifle entrepreneurialism 
and therefore advancement.98 It is through such (non-)intervention that ǲǤǳ99  Secondly, the state may need 
to intervene to protect institutional frameworks (by coercion if necessary)100 from 
the influences of socialism and collectivism. Those philosophies may pose a threat to 
the freedom of the market through what are considered to be unnecessary 
constraints on business objectives and free market trade such as price setting and 
employee rights.101 In post war continental Europe, Credit Suisse and the Volker 
Fund provided funding for the members of the Mont Pèlerin Society to cultivate and 
disseminate these ideas.102  
The philosophy of the post-war state in the UK 
The post war British state however took a different trajectory and was 
characterised by a welfarist ideology which capitalised on the sentiments of 
collective social responsibility promoted during the war.103 Under the welfarist 
approach to post-war government, social rights were delivered by agencies of the 
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state, such as the National Health Service.104  There was some recognition that social 
structural forces may fail weaker individuals (less educated, sicklier for example) 
rather than failure being a product of individual inadequacy,105 because, Rose 
argues, traditional liberalism had failed to cure the social problems caused by 
industrialisation106 such as class division, unplanned urban expansion and 
uncertainty over social responsibilities.   Keynes believed the role of the welfare ǲǳ107 which would ensure 
that everyone had an equal opportunity to participate in the market and therefore 
promote growth.   
The rationale was that by improving life chances via structural intervention 
such as improved access to education and healthcare, more people would be able to 
contribute usefully to society and, consequently, the well-being of society as a whole 
would improve.108  Welfarist approaches, I argue, advocated state facilitated social 
inclusion and citizenship programmes such as free education and free healthcare. 
Keynesian principles suggested that communities would flounder if there were no 
restriction on market practices that could run free across the globe without concern 
for local labour markets.109 Under welfarist techniques of governance social security 
could be enhanced and the risk of deviance could be reduced via state intervention 
in social domains such as education, health and employment. As such, specialist 
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professionals were viewed favourably as expert knowledge could assist in structural 
reform and social stability, as well as protect individuals from institutionalism.110   
It was therefore considered appropriate for state agencies to provide at least 
minimum levels of support for those who needed assistance in their socio-economic 
lives, which would thereby produce greater social cohesion.111 Legal aid developed 
as part of those principles from 1949, bolstered by the growing recognition that ǲfault of the individual who experienced Ǥǳ112 Thus the view of the criminal at this time was as someone who was a 
product of structural failings.  In this era, criminologists thought that crime could be 
remedied by state intervention in such domains as education, family and 
employment as criminologists attempted to understand the social features of the 
criminal.113 This view was however challenged when economic difficulty arose in the 
1970s. 
Welfarism in crisis. 
The existence of a significant range of social benefits requires government to 
manage the economic circumstances of the country in order to generate sufficient 
wealth to support the cost of social services.114 These developments were 
undermined when, coupled with relatively weak economic growth, 115  recession 
struck during the 1970s. This marked the beginning of a crisis in public confidence ǯ
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Ǥ	ǲ
comǥǤǳ116 Further, rifts developed within the Labour party as members ǯǤ117 The government 
had also agreed to costly measures to prevent strikes and had to make substantial 
cuts to the welfare state to avoid bankruptcy.118  
In the circumstances, the Conservative Party argued that the welfare state 
was both morally and politically bankrupt.119 The government fell into a period of 
crisis during which it lacked a consistent set of values120 and the ideals of Keynesian 
macroeconomics were called in question. In response to crisis in the welfarist state, 
structural approaches to the management of state institutions, including the criminal 
justice system, fell into disfavour. In its 1979 manifesto, the Conservative Party 
highlighted rising crime rates in the late 1970s and indicated that they would seek 
better crime prevention measures.121 Until this time, there had been little political 
argument about the institutions of criminal justice. This period marks a significant 
change in relation to criminal justice policy.  
As part of the post-war consensus that dominated British politics from 1945, ǡǲof the criminal process in Britain reflected a ǳǡ122 which meant that criminal 
justice issues tended to be politically non-contentious. The criminal justice system 
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was, for most of the twentieth century, regarǮǯ
with fundamental principles (rights, justice, and punishment) which governments 
were reluctant to challenge.123 This, alongside the belief that the state could facilitate 
social improvement, led to broad ideological agreement among the main political 
parties in terms of approaches to the criminal justice system.124 The ideological 
consensus was informed by positivist approaches which believed that scientific 
method, along with political will, could improve society.125  
 However, the Conservative Party called the efficacy of the social democratic ǡǲǡǳ126 the 
structural rehabilitative stance taken by leftist politics was seen as failing to prevent 
crime.127 Raine notes that between 1971 and 1984, nearly all types of offending were 
recorded as substantially increasing.128 This paved the way, from the 1980s, for 
punitive policies of deterrent incarceration to become popular in political rhetoric, 
as both major poliǲǤǳ129  Thus while post-1945 criminology assumed that criminal behaviour 
could be corrected, the late 1970s onwards saw the emergence of practices designed 
to control criminal behaviour by curbing rational choice. There was a move away 
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Ǯǯ130 Ǯǯ131 theories of 
behaviour.132 Garland notes that it was in the mid-1970s that the Conservative Party ǲction manifestos. Several elections ǥǡǤǳ133 These changes cause 
ǲ-partisan matter that can be 
devolved to professional experts and has become a prominent issue in electoral Ǥǳ134 
Crisis and the rise of neoliberalism 
As a result of the crisis of welfarism, of which rising crime rates were a 
feature, neoliberal ideas began to achieve political dominance via the Conservative 
manifesto which preceded the 1979 election.  The principles of the manifesto 
encouraged individual achievement via entrepreneurialism, privatisation of public 
services and restriction of state benefits tǮǯǤ135 Thatcher stated 
that she wanted to move politics away from theoretical issues while criticising the 
Labour party for being bound in arguments about political philosophy. Rather, she 
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wanted politics to focus on the way people wanted to live, drawing on the idea of ǯǤ136  
The Conservative manifesto argued that excessive state intervention had 
undermined the rule of law and individual liberty and had brought society to the ǲǳǤ137 It was against this background that Harvey described a 
huge transformation of global social and economic policy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.138 As such, even though the processes by which neoliberalism has been ǲntries been only partial, on the level 
of historical and economic facts it is possible to identify a worldwide neoliberal turn  ? ? ? ?Ǥǳ139  Due to differing state needs, the neoliberal movement that followed 
was experimental in nature.140 In the UK Thatcher, and later Blair, both appeared to 
have been influenced by both neoliberal and neoconservative principles141 in which 
market based practices, state regulation of publicly funded agencies, 
entrepreneurialism, individualisation and responsibilisation have become key 
features of political philosophy with little resistance from traditional left politics.142 ǲ
social realm using rational choice and cost-benefit calculations grounded on market 
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ǳ143 which presupposes that people possess the tools to be able to 
make a rational cost-benefit judgement in all aspects of their lives. Dilts argues that 
this view of homo economicus ǲ-economic analysis to be applied ǥǡǳ144 by promoting certain choices while 
discouraging others. However, Van Horn and Mirowski acknowledge that to place ǲǥ
to shape and execute public poǡǳ145  which is inconsistent with the idea of 
minimal state intervention that was originally proposed.  
The way in which neoliberalism developed leads Peck and Tickell to argue ǲn of 
competitive markets and individual freedoms, the reality of neoliberal programs is 
that they are typically defined by the tasks of dismantling those alien states and Ǥǳ146 As a result, Larner 
suggests that two forms of neoliberalism emerge147 which coexist but are 
contradictory. The first advocates free market principles and limited state 
involvement in public services and therefore advocates a roll back of state provided 
services, while the second allows the state to govern citizens at a distance via roll out 
of interventionist regulatory practices. Thus the state in fact imposes interventionist 
practices via policy initiatives in the institutions that remain under its control and 
uses a range of techniques (persuasion, enticement, coercion for example) to 
                                                          
143 Hamann T, 'Neoliberalism, Governmentality and Ethics' (2009) February(6) Foucault Studies 37; 37 
144 Dilts A, 'From 'Entrepreneur of the self' to 'Care of the self': Neoliberal Governmentality and Foucault's 
ethics' (2011) 12 (October) Foucault Studies 130; 131 
145 Van Horn, R and Mirowski, P, 'Neoliberalism and Chicago' in Emmett, R. (ed), The Elgar Companion to 
the Chicago School of Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2010); 199. See also Dean, J Democracy and 
Other Neoliberal Fantasies (Duke University Press 2009) 
146 Peck, J and Tickell, A, 'Conceptualizing neoliberalism. Thinking Thatcherism' in Leitner, H. Peck, J and 
Sheppard, E (ed), Contesting neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers (The Guildford Press 2007); 29 
147 Larner, W, 'Neo-ǣǡǡ
ǯ ?
<http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/view/6724/3723> accessed on 10 July 2011 
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encourage people to engage in the free market.148 It seems that neoliberalism has 
developed into an ideology that has become not just an economic doctrine but a way 
to regulate behaviour in order to deal with crisis. Taking this further, I argue that 
there are two main themes to the way that criminal justice policies altered following 
the rise of neoliberalism; the increased marginalisation of socio-economically 
disadvantaged members of society, from which group defendants in the criminal 
process are likely to come, and the increased use of managerial techniques to 
encourage efficiency in public services. 
Responsibilisation and attitudes to criminal behaviour   
Neoliberalism (and neo-conservatism) assumes that citizens are able to access 
resources for development equally, which means the criminal makes a choice to 
commit crime from a range of options.149 ǡǲ
person who invests in an action, expects a profit from it and accepts the risk of a 
lossǳ150 and must face the consequences of his/her actions. Criminals should not 
therefore necessarily expect state assistance with what is the outcome of poor 
decision making abilities. Furthermore, it is the criminal who is visible as tǲǡǤǳ151 Such 
attitudes mean that it is, I argue, possible to see how neoliberalism is ǲart of a strategy of governmentality which attempts to subject individuals to 
self-regulaǥǡǡ
                                                          
148 Dean M, 'Liberal Government and Authoritarianism' (2002) 31(1) Economy and Society 37. 
149 Dean, J Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies (Duke University Press 2009). See also O'Malley P, 
'Risk and Responsibility' in Barry, A. Osborne, T. Rose, N. (ed), Foucault and Political Reason. Liberalism, 
Neo-liberalism and Political Rationalities (UCL Press 1996). 
150 Oksala J, Foucault, Politics and Violence (Northwestern University Press 2012); 143 
151 Dean, J Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies (Duke University Press 2009); 67 
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intrusive way to neutralise the risk they represent by forcing them to modify Ǯ-ǯǤǯǯ152  
        Such intervention further divides a law abiding, self-reliant majority  ǲan ǡǡǥǤǳ153 Garland also notes that intrusion in the lower 
regions of social space directs crime control policies towards the exclusion, rather 
than re-integration, of those who appear to threaten neoliberal socio-economic 
policies.154 More intrusive practices have been used in attempts to manage the social 
division and instability created by the first phase of neoliberalisation.155 It is through 
such processes that welfare concerns about offending behaviour have been 
supplanted by functional interests in managing risk and protecting victims.156  ǯǲǳ157 
worsened the marginalisation of precariat groups from the late 1970s.  The welfare 
state was believed to be inefficient, to create a dependency culture which eroded any 
sense of social responsibility and to restrain the free market.158 During the late 
1970s and the 1980s,  ǲǡǥ
                                                          
152 Bell E, Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011); 9 
153 Faulkner D, 'Policy and Practice in Modern Britain: Influences, Outcomes and Civil Society' in Green, P 
and Rutherford, A (eds), Criminal Policy in Transition (Hart Publishing 2000). 
154 Garland D, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (University of 
Chicago Press 2002). 
155 Bell E, Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 
156 Bell E, Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
157 Stewart J, 'The Mixed Economy of Welfare in Historical Context' in Powell M (ed), Understanding the 
Mixed Economy of Welfare (Policy Press 2007); 28 
158Drakeford, M 'Private Welfare' in Powell, M. (ed), Understanding the Mixed Economy of Welfare (Policy 
Press 2007) 61Ǥ	ǡǲ
...rejected the notion that the state is all powerful and the citizen is merely its beneficiary; which shattered ǳȋǡThe 
Welfare State in Britain Since 1945 (2nd ed. Macmillan 1999); 3) 
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ǥ
between promise and expectation on the one hand, and cost, performance and Ǥǳ159  ǲ
frequent assertion that state welfare, by misallocating resources and sapping the will 
to workǡǤǳ160  As such, the Thatcher government 
advocated a shift from collective to individual responsibility. The unfortunate 
consequence of new limits placed on the welfare state and the shift towards 
individualism was that there remained a body of people who were unable or 
unwilling to cope with responsibilities that had, for years, been regarded as shared 
social obligations.161  
Welfare reform was also a significant feature of the New Labour manifesto, ǯ that left politics failed to adequately defend the 
idea that the state should provide for a minimum standard of living.162 Reform was Ǯǯǡǡ
which would help the economy and present the appearance of social justice.163 In 
                                                          
159 Feeley M, 'Crime, Social Order and the Rise of Neo-Conservative Politics' (2003) 7(1) Theoretical 
Criminology 111; 123 
160 Lowe, R The Welfare State in Britain Since 1945 (2nd edn Macmillan 1999); 299. However, in the UK, 
the social factors of an ageing population and high levels of unemployment meant that welfare spending 
in fact increased for a number of years despite a professed intention to reduce social spending (Lowe, R 
The Welfare State in Britain Since 1945 (2nd edn Macmillan 1999)). 
161 Drakeford M, 'Private Welfare' in Powell, M. (ed), Understanding the Mixed Economy of Welfare (Policy 
Press 2007). It should be noted however, as a result of social solidarities promoted since World War II, 
Thatcher faced struggles both from within political circles and from the general public in cutting welfare 
and promoting privatisation to the extent that had been originally intended (Peck, J and Tickell, A, 
'Conceptualizing Neoliberalism. Thinking Thatcherism' in Leitner, H. Peck, J and Sheppard, E (ed), 
Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers (The Guildford Press 2007)).  
162 Dean, J Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies (Duke University Press 2009). During her last 
parliamentary debate, Thatcher criticised the opposition for failing to offer any solid alternative policies 
while criticising those put forward by the Conservatives (--ǲǳMaggie: The First Lady. ITV3 
London 20 Jan 2012) 
163 Powell M, 'New Labour and the Third Way in the British Welfare State: A New and Distinctive 
Approach?' (2000) 20(9) Critical Social Policy 39. 
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essence, the new government of 1997 showed increasing, although not absolute, 
ideological consistency with its predecessor.164  While New Labour indicated that it 
wished to pursue policies that would reduce the rich/poor divide, Blair was also ǲ-for-ǳ165  and sought to ǮǯǤ166 As such, while 
Thatcher advocated state roll back, New Labour employed intervention to discipline 
those who did not engage with the system of reduced state funding in public Ǥǲǳǡ167 indicating the continued importance of individual 
responsibility to the new government. ǡ
 ? ? ? ?ǡǲ
part of a large majority of the public in the US and the UK that crime rates are getting ǥ of the criminal justice system to Ǥǳ168 In light of increased crime rates and falling public ǡǯ
rights had been given too much priority in recent years.169 In its 1997 manifesto, the ǲ
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165 Powell M, 'New Labour and the Third Way in the British Welfare State: A New and Distinctive 
Approach?' (2000) 20(9) Critical Social Policy 39;  41 
166 Powell M, 'New Labour and the Third Way in the British Welfare State: A New and Distinctive 
Approach?' (2000) 20(9) Critical Social Policy 39. 
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ǳ170 and consequently  sought to give greater priority to ǯǤ171 ǡǲǡ any risk 
related to public safety is not to be tolerated, thus those who put others at greater Ǥǳ172 Consequently, further intervention has been applied 
to precariat groups in order to manage the risk of social instability. 
As part of this process, and in its desire to be seen to support victims, New 
Labour created a number of new offences173 and introduced 34 statutes which have 
had a significant impact on criminal justice and procedure, compared to only six 
criminal justice statutes between 1925 and 1985.174 The effect of those statutes on 
criminal procedure is discussed in chapters four and Ǥǯǲǥnew emphasis upon effective crime enforcement and Ǥǳ175  ǡǯ
                                                          
170 The Labour Party. 'New Labour because Britain Deserves Better' (1997) <www.labour-
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ǲǡǡǮǯǤǳ176 The contemporary concern with 
risk also led to a resurgence of interest iǡǲǡǮǯǡǳ177 alongside increased police powers but 
decreased access to legal advice.178 ǯ resonate with neoliberal ideology in that, ǲǡǳ179 ǲ
deserve to inhabit it by building strong communities and exercising active Ǥǳ180 This adds an ethical dimension to individual 
behaviour.181 Thus the ideology of the third way sougǲǡǡǤǳ182 As Rutherford 
notes, responsibilisation is also about the state saying that it is not responsible for, 
and cannot be alone in effectively preventing crime.183 Consequently, not only were 
offenders to take responsibility for their behaviour, but communities were 
encouraged to take responsibility for risk. As such, the criminal justice system 
                                                          
176 Sanders A, 'What was New Labour thinking? New Labour's approach to criminal justice' in Silvestri, A. 
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ǲ ǡǤǳ184  ǯǡ
reconciliation of welfarist and punitive approaches to all social problems, allowed its 
criminal justice policies to become ever more interventionist during its time in 
power.185 This encouraged the use of coercive measures which threatened punitive 
sanctions for non-compliance with orders that required, for example, drug addicts or ǡǲǤǳ186   
It seems therefore that while New Labour did acknowledge the role of the state 
in assisting the poorest in society,  ǲ
themselves. Given that criminality was often cited as one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of the underclass, the responsibilisation of the poor was closely Ǥǳ187 
 It is this discourse which justifies the removal of traditional protections 
afforded to defendants in the criminal process - such as restrictions on publicly 
funded representation and the prioritisation of efficiency over due process goals.188 Ǯǯ189 process serves to separate the defendant from members of society 
and thereby increases their marginalisation as token players in the proceedings. I 
suggest that criminal justice procedures also demonstrate increasingly punitive 
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measures towards defendants who are required to take responsibility for the 
consequences of their actions. The notion that you can only receive support if you 
are also prepared to contribute to society190  justifies the restriction or removal of 
traditional due process protections afforded to those accused of committing criminal 
offences, as they are people accused of actǯ
interests. The focus on the responsibilisation of behaviour justifies undermining due 
process protections that have the potential to make prosecution more difficult and 
lengthier, and therefore more expensive.   
The incoming Coalition government of 2010 initially appeared to refocus 
concern on rehabilitation of offenders as a form of risk management. The 
government stated that it viewed crime as not just about numbers but also about 
social justice.191 The incoming government stated that it wanted to start a 
rehabilitation revolution,192 but this was set against a need to control state 
expenditure.193 The government sought rehabilitative measures via payment by 
results type schemes, which Silvestri refers to as the monetisation of 
rehabilitation.194 As such, and via the subsequent privatisation of parts of the 
Probation Service,195 the Coalition government demonstrated systematic 
commitment to free market principles. This reflects a continuing trend of contracting 
out services for the sake of competition and cuts in public spending although as, 
                                                          
190 Bell E, Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 
191 Silvestri, A. (ed) Critical Reflections: Social and Criminal Justice in the First Year of Coalition 
Government (Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2012) 
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Faulkner and Burnett note, the rate of change in relation to criminal justice is slower ǲǤǳ196 Austerity drives therefore appear to 
have added another dimension to governmental approaches to criminal justice. 
Furthermore, the government was keen to be seen as both tough on crime and 
to promote speedy summary case progression in the aftermath of the 2011 riots. 
These factors prompted a return to more neo-conservative Ǯtough on crimeǯ 
policies197 and provided extreme examples of speedy case progression.198  As Reiner 
noted at the end of the first year of Coalition government, the deregulation of 
markets under neoliberalism ǲ and deviance Ǥǳ199 Again, I argue, the response of 
government to the social dislocation produced by the initial roll back of the state has 
been to roll out ever more interventionist policies in an attempt to manage the risk 
of social instability.  
Increasing reliance is therefore placed on the criminal justice system to 
discipline the labour market, to segregate groups that threaten to destabilise socio-
economic order and to reinforce state authority and legitimacy.200 It seems that 
increasingly punitive strategies were not pursued by a neoliberal agenda in itself, 
but rather as an attempt to cope with the socio-political outcomes of 
neoliberalism.201 ǡǲ
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response ǡǤǳ202 The increasingly 
punitive nature of the criminal process in general is reactive rather than a scheme 
designed to segregate and discipline. Nevertheless, it has the effect of perpetuating 
the marginalisation of those accused of committing criminal offences and of casting 
defendants as responsible for their own situation and therefore undeserving of state 
funded assistance and protection. 
These issues lead me to the view that limitations applied to state funded 
services resulted in greater social dislocation, which required management via the 
agencies of the criminal justice system. I further argue that one way that 
governments have sought to achieve management, and cost control, is via efficiency 
drives based in managerial principles. 
The rise of managerialism in the criminal justice system 
As Tonry argues,203 it seems that while traditional views of criminal justice 
emphasise judicial independence from the executive and suggest that the 
management of financial resources should not affect judicial decision-making,204 
successive governments have placed efficient case progression at the core of their 
cost reduction strategy. Stenson and Edwards are of the view that governmental 
preference for management techniques has diverted attention from the traditional 
                                                          
202 Wacquant L, 'The wedding of workfare and prisonfare in the 21st century: responses to critics and 
commentators' in Squires, P and Lea, J (Eds), Criminalisation and advanced marginality. Critically 
exploring the work of Loic Wacquant (The Policy Press 2012); 245 
203 Tonry, M Punishment and Politics: Evidence and Emulation in the Making of English Crime Control Policy ȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ	ǡǲǤǳȋPadfield 
N, Text and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process (Oxford University Press 2008); 7) Indeed, the 
Attorney General recently asserted that the criminal justice system must modernise in order to reduce 
cost (Baksi C, 'Grieve spells out 'modernise or die' message' (2012) (10 May) Law Society Gazette 1). 
204 Rutherford, A Transforming Criminal Policy (Waterside Press, 1996). Laughlin also states that the ǲǳȋǡSword and Scales: An 
Examination of the Relationship Between Law and Politics (Hart Publishing 2000)). 
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welfare approach to criminal justice.205  ǲ
technical and practical problem needing an administrative and apolitical ǮǯǳǤ206   
ǯiency of the criminal justice system 
intensified as, under the Thatcher government, public services came to be seen as ǲǡǤǳ207 Subsequent governments therefore 
sought to impose intrusive forms of regulation.208 As a result of governmental ǡǲǡǳ209 thereby creating a 
performance management and audit culture.210 As Faulkner and Burnett note, the ǲ
deterioration in the performance of the criminal justice system, but higher Ǥǳ211 
Thus, as Jones argues, auditing has elevated the ǲǡǤǳ212 This means 
that, by focusing on value for money, political debate about what constitutes value in 
specific circumstances is increasingly ignored, including the value of access to 
                                                          
205 Stenson, K and Edwards, A, 'Policy Transfer in Local Crime Control: Beyond naïve emulation' in 
Newburn, T and Sparks, R (ed), Criminal Justice and Political Cultures (Willan Publishing 2004). 
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justice.213  ǯǲ ? ? ? ?ǥǡǤǳ214 Success was then 
redefǲ
reduction of crime but the internal assessment of the performance of the Ǥǳ215 Efficiency measures became increasingly important in the criminal ǲalism increased its influence over the courts in the late  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ǥǳ216  
Further, by increasing the level of scrutiny of agencies of the criminal justice 
system, co-operative working practices have been encouraged, which have 
weakened traditional adversarial boundaries despite the competing interests of 
courts, prosecutors and defence advocates.217 As will be seen in the following 
chapters, advocates have always tended to act in co-operative ways but Garland 
notes that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the desire to encourage advocates and the court 
to co-ǲǡǳ218 ǲǡ
an urgent, volatile pattern of policy develǤǳ219  However, the workings of 
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public institutions will be affected not only by top down policy but also by the 
struggle and subsequent improvisation that follows.220 The degree of co-operation ǯesire to increase 
efficiency via management techniques, which have encouraged greater routinisation 
of procedures. This is discussed further in chapters two and four. 
The idea of the executive managing workloads in criminal justice had been 
alien in most courts until at least the late 1980s but gradually permeated the system 
of state-led prosecution.221 In 1987 the Home Office produced a framework for 
statistics in summary criminal justice,222 while Bell and Dadomo note that, in 1989, it ǲsystem of summary justice was fairly haphazard, that courts ǡǤǳ223 Such 
initiatives were also driven by growing confidence in the ability of managerialism as ǲental concerns about the criminal justice system as just one 
more hopelessly inefficient and chaotic part of the public sector, and one in which 
the lack of a coherent framework was resulting in major fiscal waste."224 Following 
that assessment, the Lord ChaǯȋȌ
criminal courts from the Home Office in 1992 and introduced a system of funding 
based on efficiency.225 However funding schemes which result from performance 
                                                          
220 Larner, W, 'Neo-ǣǡ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create conflict between the requirements of managerialism and of justice226 because 
it had previously been accepted that the interests of justice might require a degree of 
delay, which will increase cost.227 
This trend towards managerialism continued after the election of New 
Labour in 1997, following which Garland commented that managerialism had ǲǡǳ228 ǲǥ
indicators and management measures have narrowed professional discretion and Ǥǳ229 As Jones noted in 1999ǡǲ
ascendant an ideology which wholly legitimates the pursuit of administratively Ǥǳ230 As such, New Labour introduced a 
series of policies designed to ensure efficiency in the criminal justice ǲǥ
that the imposition of a market-type model can deliver improvements in the quality Ǥǳ231 Falconer notes that New Labour professed a 
commitment to rejuvenating the criminal justice system and sought to focus less 
attention on socio-economic causes of crime,232 ǲǮǯǡǳ233 ǯ
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policy initiatives. Therefore, the way that neoliberalism responded to the crisis of 
perceived inefficiency in state funded institutions of criminal justice was to move 
away from reliance on professional expertise and to introduce increasingly intrusive 
regulatory practices.  
New LaboǮǯǲǤǤǤǳǡ234 and to create distance from the internal 
ideological struggles of the Labour party.235  Indeed, New Labour described itself as ǲǤǤǳ236 ǲ
evidence-led policies, Labour often ignored the evidence and listened to its political Ǥǳ237 Rose argues that the methods of government used by New Labour arose ǲÃǳ238 coupled with 
ingrained confidence in the strength of the free market.239 This was demonstrated by ǯǲǤǤǤǤǳ240 Ǯǯs of recession and 
rising crime rates under the preceding Conservative governments and the crisis 
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 ? ? ? ?Ǥǯ
market principles and responsibilisation strategies maintains its connection to 
neoliberal principles. ǯǡ ? ? ? ?ǡǯ
process.241 This was the beginning of a series of initiatives designed to increase 
efficiency in summary criminal justice, which had begun when Home Office minister 
Martin Narey was commissioned to conduct a review of delay in criminal 
proceedings. Narey was of the view that magistrates lacked the robust decision 
making skills required for effective case management.242 He suggested that more 
cases could be processed to conclusion in a single hearing and that Pre Trial Review 
hearings may alleviate the volume of ineffective trial listings that occurred.243   
Building on this, in 2001, former senior presiding judge, Sir Robin Auld 
conducted a review of procedures within the criminal courts.244 His review 
concluded that criminal court processes were inefficient, wasteful245 and in need of 
streamlining.  As a result of those concerns, Auld suggested that the parties should 
take a proactive and co-operative approach to case management, and was of the 
view that the widespread use of police administered cautions would make the 
criminal justice system more efficient by removing low level offending from the 
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245 Zander M, Cases and Materials on the English Legal System (Oxford University Press 2007). 
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ǯǤ246 ǯǯǢ ? ? ? ? Criminal Justice Act 
2003.  Bell and Dadomo note that the effects of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 on 
magistrǯǲǮǯǤǳ247 Efficiency, in this context, 
meant streamlining court procedures.248 ǯ
efficiency is synoǯǤ249 ǯ
2004 to provide advice about how to manage cases effectively and efficiently.250 A ǡǯǲ
which we deliver simpler, speedier justice for our communities. Cases take too long ǤǤǳ251 In 2006, the National Audit Office (ǮNAOǯ) ǯ to problems within the 
CPS.252 As will be seen in subsequent chapters, excessive burdens placed on 
                                                          
246 Auld, R. 'Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales: Executive Summary' (2001) 
<http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/auldconts.htm> accessed on 05 October 2008. The ǡǲ ? ? ? ?ǡad ǥǳȋǡCases and 
Materials on the English Legal System (Oxford University Press 2007); 257) 
247 Sanders A, 'Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 
324; 341 
248 Bell B and Dadomo C, 'Magistrates' Courts and the 2003 Reforms of the Criminal Justice System' 
(2006) 14(4) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 339. Further, provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 require defendants to provide the prosecution with full details of potential 
defence witnesses which could previously be kept from the prosecution until the trial. This change can be 
justified if the main concern of the criminal justice system is to ensure that cases are dealt with in a 
manner that is cost effective.  
249 Sanders A, 'Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 
324 
250 Department for Constitutional Affairs, 'Supporting Magistrates' Courts to Provide Justice' (Cm 6681, 
2005) 
251 Department for Constitutional Affairs, 'Supporting Magistrates' Courts to Provide Justice' (Cm 6681,  ? ? ? ?ȌǢ ?Ǥǲǡ-level cases that do 
not require ǳȋ
Constitutional Affairs, 'Supporting Magistrates' Courts to Provide Justice' (Cm 6681, 2005); 28).  
252National Audit Office, 'Effective use of Magistrates' Court hearings' (The Stationery Office 2006); 2. The 
NAO had earlier noted that the advent of the CPS had increased costs in the criminal justice system and 
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ǯǤ ? ? ? ?ǡ
confidence in the criminal process had fallen and this was ascribed to delays in the 
system.253  
 The concern to ensure efficiency was also manifest in the introduction of the ȋǤȌǤǲ
under constant pressure to avoid unnecessary hold-ups and to be especially wary of Ǥǳ254 Those rules require 
that the parties identify issues in the case at an early stage and place a duty on the 
court to actively manage cases.255  This reflects a shift in adversarial approaches to 
criminal justice, which would have previously allowed a defendant to simply make 
the prosecutor prove the case against him or her without disclosing the nature of his ǡǯǤ
shift beginning prior to the commencement of the Cr.PR, as reflected in the case of R 
Ȃv- Gleeson256 which identified a duty on the parties to ascertain issues in a case at an 
early stage in the proceedings, and asserted that the same duty did not conflict with 
rules which protected the defendant from self-incrimination, nor did it offend 
solicitor-client privilege. These measures have again increased co-operative working 
                                                                                                                                                                                    ǯȋǡ ?iminal 
Justice' (1993) 33 British Journal of Criminology 187) 
253 Morgan, R. 'Summary Justice. Fast - but Fair?' 
<www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/summaryjusticefastbutfair.html> accessed on 10 February 2012. 
254 Grove, T ǯ (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003); 49 
255 See also R - v- Chaaban [2003] EWCA Crim 1012. That duty extends to the defence, who the Court will 
now expect to indicate the likely issues at trial and confirm which parts of the prosecution case are not in ǲǥǳȋDPP Ȃv- Chorley Justices and Andrew Forrest [2006] EWHC 1795 at paragraph 
27).  
256 [2003] EWCA Crim 335 
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practices among the court workgroup and have prioritised efficient working 
practices over adversarial principles.257 ǡǯǡ
2006 and 2007 to try and combat perceived delay Ȃ Criminal Justice; Simple Speedy 
Summary (ǮCJ: SSSǯ).258 The policy sought to reduce the workload of magistrǯ
courts by advocating greater use of fixed penalty notices, cautions or warnings to 
rapidly conclude cases in which formal court proceedings were disproportionate.259 
Measures which diverted low level offending away from the court process were 
advocated on the basis of economic efficiency, but this approach does not recognise 
the procedural safeguards which are attached to the criminal court process, and 
evidence suggests that diversionary penalties are administered on occasions when 
behaviour would previously have merited no more than an informal warning.260 The ǲǤǳ261 Ashworth and Zedner do 
however express the view that diversionary methods might have a number of 
advantages for would-be defendants, such as avoiding the stigma of conviction,262 ǲǡ
                                                          
257 Cr.PR 3.2 explicitly states that the parties are expected to co-operate and assist the court (Ministry of 
Justice. 'Criminal Procedure Rules' (2011) < http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/criminal> accessed on 1 June 2012). 
258 Office for Criminal Justice Reform, Delivering Simple Speedy Summary Justice. An Evaluation of 
Magistrates Court Tests (2007) 
259 Zander M, Cases and Materials on the English Legal System (Oxford University Press 2007).  
260 Roberts, R and Garside, R. 'Punishment before Justice? Understanding Penalty Notices for Disorder' 
(2005) <http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/opus286/briefing1_march05.pdf> accessed on 16 February 
2012); Ashworth A and Zedner L, 'Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of 
Crime, Procedure and Sanctions' (2008) (2) Criminal Law and Philosophy 21). Instead, police officers are 
able to exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to issue a caution or penalty notice 
(Ashworth, A and Redmayne, M The Criminal Process (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2005)). 
261 Roberts, R and Garside, R. 'Punishment before Justice? Understanding Penalty Notices for Disorder' 
(2005) <http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/opus286/briefing1_march05.pdf> accessed on 16 February 
2012 
262 Ashworth A and Zedner L, 'Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of 
Crime, Procedure and Sanctions' (2008)(2) Criminal Law and Philosophy 21 
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arcane court proceedings, thereby freeing up the courts to deal more effectively with 
serious matters."263 Despite this, both the Police Federation and HHJ Cutler have 
expressed concerns about the blurring of roles within the criminal justice system, 
based on a desire to save money and yet record more crime as detected.264  
CJ: SSS discouraged adjournments at the first hearing, as all necessary 
documents should be with the court and the defence advocate before the hearing, 
thereby allowing appropriate advice to be given.265 There was some difficulty in 
reconciling this with simultaneous changes to legal aid provision which meant that 
funding for representation was uncertain, as is discussed in chapters three and six. ȋǮǯȌ
in favour of more active case management by the parties outside the court. 
CJ: SSS evolved via the introduction of streamlined processes, which were 
examined by the NAO in 2011. Subsequent to the streamlining initiative, the NAO 
reported that 53 per cent of police files reviewed failed to provide an adequate case 
summary.266 Further, some file supervisors indicated they had insufficient time to 
properly consider file preparation.267 These issues suggest that limiting cost in the 
name of efficiency has been at the expense of the sufficient provision of information.  
                                                          
263 Morgan R, 'Austerity, Subsidiarity and Parsimony: Offending Behaviour and Criminalisation' in 
Silvestri, A. (ed), Lessons for the Coalition: An End of Term Report on New Labour and Criminal Justice 
(Centre for Crime and Justice Studies 2010); 19 
264 Ryder M, 'Panorama: Assault on Justice' Stead, K. (ed) (British Broadcasting Corporation 2009). 
ǲǳȋ
ǡThe Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society 
(University of Chicago Press 2002); 19). The increased use of cautions may also be unpopular among the ǡǮǯȋǡ ?
cautions revealed' Kentish Gazette (2011) 2.) 
265 Office for Criminal Justice Reform, Delivering Simple Speedy Summary Justice. An Evaluation of 
Magistrates Court Tests (2007) 
266 National Audit Office, Crown Prosecution Service. The introduction of the Streamlined Process (2 
November 2011, Comptroller and Auditor General HC 1584, 2011) 
267 National Audit Office, Crown Prosecution Service. The introduction of the Streamlined Process (2 
November 2011, Comptroller and Auditor General HC 1584, 2011) 
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In essence, the provisions were designed to increase efficiency and reduce 
cost. However, as Jones predicted, justice may give way to speed as lawyers are 
given insufficient time to properly prepare cases.268 The courts have attempted to ǲǳǡ269 
the detail of which are discussed in chapter four. Generalised procedures direct the ǲn will seem Ǥǳ270 Consequentlyǡǲ-ǥǮǯǳǤ271 
Standardisation thus becomes a key feature of bureaucratisation.272  The result is 
that defendants are less able to play a distinct role in the proceedings, as is discussed 
in chapters two and four.  
Despite these difficulties, the 2009-2010 business plan for the criminal justice 
system continued to assert that the system should be simplified and thus made more 
efficient.273 The need to deal with cases efficiently was restated by the 
administrative court in Persaud Ȃv- DPP.274 The incoming Coalition government of 
2010 appeared to recognise that the criminal justice system had become very 
                                                          
268 Jones C, 'Auditing Criminal Justice' (1993) 33 British Journal of Criminology 187. 
269 Howard, G and Freilich, J, 'Durkheim's Comparative Model and Criminal Justice Theory' in Duffee, D 
and Maguire, E (ed), Criminal Justice Theory: Explaining the Nature and Behaviour of Criminal Justice 
(Routledge 2007); 61 
270 Hosticka C, 'We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What is Going to Happen: 
Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality' (1979) 26(5) Social Problems 599; 607 
271 Tepperman L, 'The Effect of Court Size on Organisation and Procedure' (1973) 10(4) The Canadian 
Review of Sociology and Anthropology 346; 346 
272 Tepperman L, 'The Effect of Court Size on Organisation and Procedure' (1973) 10(4) The Canadian 
Review of Sociology and Anthropology 346. 
273 Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 'Working Together to Cut Crime and Deliver Justice: Criminal Justice 
System Business Plan 2009-2010' (2007).  
274 [2010] EWHC 1682 (Admin). ǯȋȌ [1998] QB 110 also 
stressed the need for efficiency alongside fairness. These cases follow a long line of precedent including R 
Ȃv- Aberdare Justices (ex parte DPP) [1990] 155 JP 324, R (ex parte Walden and Stern) Ȃv- Highbury Corner 
ǯ [2003] EWHC 708 and CPS Ȃv- Picton [2006] EWHC 1108. Similarly, these cases have 
reinforced a requirement for the defence to co-operate with the prosecution process. See, for example, 
Malcolm-v- DPP (2007) EWHC 363 (Admin). 
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bureaucratic, but felt that this resulted from fragmented working patterns, rather 
than from change brought about by political decision making.275 This reaction must 
also be placed in the context of the public spending crisis, leading to further distrust 
of professional behaviour in state funded institutions and austerity measures. In 
essence, the new government of 2010 continued to pursue a desire to increase the ǯǤ
further in relation to legal aid in chapter three. 
Building on the CJ: SSS initiative, the Ministry of Justice introduced the Stop 
Delaying Justice! policy in 2012. The policy documents criticise the judiciary for 
failing to properly implement CJ: SSS,276 even though the number of hearings per 
case had reduced and the speed at which cases were progressed had increased.277 
One of the key provisions of the initiative is that case management should occur at 
the first hearing. Riddle noted that lawyers were concerned that legal aid 
applications would not be processed in sufficient time for the first hearing, that 
adequate prosecution case papers would not be available and that trying to conduct 
case management at too early a stage in the proceedings could breach lawyer-client 
privilege if instructions are unclear.278 Waddington goes on to describe the position ǯǡ
principles, as follows: ǲ
court. Within a short period of time thereafter, the defendant (in person or 
                                                          
275 Ministry of Justice, Swift and Sure Justice: The Government's Plans for Reform of the Criminal Justice 
System (Ministry of Justice Command Paper CM 8388, 2012) 
276 --, 'Stop Delaying Justice!' (Delegate pack edn 2011). 
277 --, 'Stop Delaying Justice!' (Delegate pack edn 2011). 
278 Riddle H, 'Advancing the case for swift action' (2012) (18 October) Law Society Gazette 32. The cases 
of Firth Ȃv- ǯ [2011]EWHC 388 (Admin) and R Ȃv- Rochford [2010] EWHC 1928 
have effectively undermined this claim. 
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through his lawyer) is required to: identify the issues in the case (in effect ǯ
to have the best or any chance of success); identify which prosecution witnesses 
are required to attend at trial (explaining why this should be permitted by the 
court); give an adequate account of his defence; identify his witnesses (at least 
in general terms) and be able to give a time estimaǤǳ279 
By April 2012 defence lawyers complained that service of evidence was inadequate 
but defendants were still expected to enter a plea.280 Interviewees voiced similar 
concerns during the course of empirical research, as discussed in chapter four. 
All of the above initiatives have been designed to ensure a speedy through-ǯǡ
public services.281 Management techniques were employed in light of the political 
crisis engendered by the perceived inefficiency of state funded services. However, 
Carlen,282 Bottoms and McClean283 and McBarnet284 had earlier noted that summary 
proceedings were often conducted at speed, which left defendants confused. 
Measures designed to increase speed are likely to leave more defendants more 
confused.  The Law Society has recently voiced its concern that, by placing emphasis 
on speed, the courts risk increasing the likelihood of miscarriages of justice.285 It 
                                                          
279 Waddington B, 'Rules of Engagement. Stop Delaying Justice!' (2012)(29 November) Law Society 
Gazette 21; 22 
280 Cave, R 'Lawyers Claim New Policy Causes Miscarriages of Justice' <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
17690404> accessed on 14 April 2012. 
281 Other initiatives are also being pursued to streamline proceedings, such as the use of virtual courts 
and greater reliance on technology (Baksi C, 'Lawyers Must Embrace IT, Says Minister' (2013) (25 
February) Law Society Gazette 3; Ministry of Justice. 'Criminal Justice System Efficiency Programme' 
(2012) <http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/justice/transforming-justice/criminal-justice-efficiency-
programme> accessed on 2 December 2012). 
282 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
283 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
284 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981). 
285 Baksi C, 'Speeding up cases 'risks miscarriages'' (2012) (29 November) Law Society Gazette 3. 
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ǯ ability to improve efficiency rather 
than their ability to improve access to justice. 
Further, when implementing those schemes, Waddington notes that it is 
impossible to fully engage all of the agencies of criminal justice, each of which have 
their own working methods that they seek to preserve.286 We therefore begin to see Ȁǯ
experience of the criminal justice system, because the way in which initiatives are 
actually implemented is dependent on the behaviour of courts and advocates. As 
ǡǲǤǳ287 The tendency of 
criminal justice professionals to adapt and interpret rules so that they are congruent 
with situationally appropriate behaviour had previously been noted by Carlen.288 I 
intend, in subsequent chapters, to demonstrate how the courtroom workgroup has 
adapted to demands for efficiency.  
Nevertheless, the government pursues its desire to increase the speed at which 
cases are processed in the belief that the criminal justice system habitually tolerates 
delay.289 ǯ ? ? ? ?
causing delay in the system,290 despite the fact that, as the Law Society pointed out, 
                                                          
286 Waddington B, 'Rules of Engagement. Stop Delaying Justice!' (2012)(29 November) Law Society 
Gazette 21. 
287 Garland D, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (University of  ? ? ? ?ȌǢ ? ?Ǥ
ǲǡble actors ǡǳȋ

D, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (University of Chicago Press 
2002); 26) 
288 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). This was an issue that was explored as part of 
the primary research, and is considered further in subsequent chapters.  
289 Ministry of Justice, Swift and Sure Justice: The Government's Plans for Reform of the Criminal Justice 
System (Ministry of Justice Command Paper CM 8388, 2012) 
290 Ministry of Justice, Swift and Sure Justice: The Government's Plans for Reform of the Criminal Justice 
System (Ministry of Justice Command Paper CM 8388, 2012) 
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 ǲǤ
been subject to significant reductions in legal aid fees, and are paid on the basis of a 
fixed, standard or graduated fee scheme for criminal cases. The incentive on them is Ǥǳ291 
The government therefore expressed its wish to increase efficiency even ǲ
discretioǯǤǳ292 It seems that one by-product of neoliberal efficiency ǯǤǡ
individual responsibility promoted by neoliberal governments limits the ability to 
challenge that outcome.  
Conclusion ǯ
demonstrates that neoliberalism emerged in response to political crisis in the 
welfare state. Thatcher believed that the welfare state had undermined individual 
responsibility for development in the socio-economic world and therefore advocated 
the roll back of state funded services. This had the effect of further marginalising 
precariat groups, including defendants. The philosophy also demonstrated 
commitment to market based principles via managerial techniques designed to 
improve efficiency in light of suspicion about the effectiveness of public services.  
                                                          
291 The Law Society, Response of the Law Society of England and Wales to 'Swift and Sure Justice: The 
Government's Plans for Reform of the Criminal Justice System' (The Law Society, 2012). The fact that the 
legal aid funding regime encouraged efficient working practices is discussed in chapter 3. 
292 Ministry of Justice, Swift and Sure Justice: The Government's Plans for Reform of the Criminal Justice 
System (Ministry of Justice Command Paper CM 8388, 2012); 5 
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As the philosophy advanced, crisis developed in terms of managing the risk of 
social instability created by the first, roll back, phase of neoliberalism. This 
prompted subsequent governments to introduce more interventionist, regulatory 
measures in order to manage threats of crime and anti-social behaviour, particularly ǯǤ
measures have contributed to the process of marketisation, which has resulted in 
the further marginalisation of precariat groups. All of the above demonstrates that ǯǡǡ
contradictory system of governance. Those complexities have resulted in a system 
which exacerbates the marginalisation of defendants and their inability to 
participate in the criminal justice system. ǡǡǯ
experiences of the summary criminal justice system. There are other rationalities 
and practices that will also have an impact on defendantǯǡǯǤ
therefore turn to consider the practices of those professionals who are in a position 
to potentially challenge government demands for efficiency and intervention, or, in 
other words, the culture of the court workgroup.  
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Chapter 2: The Culture of Summary Criminal Justice 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the findings of socio-legal studies which have 
considered the behaviour of professionals who work in criminal courts in order to 
identify the ways in which workgroup culture and the agency of actors within the ǯǤ
in public institutions presents a possible challenge to the implementation of policy 
designed to execute political philosophy, although many of the significant studies of 
summary criminal justice predate the neoliberal political turn. Processes of cultural 
adaptation to political policy have the potential to affect levels of marginalisation 
experienced by defendants, and to affect their ability to participate effectively in the 
proceedings. Ǯǯ
referring to the organisational culture of magistratǯǤ293 The term was 
proposed by Eisenstein and Jacob294 to assist in explaining how low level courts 
make decisions. The professional courtroom workgroup consists of magistrates, 
court clerks (also known as legal advisers),295 prosecutors, defence advocates and Ǥǡǲ
                                                          
293 See, for example, Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 
Common Law World Review 203. 
294 Eisenstein. J and Jacob. H, Felony Justice: An Organisational Analysis of Criminal Courts (Little Brown 
1977). 
295 There are different types of court legal adviser Ȃ ǯǤe a ǯǡ ?ǯǤ
a member of the legal profession but are required to have undergone alternative training.  
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Ǥǳ296 Those boundaries may be interrupted by 
political policies that attempt to alter workgroup practices. The courtroom therefore 
becomes a potential site for struggle as actors negotiate the nature of their role 
within the proceedings. Once equilibrium is reached, the introduction of external 
pressures (such as efficiency drives) has the potential to upset the negotiated 
relationships as the site of struggle changes.297 
Successive studies have however demonstrated that the culture of ǯǤ
of summary justice have proved enduring despite significant political change. Thus it 
appears that the professional actors who participate in the criminal justice process ǯ
maintained, despite being subject to increasingly politicised intervention since the 
1970s. Therefore, although the demands placed on, and the composition of, the 
workgroup may have changed, some features of summary criminal justice remain 
constant.  ǯ
have a signifiǯǢ
networks that operate among court personnel and the speed at which cases 
progress. Following the neoliberal turn, the exclusion of defendants has been 
exacerbated by the political othering of prǤǮǯ
attitudes operate to strengthen the pre-existing court personnel networks from 
                                                          
296 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203; 218 
297 Young argues that change is most likely to be achieved by disrupting the relationships that constitute 
the workgroup itself because this would cause the most disturbance to pre-existing practices (Young R, 
'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World Review 
203). 
  
83 
 
which the defendant is excluded. Secondly, neoliberal demands for efficiency have 
increased the speed at which proceedings take place, which further undermines the 
ability of defendants to participate in a meaningful way.  
Those two features interact to limit the ability of defendants to effectively 
participate in the process, as is set out more fully in chapters four, five and six. In 
order to demonstrate this, I begin with a brief explanation of the nature and ǯ
workgroups within models of adversarial justice. Several commentators have 
suggested models of the criminal process298 which are useful to provide descriptions 
of overarching issues in summary criminal justice. I then move on to conduct an ǯeir effects on 
defendants.  
Magistrates and models of adversarial justice 
The criminal justice process exists to determine whether a person accused of 
committing a criminal offence is to be found guilty of the crime and, if so, what their 
punishment ought to be.299  ǡǲe 
most explicit coercive apparatus of the state and the idea that police and courts can 
interfere with the liberties of citizens only under known law and by means of due 
                                                          
298 In addition to those offered by Packer, King suggested a further six models of the criminal justice 
system (King M, The Framework of Criminal Justice (Croom Helm 1981)). Two of those models Ȃ the 
justice model and the punishment model Ȃ ǯ
crime control models. The third model is one of rehabilitation which relies on the expertise of 
professionals who will consider appropriate methods of diagnosis and treatment. The fourth model is the 
bureaucratic model, which is concerned with the management of crime and of criminals. The fifth model 
focuses on the necessity to degrade the criminal and is called the status passage model. Finally, the power 
model concerns itself with the maintenance of class domination.  
299 ǯǲǳȋǡ'Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report' (2002) 29(2) Journal of 
Law and Society 324; 325)  because the burden of proof applied in criminal trials is whether the Crown 
has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, not what the adjudicators believe the truth to be.  In R Ȃv- 
Gleeson [2003] EWCA 3357, Auld LJ described a criminal trial as a search for the truth, but added caveats 
in relation to the burden and standard of proof. 
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Ǥǳ300 
The processes by which guilt is determined and punishment imposed operate within 
limits set by law301 which are designed to prevent both unfair treatment and 
wrongful conviction. Sanders is of the view that the priority given to acquitting the 
innocent is manifest in the existence of rules designed to ensure due process such as 
the burden and standard of proof and rules about the admissibility of evidence.302    
 However, the simple existence of rules may not be sufficient to protect accused 
people from the devaluation of due process provisions because, as Bourdieu notes, 
law operates in a field of practice within which professionals use established 
procedures to resolve any conflict that may arise303 ǲpolitics of the 
profession which exercises its ǳǤ304 The 
courtroom operates via rituals which are executed on a daily basis by the 
professionals who work therein.305 It is via such procedures that the cultural 
practice of law evolves in criminal courts, and such practices affect the way that Ǥǲ
to manipulate justice exists; what does exist are the shared understandings of ±ǳ306 ǲué Ǥǳ307  
                                                          
300 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981); 8 
301 Sanders, A and Young, R, Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2007). 
302 Sanders A, 'Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 
324 
303 Bourdieu P, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38(July) The Hastings 
Law Journal 805; 816. Emphasis in original.  
304 Bourdieu P, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38(July) The Hastings 
Law Journal 805; 806 
305 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
306 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976); 55 
307 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976); 55 
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There are a number of actors in the courtroom workgroup, the most 
prominent of which are magistrates, clerks or legal advisers, prosecutors and 
defence advocates. However, before considering how these actors affect the 
operation of summary justice, it is important to acknowledge the local nature of ǯǤ
courtroom workgroup will affect its stability308 and, I suggest, the extent to which 
advocates are prepared to risk damaging relationships which, in turn, affects the ǯǤǡ
workgroup which had low levels of familiarity among members, there was a greater 
number of contested cases and less emphasis on negotiation than in courtroom 
workgroups which they regarded as stable and familiar.309  ǯ
workgroup culture, and Young notes that the local context can varǲǳǡ310 previous socio-legal scholars have 
identified some features of courtroom culture that appear to be of general relevance ǯǤǡdges ǲǡǤǳ311 There are therefore ǯǤ
order to understand the way that summary justice operates, each of these subgroups 
                                                          
308 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203. 
309 Eisenstein. J and Jacob. H, Felony Justice: An Organisational Analysis of Criminal Courts (Little Brown 
1977). ǲworks of friendship that ǳȋTepperman L, 'The Effect of Court Size on Organisation and Procedure' (1973) 10(4) 
The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 346; 364) that may arise. 
310 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203; 204 
311 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203; 217 
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is considered in turn alongside an examination of models of summary criminal 
justice. ǯ
magistrates themselves. While it was historically desirable for magistrates to be 
legally qualified,312 professional legal qualification is no longer necessary.313 This led ǲ
without training who could not ǳǤ314 Magistrates are 
also frequently criticised for failing to represent various socio-cultural groups,315 in ǲǡǳ316 and disproportionately represents those who are retired.317  
Clements asserts that, because they are not socially representative, magistrates have ǲȋȌǥǥerience of what it is like to be Ǥǳ318 There thus exist different socio-cultural ǲ
overwhelmingly socio-economically disadvantaged defendants appearing before 
                                                          
312 Davies M, 'A New Training Initiative for the Lay Magistracy in England and Wales - A Further Step 
Towards Professionalisation?' (2005) 12(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 93 
313 Davies M, 'A New Training Initiative for the Lay Magistracy in England and Wales - A Further Step 
Towards Professionalisation?' (2005) 12(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 93 
314 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976); 89 
315 Morgan R, 'Magistrates: The Future According to Auld' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 308; 
Darbyshire P, 'For the New Lord Chancellor - Some Causes for Concern About Magistrates' (1997)(Dec) 
Criminal Law Review 861 
316 Davies M, 'A New Training Initiative for the Lay Magistracy in England and Wales - A Further Step 
Towards Professionalisation?' (2005) 12(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 93 
317 Morgan R, 'Magistrates: The Future According to Auld' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 308; 
Darbyshire P, 'For the New Lord Chancellor - Some Causes for Concern About Magistrates' (1997)(Dec) 
Criminal Law Review 861 
318 Clements L, 'Little Justice - Judicial Reform and the Magistrates' in Thomas, P (ed), Discriminating 
Lawyers (Cavendish 2000); 207. As Carlen noted in 1976, magistrates interpretation of legal and social ǲ-existent regulativǳȋǡ
Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976); 100) 
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Ǥǳ319 This means that defendants are likely to be viewed by the Bench as a 
different category of citizen to its members and the professional workgroup that 
operates in court.  ǡǯǡ ? ?
per cent more defendants following trial and imprison more people (both on remand 
awaiting case resolution and when sentencing) than Crown court judges.320 
Research indicates that magistrates often require defendants to prove their 
innocence, contrary to the legal burden of proof, 321 and despite specific training 
about the importance of the burden and standard of proof.322 Magistrates are also 
criticised for inconsistent decision making, but Davies suggests that this can be 
addressed by increased training and provision of guidelines,323 the supply of which 
is discussed later, in chapter five. ǯǡǮ-ǯǤ324 Sanders notes that magistrates "regard 
defence solicitors as representing a particular viewpoint, but see the Crown ȋȌǥǡ
the adversarial system as enthusiastically as most defence solicitors do their 
                                                          
319 Sanders, A Community Justice. Modernising the Magistracy in England and Wales (Institute of Public 
Policy Research, 2000); 11 
320 Sanders A, 'Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 
324; 328 
321 Sanders A, 'Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 
324; 328. See also Darbyshire P, 'For the New Lord Chancellor - Some Causes for Concern About 
Magistrates' (1997) (Dec) Criminal Law Review 861 and Sanders, A Community Justice. Modernising the 
Magistracy in England and Wales (Institute of Public Policy Research, 2000) 
322 Grove, T ǯ (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003) 
323 Davies M, 'A New Training Initiative for the Lay Magistracy in England and Wales - A Further Step 
Towards Professionalisation?' (2005) 12(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 93 
324 Mulcahy A, 'The Justifications of `Justice': Legal Practitioners' Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements 
in Magistrates' Courts' (1994) 34(4) British Journal of Criminology 411; 420 
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Ǥǳ325 Darbyshire also notes that ǲ
witnesses. Research and commentaries on this point all substantiate this defence ǯǤǳ326 Bottoms and McClean noted similar concerns which meant that ǯently thorough.327  
Magistrates are further described as processing cases at high volume, with Ǥǯǯǡefficient 
disposal of cases is the paramount concern. The model anticipates high numbers of 
guilty pleas that can be dealt with swiftly. The criminal justice system is regarded as 
inherently able to process a large number of early guilty pleas because preliminary 
controls can be trusted to adequately discard weak or inappropriate prosecutions.328 ǯǡ329 
which concerns itself with the power of the state versus the power of the individual, 
and is ǲǤǳ330 Quality control means ensuring strict 
compliance with the rule of law, the burden and standard of proof and the ǯǤǡ
advocates infrequently raise due process issues.331 Atiyah observes that the due 
process model establishes an adversarial obstacle course which the prosecution 
must take time to complete in order to maintain a just system.332 Despite this 
                                                          
325 Sanders, A Community Justice. Modernising the Magistracy in England and Wales (Institute of Public 
Policy Research, 2000); 33 
326Darbyshire P, 'For the New Lord Chancellor - Some Causes for Concern About Magistrates' (1997)(Dec) 
Criminal Law Review 861; 871 
327 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976) 
328 Roach K, 'Four Models of the Criminal Process' (1999) 89 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 671. 
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rhetoric, McBarnet noted many years ago that magǯǲǤǳ333 Galligan also observes that due 
process considerations do not appear to be supported by firm legal rules (for 
example, the right to silence under police questioning is not absolute) or by legal 
practice itself.334 I shall discuss the culture of practitioners below.  ? ?ǯ
courts,335 legally qualified district judges (formerly known as stipendiary 
magistrates) also sit in summary criminal proceedings. Morgan and Russell, and 
Sanders, are of the view that district judges are more efficient336 than lay justices337 
and apply legal rules more fairly.338 Darbyshire reports that district judgeǯǲ
style was characterised by speed, command and readiness to challenge CPS ȋȌǤǳ339 District judges make 
greater use of custody than magistrates do, but this may be a result of the fact that 
they tend to hear the most serious caǯǤ340 ǲǥǡ
                                                          
333 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981); 143 
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337 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ǡCases and 
Materials on the English Legal System (Oxford University Press 2007); 21) while Morgan and Russell note 
that district judges deal with 22 per cent more cases than lay Benches in a standard court session, and 
this is not at the expense of inquisition and challenge, and there are fewer adjournments before district 
judges. (Morgan, R and Russell, N. 'The Judiciary in the Magistrates' Courts' (2000) 
<library.npia.police.uk/docs/homisc/occ-judiciary.pdf> accessed on 08 February 2012). By 2002, Morgan 
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(2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 308). 
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more efficient and consistent in their decision-Ǥǳ341 As a result, defence 
lawyers prepare cases more thoroughly and do not make unrealistic submissions to 
district judges that they might attempt when addressing lay magistrates.342 District 
judges are however a more costly option than magistrates, because magistrates are 
volunteers.343 
Whether a district judge or a lay Bench is sitting, the court is assisted by a 
clerk or legal adviser who provides advice to unqualified, or lay, magistrates,344 and 
assumes a more administrative role when a district judge is hearing cases. ǯǡ ? ? ? ?ǲǯǡǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥǳ345  Sanders also notes that ǯ-making processes.346 In ǡǯǲǯt of ǥǤǳ347 
Astor further notes that clerks tended to place greater importance on compliance 
                                                          
341 Dennis I, 'Judging Magistrates' (2001) (Feb) Criminal Law Review 71; 71. See also Morgan R, 
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with rules as opposed to ensuring that defendants understood the process.348 As 
such, defenǲǤǳ349  ǯ
bureaucratic model of summary criminal justice, which is a hybrid of the crime 
control and due process models.350 ǡǯǡǲǳ351 agree that there is a 
need for formal procedures which ensure justice is seen to be done, but also require 
restricted protections so that the system does not become over-burdened and 
collapse.352  The system of a reduction in sentence in exchange for entering an early 
guilty plea (formalised by s.144 Criminal Justice Act 2003) is an example of the 
liberal bureaucratic model in operation353 because it offers an inducement to plead ǯǤ
encourage swift case progression, which has become increasingly important to 
governments since 1979.  
Packer354 was astute to acknowledge that any criminal justice system is likely 
to display features of more than one model at any point in time. The fact that it is 
hard to identify a single dominant model indicates that relationships between 
criminal law, criminal justice and politics are not clear-cut. Broad themes can 
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Magistrates' Courts' (1986) 13(2) Journal of Law and Society 225; 233 
350 Bottoms A and McClean J Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976) 
351 Bottoms A and McClean J Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976); 228. Darbyshire would 
probably disagree with this statement given her comments about court clerks/legal advisers below 
(Darbyshire P, 'A Comment on the Powers of Magistrates' Clerks' (1999)(May) Criminal Law Review 377) 
352 Bottoms A and McClean J Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976) 
353 Atiyah P, Law and Modern Society (Oxford University Press 1995) 
354 Packer H, The Limits of Criminal Sanction (Oxford University Press 1968) 
  
92 
 
however be identified, which are likely to reflect political approaches to criminal Ǥǲ ? court 
is an institution rhetorically functioning to perpetuate the notion of possible justice 
in a society whose total organisation is directed at the maintenance of the capitalist ǡǤǳ355 As such, the rhetoric of summary 
justice differs from its practice ǡǯǡ  ǲǣ
ideological function of displaying the rhetoric of justice in action by being tipped 
(visibly) in favour of due process and the accused, (and) the pragmatic function 
of crime control by being tipped (invisibly) but decisively in favour of Ǥǳ356  
These observations demonstrate that socio-legal scholars of the 1970s and 1980s 
viewed summary justice as performed by institutions in which little regard was ǯǤ ǯ-legal study 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, contrary to Bourdieu, who considered that 
the field of legal practice was characterised by resistance and competing forms of 
professional judgement,357 ǯ
of co-operation and negotiation among personnel, particularly among advocates.   
Defendant experiences and the culture of summary justice 
In 1976, Carlen argued that the culture of summary justice operates to prevent 
defendants from being able to engage properly in the criminal justice process. There 
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are three major contributory factors to this assessment. Firstly, the volume of ǯǤ
Secondly, defendants lack understanding about legal rules and procedures and, 
thirdly, professional participants are concerned to preserve their own roles within 
the criminal justice system.  
It should be noted that, when some significant studies of summary justice 
were conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s, defendants were normally 
unrepresented.358 Unrepresented defendants were unaware of the relevant legal 
rules, and often silenced by magistrates who would not take the same tactical or 
professional routes to cross-examination as a defence advocate.359 ǲ
paradox of a legal system which requires knowledge of procedural propriety in 
making a case, and a legal systǤǳ360 Carlen had earlier ǯ
unfamiliar to normal social settings, such as the appropriate use of particular forms 
of language.361 These factors, combined with nervousness, might have a paralysing 
effect on unrepresented defendants.362  
Since the mid- ? ? ? ?ǡǯ
increased so that the vast majority of defendants appearing there are now legally 
represented.363 This coincides with the professionalisation of summary justice. 
Prosecutions are now conducted by lawyers, rather than police officers, and there 
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360 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981); 124 
361 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
362 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
363 See, for example, Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
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are more defence advocates in court. Therefore, while the English and Welsh system 
is unique in its use of lay justices, the workgroup has become increasingly Ǥǯ
since the 1970s364 ǲǡ
remove the defendant from active engagement in the cǤǳ365  
In the studies of the 1970s and 1980s,366 there was an implicit argument that 
if defendants were legally represented, fewer of the difficulties identified might exist ǯnd enhance ǯǤǡ
was concerned that the provision of defence advocates would not, of itself, alleviate 
problems with summary justice, but rather a cultural shift would be necessary to ǯ
courts.367 McBarnet also thought that, because the institutions of criminal justice are 
workplaces, they create networks and routines that the defendant is not a part of368 
and therǲǯǤǤǤǳǤ369  ǯ
evidence suggests thǡǲ
work for outsiders. It is a ǯ ǡǤǳ370 ǡǯ
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that there remains a strong culture of co-ǯ
advocates which continues to marginalise defendants from proceedings. 
Prosecutors and defence advocates; Networks and co-operation 
Defending and prosecuting advocates have particular roles but those roles are 
constrained by a broader pattern of courtroom procedure. As Snipes and Maguire ǡǲǡ
and are formally arranged in an adversarial relationship, they often bind together in Ǥǳ371  The networks that operate to form 
court workgroup culture develop as a result of the existence of shared goals among 
the workgroup members. The goals that exist may provide symbolic meaning to 
activities (such aǮǯȌ
may exist to ensure the smooth functioning of the proceedings (that is, expeditious 
case handling and controlling uncertainty).372 This analysis, while useful, is not 
necessarily straightforward because different types of goal may come into conflict. ǡǮǯ
groups, but also for most defence solicitors 
 ǲǤǤǤ them only 
modest fees...and a fast aggregate turnover is the only way to make a living 
and/or to cope with the caseload. At the same time their institutional and 
market position requires them to maintain a reputation for effective Ǥǳ373 
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As such, while instrumental goals of reducing uncertainty and dealing with 
cases expeditiously are usually complementary, the goals of maintaining group Ǯǯǡ
between crime control and due process may vary on a case by case basis. This leads ǲǳ374 and so to Ǯǯsleading, although I will continue to use the 
term here.  
In an attempt to meet the court workgroup objectives of maintaining cohesion, Ǯǯǡǡ
commonly used to accommodate the wishes of those who are partially dependent on 
each other to ensure expeditious case progression.375 ǡǯ
study commented that there is a need to co-operate to ensure swift case 
progression.376 Furthermore, there exist specific provisions, such as the disclosure of 
initial prosecution evidence and Pre Trial Review Hearings that are designed to ǡǡǯǲǤǳ377 The Criminal 
Procedure Rules encourage further co-operative practices (as discussed in chapter 
one) to assist negotiation in terms of identifying the matters in issue and relevant 
witnesses. As such, courtroom behaviour is characterised by high degrees of 
                                                          
374Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203; 210. This is a significant point to remember in the context of interviewing advocates about 
their actions.  
375 Eisenstein. J and Jacob. H, Felony Justice: An Organisational Analysis of Criminal Courts (Little Brown 
1977). 
376 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
377 McConville M, Sanders A and Leng R, The Case for the Prosecution (Routledge 1991); 6 
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nǲǤǳ378 ǯǯǲ ǥǥǤǳ379 In 
seeking to employ various legal rules, Carlen noted the existence of an 
uncomfortable compromise between court personnel.380 Similarly, Sudnow reported 
a high degree of interaction and negotiation among prosecuting attorneys and public 
defenders in American criminal courts.381 Thus, during an adversarial hearing, the ǲ
yet, at the same time, not permanently jeopardise the stability of their usual team Ǥǳ382  
One way in which the networks manifest themselves (and interact with a 
desire for speedy case progression) is via the use of plea negotiations.383 Newman 
noted that most defence advocates tended to consult prosecutors about cases before 
speaking to their clients.384 While plea negotiations may place undue pressure on ȋǡǲǳ385 for entering 
an early guilty plea and the provisions which allow for an advance indication of 
                                                          
378 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203;229 
379 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976); 10 
380 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
381 Sudnow D, 'Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office' (1965) 
12(3) Social Problems 255 
382 Sudnow D, 'Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office' (1965) 
12(3) Social Problems 255;275 
383 Mulcahy A, 'The Justifications of `Justice': Legal Practitioners' Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements 
in Magistrates' Courts' (1994) 34(4) British Journal of Criminology 411 
384 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 
385 Grove, T ǯ (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2003); 32.  
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sentence)386 ǲǥǡ
to claim success in the form of a sentence diǤǳ387 These 
incentives also enable not guilty pleas to be kept at a manageable level388 and 
operate as part of the liberal bureaucratic model.  As Mulcahy notes, heavy 
workloads encourage routine, minimal practices in which plea-bargaining is a useful 
tool which may subordinate the needs of defendants to managerial imperatives.389 
As will be seen in chapter four, the use of plea negotiations remains a significant 
feature of summary criminal proceedings. 
Similarly, Sudnow notes, in the context of the American Public Defender, that Ǯǯ
or common types of offending.390 ǡǡǲ
unstated recipes for reducing original charges to Ǥǳ391 This effectively 
excludes defendants from participation in the process because they are unaware of Ǯǯ, which exacerbates the othering process. 
Similar patterns emerge in English and Welsh courts and as such, the use of plea 
                                                          
386 See R -v- Goodyear [2005] 2 Cr.App.R. 20 
387 It is important to note that this research did not take some important factors into account, such as the 
amount of work that had been put into a case outside of the courtroom and the nature/strength of the 
evidǤǯǤ
(Mulcahy A, 'The Justifications of `Justice': Legal Practitioners' Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements in 
Magistrates' Courts' (1994) 34(4) British Journal of Criminology 411; 414) 
388 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
389Mulcahy A, 'The Justifications of `Justice': Legal Practitioners' Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements 
in Magistrates' Courts' (1994) 34(4) British Journal of Criminology 411. Mulcahy noted that plea 
negotiations tend to take place at Pre Trial Review hearings, which have been re-formed as Case 
Management Hearings in east Kent.  The resort to plea bargaining, and the system of credit for the entry 
of an early guilty plea is considered by Bibas to be an example of insiders in the criminal justice system 
redirecting standard practices in order to dispose of more cases in less time (Bibas S, The Machinery of 
Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2012)). 
390 Sudnow D, 'Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office' (1965) 
12(3) Social Problems 255. 
391 Sudnow D, 'Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office' (1965) 
12(3) Social Problems 255; 262 
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negotiations reinforces the co-operative networks that operate in summary criminal 
courts. As Baldwin and McConville noted, such practices operate to exclude 
defendants from the process.392 
Worryingly, McConville, Sanders and Leng note that weak cases also tended to 
elicit guilty pleas via bargaining techniques.393 They suggested that this occurs ǲpart of, rather than challenger to, the apparatus 
of criminal justice...As officers of the court they are captured by crime control, not 
due pǳǤ394 ǯ
in this regard, suggesting that lawyers advise possibly innocent people to plead 
guilty not  ǲdeology, nor because they are 
the subservient hacks of the court system ... They provide it because they are 
operating within a system heavily imbued with liberal bureaucratic rules and 
values, and they know that their clients might indeed receive heavier penalties if Ǥǳ395 
It should also be noted that Bottoms and McClean found that the majority of 
defendants who had pleaded guilty said they had done so because they were in fact 
guilty or because the police had a good case.396 ǯǯ397 in that he similarly 
                                                          
392 Baldwin J and McConville M, Negotiated Justice: Pressures on Defendants to Plead Guilty (Martin 
Robertson 1977). 
393 McConville M, Sanders A and Leng R, The Case for the Prosecution (Routledge 1991) 
394 McConville M, Sanders A and Leng R, The Case for the Prosecution (Routledge 1991); 167. Emphasis in 
original. It must however be noted that the writers do not appear to have been privy to the actual 
discussion that took place among the advocates nor to the advice given to the defendant  by his or her 
advocate in cases that they assessed as being evidentially weak. 
395 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976); 231 
396 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
397 Baldwin J and McConville M, Negotiated Justice: Pressures on Defendants to Plead Guilty (Martin 
Robertson 1977). 
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considered that defence solicitors placed pressure on defendants to enter negotiated 
guilty pleas, he did not interview defendants and accepted that he did not have the 
legal training necessary to evaluate the strength of the case.398  
Carlen had earlier noted that court personnel presented coercive tactics as no 
more than the routine and mundane way of conducting court business, because 
those who work regularly within the courts are able to exercise greater control over 
the social space than those who pass through the system.399 The exercise of such ǲǯ
abilities to partiǤǳ400 Furthermore, the design of the courtroom (as a 
result of poor acoustics) along with the use of jargon401 and inter-personnel 
signalling ostracise the defendant, which leaves defendants unable to understand or 
follow proceedings.402 All parties are aware that such compromises exist while 
simultaneously trying to preserve their professional integrity, which is itself 
undermined by the very existence of inter-professional compromise.403 Again, these 
problems appear to persist in summary criminal justice, as is discussed in chapters 
four and five. 
Compromise is therefore a significant feature of professional relationships ǡǡǲ
strict adherence to the formal rules would slow ǥǥ
                                                          
398 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
399 Carlen P, 'The Staging of Magistrates' Justice' (1976) 16(1) British Journal of Criminology 48; Carlen P, 
Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
400 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976); 19 
401 That is not to say that court personnel did not make attempts to explain the rules to unrepresented 
defendants, although this often simply added to the confusion (Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin 
Robertson 1976)). 
402 Carlen P, 'The Staging of Magistrates' Justice' (1976) 16(1) British Journal of Criminology 48.  
403 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
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Ǥǳ404 However, strict adherence to rules might also damage professional 
relationships, and, in turn, affect negotiating powers and reputation. In a more 
recent study, Young refers to literature that supports the notion that defence ǲǳǤ405 As such, the view taken by socio-legal scholars 
tends ǲǯǳǡ406 ǯǯǤ407 This issue is discussed in greater 
detail in chapter five, in which I accept that co-operative working practices mean 
that formal legal argument is rare, but I argue instead that legal provisions are 
referred to in particular ways that only members of the workgroup understand. ǯǲǳ408 clearly remains relevant today. Consequently, due process becomes a ǲǳ409 used to legitimise proceedings rather than actually allowing the defendant 
a fair opportunity of comprehension and participation.  This situation is exacerbated 
when one considers the speed at which cases are processed, which is also dependent 
on co-operative networks among the workgroup and knowledge of routine case 
handling procedures. 
                                                          
404 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976); 69 
405 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203;232 
406 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976); 150. See also 
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Speed and bureaucratisation 
Carlen noted, in 1976, that the volume of business which passes through the ǯǤ410 
This meant that the police prosecutors made value judgements about which cases 
were worthy of being dealt with early in the day, often based on whether the ǯ
demeanour based on certain court accepted stereotypes.411 Those stereotypes 
limited the ability of the defendant to present him or herself in another way.412  ǡǲ
the police into acceptable arrest rates, lawyers into negotiating pleas, court officials 
into a speedy rather than necessarily a just through-put of caǤǳ413 Such speed 
denies defendants the opportunity to understand the proceedings and consequently 
does not necessarily persuade them that just procedures are followed.414 Further, 
the police were aware that a less serious charge would be more likely to elicit a 
guilty plea and pressure to save police time was evident.415 This meant that lesser 
charges might be offered to speed up the court process. Courts have themselves 
noted that prosecutors might prefer summary charges in the name of expedition but 
also in order to elicit early guilty pleas.416 Conversely, defendants often spent 
protracted periods of time waiting for their cases to be called, which only increased 
                                                          
410 Carlen P, 'The Staging of Magistrates' Justice' (1976) 16(1) British Journal of Criminology 48 
411 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
412 	ǡǮǯǤ
inappropriate (i.e. something which threatens the legitimacy of the proceedings), remedial methods 
classify defendants as acting out of time, place, mind or order. (Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin 
Robertson 1976)) 
413 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981); 3 
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415 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
416 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
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their anxiety.417 More recently, not only have prosecutors offered lesser charges but 
police have made more use of diversionary measures in order to increase efficiency 
and save money, as is discussed in chapter five. It is via processes such as these that ǲǳ418 as 
legal ideology becomes subordinate to economic and bureaucratic ends.419 As a ǡǲǤǳ420   
Such situations occur because the volume of court business requires a quick, 
routinised approach to case management which also legitimises institutional 
power;421 all the more so since the proliferation of managerialist techniques as 
discussed in the preceding chapter.  In the early twenty-first century, Leverick and 
Duff also ǲthe concern of courtroom workgroups to progress through the work Ǥǳ422 
Further, Darbyshire noted in her recent study that district judgeǲ
speed of the proceedings, the summary Ǥǳ423 The 
speed at which the proceedings operate coupled with low levels of publicly-funded ǡǯǡ
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419 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981) 
420 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981); 124 
421 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
422 Leverick F and Duff P, 'Court Culture and Adjournments in Criminal Cases: A Tale of Four Courts' 
(2002) 39(Scotland) Criminal Law Review 39; 44 
423 Darbyshire P, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (Oxford: Hart 2011); 154. Indeed, until  ? ? ? ?ǡǯ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offered fragmented access to legal services.424 This is discussed further in the 
following chapter. 
The speed of the proceedings also creates an air of informality which, to ǡǲ-ǣǯroleǥǡǯrights Ǥǳ425 
The result is that lawyers tend, according to McConville, Sanders and Leng, to opt 
into a crime control model.426 Thus the speed at which cases progress is likely to be 
assisted by the presence of a greater number of defence advocates than observed by 
Carlen427 because those specialist practitioners are equipped with the tools for 
negotiating case outcomes and understand the procedural issues involved in case 
management. This adds a degree of specialisation to the proceedings which, 
Castellano notes, allows the workgroup to routinise procedures.428 Routinisation 
appears as a by-product of demands for efficiency and is manifested by a desire to 
process cases in standardised ways. As Garland notes, management measures are 
designed to limit professional discretion and closely regulate working practices,429 
such that they become standardised, and such standardisation is encouraged by the 
use of forms.  
                                                          
424 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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 ? ? ? ?ȌǢ ? ? ?Ǥǯ 
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Brenneis discusses how neoliberal governmentsǯ distrust of public services 
created a desire for efficiency to be both maximised and monitored through forms in 
public institutions. He asserts that the propagation of standardised forms occurred  ? ? ? ?ǡǲ
models and, especially given the constrained resources and political climate, a new Ǥǳ430 It is via such mechanisms that 
bureaucracy (to which processes of document completion are integral) allows the 
state to exercise some control over the functions of publicly funded institutions.431 
Such bureaucratisation and standardisation has the effect of undermining individual 
rights in favour of speed. 
Bourdieu has noted that routinised practices are also important in 
encouraging stability within workgroups.432 Thus standardisation becomes 
important to the habitus which provides actors with a sense of appropriate actions 
to take in particular circumstances. As such, the form may be a way of ensuring that 
policy initiatives become integrated in the habitus, and the use of forms may be seen 
as one of the practices within neoliberal techniques of governance. There are, 
however, competing agendas to the working practices in the criminal justice system. 
The adversarial nature of the process Ȃ even when undermined by bureaucratic 
procedures - means that defence advocates and prosecutors assume different roles, 
which may explain why advocates raised concerns about the routinisation of 
proceedings (particularly case management) during the empirical research. This is 
discussed in chapter four. 
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431 Murphy M, 'Bureaucracy and Its Limits: Accountability and Rationality in Higher Education' (2009) 
30(6) British Journal of Sociology of Education 683; 689 
432 Bourdieu P, The Logic of Practice (Stanford University Press 1990). 
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All of the above is not, however, to say that defendants would necessarily 
prefer the proceedings to be conducted at a slower pace. Bottoms and McClean note 
that many defendants seek swift case conclusion for a number of reasons, including 
issues with employment, the trouble of attending court and the anxiety it causes.433 
There is therefore a balance to be struck between the swift conclusion of cases and 
enabling defendants to be included in the process while also protecting their rights. 
Conclusion ǯǡǡ
operated with voluminous caseloads. This has required techniques that encourage 
efficient case progression. A high degree of co-operation among courtroom 
personnel is central to those techniques, which not only adds to the speed at which 
cases are progressed but also creates an air of informality. This, along with the 
specialised use of language and technical decision making, operates to exclude 
defendants from effective participation in the proceedings.  
As seen in chapter one, since the 1970s there have been demands for greater 
efficiency in summary criminal courts. Such initiatives not only place greater 
emphasis on speed over just processes but also encourage even greater degrees of 
co-Ǥǡǯ-
operative working practices, the advent of concerns about both efficacy and 
efficiency in the criminal justice system has the potential to exacerbate the inability 
of defendants to effectively participate in the proceedings, particularly when 
workgroups are familiar with one another and therefore stable.  
                                                          
433 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
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Those co-operative practices are assisted by increased levels of 
representation, which seems to Ǯ-ǯǤKemp ǯ
understanding of what was happening in court than unrepresented defendants.434 
However, while increased levels of representation are beneficial in that 
unrepresented defendants were previously excluded from participation in the 
proceedings by lack of specialist knowledge in relation to law, procedure and jargon, ǯreased 
routinisation, greater degrees of professional negotiation and compromise and 
quicker case progression, which may also leave defendants confused and alienated. 
This, in turn, reinforces the othering process in relation to defendants as they are 
excluded from effective participation in the process. Therefore, the culture of 
summary justice can actually exacerbate the effects of neoliberal policies in terms of 
the marginalisation of defendants. The data that is presented in the following 
chapters appears to support those assertions. 
The existence of effective defence representation is crucial to ensure ǯǤǡ
provide the best service may be compromised not only by both bureaucratic and 
professional pressures but also by low levels of remuneration via legal aid, which is 
another important feature of summary criminal proceedings and is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
                                                          
434Kemp, V and Balmer, N ǣǯ (Legal Services Research Centre 21, 
2008) 
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Chapter 3: ǯourts 
Introduction 
Publicly funded representation is an important component of an adversarial 
system. It exists to ensure equality of arms, to ensure that the presence of defence 
lawyers protects both the accused and the system from potential state abuse of 
power (or the appearance of abuse) and to legitimate punishment so that the ǲǤǳ435 The state must be seen to support access to justice in order to provide 
some legitimacy to state instigated, and funded, processes of prosecution.436 
This chapter therefore considers the provision of publicly funded 
representation in summary criminal proceedings, the most common of which are the 
Court duty solicitor (who provides advice, assistance and advocacy assistance in the ǯȌ
which is granted under a Representation Order following application made to the 
Legal Aid Agency.437  I reflect on how changes to public funding have affected the 
                                                          
435 Regan F, 'Criminal Legal Aid: Does Defending Liberty Undermine Citizenship?' in Young, R and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 
104 
436 The importance of legal aid is well summarised by Young and Wall, who say that the legitimacy of the 
adversarial process ǲtwo sides have access to roughly equivalent resources and ǡǮǯǥǤ	ǡuate Ǥǳȋǡ ?ǡ ?ǡǤ
Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 
1996); 5)  
437 There are five other types of legal aid in criminal proceedings; 1. Duty solicitor to provide advice and 
assistance at the police station which is not means tested and coverage is allocated by rota. 2. Own 
solicitor at the police station, which is the same assistance as under the duty solicitor scheme but the ǯǤ ?Ǥ
Representation Order. 4. Free-standing advice and assistance can be allowed to provide initial advice up 
to a fee limit as long as no claim is made under a Representation Order. 5. Advocacy assistance can be ǯ
funding schemes, such as an application for further detention of an accused at the police station for 
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culture and behaviour of defence advocates, and the implications for defendants. My 
examination of legally aided representation at this level enables a more detailed 
exposition of the effects of neoliberalism on summary criminal justice. Development 
on issues that arose in chapter one ǯ
approaches to publicly funded representation have been inconsistent with 
traditional neoliberal approaches to state funded services. 
 This chapter tells the last of three interweaving stories about lawyers, 
defendants and access to justice, before these stories are empirically interrogated. I 
go beyond a descriptive account of the contractions in legal aid in order to make 
three arguments. Firstly I argue that tracking the provision of publicly funded 
representation allows us to examine different phases of liberalism and to challenge 
the idea that neoliberalism is a monolithic framework.  
Secondly I argue that, within current British society, lawyers have multiple 
identities Ȃ as self-serving business people, professional experts and champions of 
access to justice. Such multiplicity leads to confusion about roles both in the minds of 
lawyers themselves and in the minds of civil servants with responsibility for making 
and administering criminal justice policy.  
Thirdly I suggest that debates about the meaning of access to justice have been 
lost in neoliberal concerns about efficiency, and in austerity measures initiated by 
recent government policy. Further, the promotion of individualism by neoliberal 
techniques of governance erodes the sense of collective responsibility for access to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
questioning.  These can be further subdivided according to payments schemes via fixed fee, standard fee, 
graduated fee, hourly rate or according to page count. Some of these schemes are means tested while 
others are subject only to an interests of justice requirement.. I will concentrate on those types of funding ǯȂ the court duty solicitor scheme and publicly 
funded advice, case preparation and representation at court under a Representation Order granted on ȋǮǯȌǤ 
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justice promoted by the welfare state. Both of these features inadvertently 
contribute to the increased marginalisation of precariat groups. 
A detailed examination of legal aid funding can demonstrate some of the 
paradoxes at the heart of state governance Ȃ a desire to fund representation to 
provide legitimacy for a form of state force but resentment towards funding a 
system that has the ability to challenge its authority, particularly in light of increased 
demands for efficiency in public institutions.438 
It is difficult to neatly separate these complex issues and so they are 
interwoven into the story of different phases of liberal and neoliberal government 
throughout the chapter. I begin by examining the modern liberal origins of legal aid 
and I note how it has developed during different political phases. I suggest that the 
pace of change accelerated since the 1970s, as different governments, who have 
emphasised different aspects of neoliberal philosophy, became more distrustful of ǯǤǡǯ
assistance to ensure that the process of summary criminal justice is efficient. The 
measures introduced, which ǯ
behaviour and control cost, have further marginalised defendants from being able to 
participate in the proceedings. 
The development of legal aid, liberalism and welfarism 
Goriely, who has done some of the most significant work on the history of ǡǡ ? ? ? ?ǡǲ
                                                          
438 Peck and Tickell would advocate such an approach which considers not only different phases of 
neoliberalism but also considers the philosophy in different political and social realms (Peck, J and 
Tickell, A, 'Conceptualizing Neoliberalism. Thinking Thatcherism' in Leitner, H Peck, J and Sheppard, E 
(ed), Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers (The Guildford Press 2007). 
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Ǥǳ439 During this 
period, the existence of the British Empire and Commonwealth necessitated 
approaches to governance that appeared to provide examples of liberalism as an 
appropriate political, economic and social philosophy. As such, governments began 
to recognise that facilitating access to legal advice provided the criminal justice 
process with a sense of legitimacy which enabled liberal politics to live up to its 
claim of creating the conditions necessary for individual liberty and reason.440  
In the early 1900s, the Poor Prisoners Defence Act 1903 enabled some 
defendants to request free legal advice via an Order from the magistrates which 
would allow funds to be drawn from local monies, but only if the defendant was 
prepared to disclose the nature of his or her defence. At this time the government ǲourage defendants to contest ǥǤǳ441 This statement provides ǯ
criminal justice process as legitimate and its desire to control expenditure. As shall ǡǯǡ
with the pendulum swinging either more towards due process, defendant rights and 
legitimacy or more towards efficiency, popular penalism and austerity, depending on 
the particular needs of, or crisis faced by, government, and the extent to which 
liberal or neoliberal political philosophy has been endorsed as an appropriate art of 
governance.  
                                                          
439 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 34 
440 Adams I, Political Ideology Today (Politics Today, Manchester University Press 2001). 
441 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 35 
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In 1930, following victory in the First World War and in an endorsement of 
liberal welfare principles, the availability of legal aid was expanded via the Ǯǯ
determining whether an individual should, in exceptional circumstances, be 
represented at public expense in summary criminal proceedings.442 However, 
magistrates often remained reluctant to grant legal aid,443 particularly in summary 
proceedings.444 Hynes and Robin note that only 327 of the 19,079 people that 
magistrates sent to prison in 1938 had benefitted from legally aided 
representation.445  
Legal aid development slowed until the late 1940s, when the report of the 
Rushcliffe Committee (which led to the enactment of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 
1949) made a number of recommendations.446 Those recommendations formed the 
founding principles for wide access to publicly funded legal advice, supported by 
welfarist approaches to government that prioritised social inclusion over cost in the 
belief that social cohesion would assist long term economic and social stability.447 Its 
objectives included that legal aid should be available to people of small or moderate 
means, that contributions should be payable and a merits test should be applied and 
judged by legal practitioners, who should receive adequate remuneration for such 
work.448  
                                                          
442 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
443 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
444 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
445 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 9 
446 ǯReport of the Committee on Legal Aid and Legal Advice in England and 
Wales (Cmd. 6641) (1945) 
447 Smith, R Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales. Response (Justice,  February, 2011) 
448 Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992); 4 
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So far as criminal legal aid was concerned, the Rushcliffe Committee 
proposed that the exceptional circumstances provisions should be removed to 
encourage magistrates to grant legal aid where the interests of justice so required, 
and any doubt should be exercised in favour of the defendant. The recommendations 
also included allowing solicitors at least four days to prepare cases, that the scheme 
should be widely advertised,449 that fixed fees should be abolished and costs should 
be borne nationally rather than locally.450 ǯ
were gradually adopted by parliament in subsequent years. However, by 1950 there ǲǥǡ
number  ?Ǥ ?ǳ451 and, until the 
1960s, defence advocates were paid by way of a fixed fee drawn from local taxes. 
The government then recognised that it would be more equitable to pay solicitors by 
hourly rate, and that the scheme should become state funded.452 The government felt 
that legal aid was granted so infrequently that the scheme would be easy to manage 
centrally.453   ? ? ? ?ǡǮǯ
proceedings was removed,454 which allowed a greater number of criminal defence 
advocates to access the market. Historically, criminal defence services have tended 
to be provided by private practitioners in high street firms. The government did not 
seek to alter that framework and the removal of the exceptional circumstances 
                                                          
449 Information slips were produced in 1948 
450 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
451 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 43 
452 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
453 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
454 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
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requirement allowed the growth of private practice in this field. This can be 
contextualised within a period of government during which specialist opinion and 
expertise were highly valued in public services and such professionals were 
assumed to act in a public-spirited fashion.455   ? ? ? ?ǡǯȋǮǯȌǤ456  While the Widgery report concluded that the 
legal aid system worked adequately, it also provided guidance to magistrates about 
when the interests of justice test would be satisfied.457  The criteria were based 
either on the risk of loss of liberty or livelihood, complexity or the inability of 
defendants to properly follow the proceedings. 458 The guidance was drafted widely 
in order to encourage greater levels of representation in a range of situations rather 
than simply when a defendant was at risk of being sent to prison. The Widgery 
report therefore sought to persuade government to take an even more benevolent 
approach to publicly funded representation to bolster the appearance of fairness and 
legitimacy.  
                                                          
455 This attitude in relation to public service professionals has been identified by Le Grand J, 'Knights, 
Knaves or Pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy' (1997) 26(2) Journal of Social Policy 149 and, 
more recently in the context of legal aid, by Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart 
Publishing 2013). 
456 Home Office, 'Report of the Departmental Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings' (H.M.S.O. 
Cmnd 2934 1966) 
457 The suggested criteria were given statutory recognition in s.22 Legal Aid Act 1988, and have been 
repeated in s.17 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, subject to a proviso that 
the Lord Chancellor can amend the criteria by order. The Divisional Court has, at times offered assistance 
in interpreting the criteria. For example, in the case of R Ȃv- Havering Juvenile Court ex parte Buckley Lexis 
CO/554/83 the Court commented that it was appropriate to take into account the fact that the 
prosecution authority is legally represented. 
458 The full criteria are; the case involves a substantial question of law, conviction would be likely to lead 
to loss of liberty or livelihood, conviction would cause substaǯǡ
the defendant may be unable to understand the proceedings or to present his own case due to a language 
barrier, mental illness, or other incapacity, the nature of the defence requires that witnesses need to be 
traced, or prosecution witnesses will need to be expertly cross-examined, it is in the interests of someone 
other than the defendant that the defendant should be represented (Home Office, 'Report of the 
Departmental Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings' (H.M.S.O. Cmnd 2934 1966)) 
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However, the lawyer-led pressure group Justice disagreed with the Widgery ǯvision and reported that, in 
1969, only four per cent of those charged with criminal offences applied for legal aid 
(with significant local variation in grant rates), even though the legitimacy of the ǲides being adequately Ǥǳ459 Zander found, in 1969, that the majority of 
people sent to prison by magistrates had been unrepresented, despite the guidance 
issued in the Widgery report.460 Justice therefore advocated the introduction of a 
duty solicitor scheme,461 which had been specifically rejected by the Widgery report 
on the basis that the system functioned adequately as it was. Justice argued that the ǲǡǡe ǳ462 which had the potential to 
damage public perceptions of justice. 
Despite this, the interests of justice criteria were not widely circulated due to 
fears over rising cost.463 ǲre agreed that legal aid was Ǥǳ464 As 
such, despite various parliamentary reports suggesting legal aid expansion, 
governments remained reluctant to relax the criteria which must be met to obtain 
                                                          
459Justice, The Unrepresented Defendant in Magistrates' Courts (British Section of the International Cmssn 
of Jurists, 1971); 4. It should however be noted that Justice also accepted that certain types of case, such 
as minor motoring offences, do not require legal representation.  
460 Zander M, 'Unrepresented Defendants in the Criminal Courts' (1969) Criminal Law Review 362. These 
findings were supported by Borrie and Varcoe (Borrie G and Varcoe J, Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings. A 
Regional Survey (Institute of Judicial Administration 1970)) 
461 Justice, The Unrepresented Defendant in Magistrates' Courts (British Section of the International Cmssn 
of Jurists, 1971) 
462 Justice, The Unrepresented Defendant in Magistrates' Courts (British Section of the International Cmssn 
of Jurists, 1971); 15 
463 Justice, The Unrepresented Defendant in Magistrates' Courts (British Section of the International Cmssn 
of Jurists, 1971) 
464 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 4 
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publicly funded representation. Thus the tension between cost and efficiency as 
against due process and legitimacy was evident even during periods in which 
welfarist political philosophy prevailed. 
The expansion of legal aid provision 
By the early 1970s, a different form of welfarism was becoming dominant, which 
supported the expansion of legal aid in principle. That stage of governance was ǯǤ465 This phase 
presaged neoliberalism in its focus on individualism, which meant that the political 
left subsequently had difficulty in effectively opposing neoliberal politics.466 
Increased interest in individual rights also, however, paved the way for the 
expansion of legal aid and, in 1973, the Law SǮǯ
scheme which allowed solicitors to perform a simplified means test in order to 
assess initial eligibly for publicly funded advice in relation to any matter of English 
law.467 Further, Section 37 Criminal Justice Act 1972 prohibited magistrates from 
sending first time offenders to custody if unrepresented.  In 1976, Bottoms and 
McClean found that, of applications for legal aid made, 82 per cent were granted 
nationally, subject to local variation on the basis of publicity.468 Later, legal aid 
                                                          
465 Examples of this phase in action include the enactment of various statutes designed to protect and 
promote individual rights, such as the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Equal Pay Act 1970. 
466 Dean J, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies (Duke University Press 2009). 
467 Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992). In 1994-1995, 397,169 green form bills were paid (Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, 
Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, 
Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996)) 
468 They also found that defendants were 17 per cent more likely to plead guilty when unrepresented. 
Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge, 1976) 
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eligibility on income grounds was revised so that 79 per cent of the population was 
eligible by 1979.469   
Duty solicitor schemes were also introduced under the Legal Advice and 
Assistance Act 1972, and entitled defendants charged with imprisonable offences or 
appearing in custody to receive free advice and advocacy assistance. A defendant is 
only entitled to use the services of a duty solicitor on a single occasion and the right 
to instruct the duty solicitor does not extend to conducting trials.470 The emergence ǲǤǳ471 Duty solicitor schemes were placed on a more formal 
statutory footing by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, having previously 
been conducted on a voluntary basis.472 Such schemes provided less well established ǯǮǯǡ473 marking a period 
of further expansion in the provision of legally aided criminal defence services. 
State crisis and legal aid ǯ
courts, combined with a rise in the number of people prosecuted, meant that by 
                                                          
469 Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992). 
470See, for example, Liberty. 'Your Rights. The Liberty Guide to Human Rights' 
<www.yourrights.org.uk/yourrights/the-rights-of-defendants/representation-and-funding.html accessed 
on 13/11/2013> The duty solicitor is a qualified lawyer who has undertaken specific further 
qualifications in order to provide reǯȋȌǤȋǮǯ ?http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/accreditation/specialist-schemes/criminal-litigation/> 
accessed on 13 November 2013. Those advocates are allocated to act as duty solicitor in their local ǯȋǮǯhttp://www.justice.gov.uk/legal-aid/areas-of-work/crime/duty-solicitor-rotas accessed on 
13/11/2013)) 
471 Ashworth A, 'Legal Aid, Human Rights and Criminal Justice' in Young, R. and  Wall, D (eds), Access to 
Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 64 
472 Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992) 
473 Goriely T, 'Revisiting the Debate over Criminal Legal Aid Delivery Models: Viewing International 
Experience from a British Perspective' (1998) 5(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 7. 
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1986/87, spending on summary criminal legal aid accounted for a quarter of all legal ǯ
courts were now represented.474 Expansion of legally aided representation during 
this period is somewhat incongruent with conventional accounts of the roll back of 
state funded services as Conservative neoliberal polices became dominant. However, 
there are several factors that may provide at least partial explanations for this trend. 
Firstly, rising crime rates had contributed to the crisis of the welfare state, 
which would suggest that there was more court business and one might expect a 
greater number of advocates to be appearing before the Benches. Secondly, the 
legitimacy of state-led prosecutions was under public scrutiny in the face of several 
notorious miscarriages of justice.475 This contributed to the professionalisation of 
the police under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the creation of an 
independent CPS, which bolstered demands for defence representation under 
equality of arms arguments. Furthermore, in the wake of tough police action in 
relation to inner city riots and industrial action that occurred during this period, ǯ-led forces to account could play a role in legitimising 
institutional power. These factors, alongside the rise of individualisation in political 
philosophy, provide evidence that politics has the ability to interrupt trajectories of 
neoliberalism476 as the state must respond to immediate crises of legitimacy. 
                                                          
474 Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992) 
475 See, by way of example, R- v- Anne Maguire, Patrick Joseph Maguire, William John Smyth, Vincent 
Maguire, Patrick Joseph Paul Maguire, Patrick O'Neill and Patrick Conlon (1991) 94 Crim. App. R. 133 
476 Daly is of the view that politically motivated incidents can disrupt the strict order of political 
philosophy (Daly G, 'Radical(ly) Political Economy. Luhmann, Postmarxism and Globalisation' (2004) 
11(1) Review of International Political Economy 1) while Middleton described how particular expressions 
of subordination and social dislocation can be used to challenge universal understandings of 
neoliberalism (Middleton M, 'Becoming War-machines: Neoliberalism, Critical Politics, and Singularities 
of Struggle' (PhD, University of Utah 2011)). 
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Furthermore, Young and Wall suggest that these changes occurred because, ǲ
proceedings (often by negotiating a guilty plea), grants of legal aid were made much Ǥǳ477 Goriely notes that there were attempts to routinise court procedures 
at the same time, which is, as discussed in chapter two, facilitated by greater levels of 
defence advocates who then play an important role in providing legitimacy to state 
policy initiatives.478 
ǲ ǯǥǤǳ479 This phase of legal aid 
development is therefore significant in its complexity. The state faced several public 
setbacks to its appearance of legitimacy and fairness, and lawyers had the potential 
to redress any perceived imbalance while also increasing the efficiency of court 
proceedings. Thus lawyers fulfilled a dual function for the government even though 
neoliberal Conservative politics was becoming increasingly sceptical about the 
behaviour of public service professionals and ever more interested in cost control in 
what was perceived as the wasteful public sector. This again highlights the complex 
nature of neoliberal politics when actually applied to state funded institutions.  
By the mid- ? ? ? ?ǡǡǲǥ
off, yet the numbers receiving legally-Ǥǳ480 This 
growth led the government to introduce various initiatives and reviews to reduce 
                                                          
477 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(Eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 4. 
Goriely agrees with this view (Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in 
Young, R and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone Press 1996)) 
478 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996) 
479 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 45 
480 Bridges L, 'The Reform of Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: 
Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 281 
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legal aid expenditure,481 ǯ
managerialism, distrust of professional behaviour and concerns about efficiency. 
Until 1988, the Law Society had been responsible for the administration of legal aid. 
However, the Thatcher government took the view that the duties of the Law Society 
as representative of solicitors conflicted with their responsibility for payment of ǯȋǮǯȌǡ-
departmental public body.482 This again provides evidence of a shift in attitude 
towards public service professionals as criminal defence advocates came to be seen 
as obstructive and in need of external supervision. These developments paved the 
way for greater regulation as demands for greater efficiency were made by 
subsequent governments, as detailed in chapter two. As Marshall noted, there had 
previously been a tendency to try to protect individuals from institutions but 
 ǲ
professional, or the expert, between the bureaucratic machine and the ǥǥǤ
professional, by contrast, claims the right to judge each case on its own merits 
and then to prescribe or recommend, what is, in his opinion, the best treatment ǡǳǤ483  
We can thus identify the problematic approach of politics to lawyers Ȃ their 
presence appears to increase efficiency but governments remain of the view that 
they are, at least to an extent, selfȂserving professionals. This resulted in increased 
                                                          
481 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009) 
482 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
483 Marshall T, Social Policy in the Twentieth Century (Hutchinson and Co (Publishers) Ltd 1975); 13 
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regulation of the profession via franchising and contracting measures discussed 
below. 
Hynes and Robins view the creation of the LAB as the beginning of a period 
during which the government was increasingly unconcerned about policies which 
related to publicly funded representation,484 but were instead concerned about Ǥ
ǲless than half the initial 
membership of the board came from business, while the role of the Law Society was Ǥǳ485 This is consistent with ǯe funded 
institutions, and the efficacy of those working within them, alongside a more 
marketised, managerialist approach to funding in public services. There was 
however a significant rise in legal aid costs in summary criminal proceedings486 and, 
in 1992, government spending on legal aid passed the billion pound mark, with the ǯ
being £218m net.487 At this time, public discussion focused largely on expenditure 
versus the remuneration of legal aid lawyers.488 ǯ
strategy at this time was to reintroduce the system of payment by fixed fee in the 
                                                          
484 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009) 
485Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992); 11 
486 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
487 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). Young 
and Wall report that in the decade to 1993- ? ? ? ?ǡǲ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ǥǳȋǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ
R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 17). Wood notes however that the application refusal rate rose by 8.7 per cent between 
1991 and 1993 (Wood A, 'Administrative Justice within the Legal Aid Board: Reviews by Caseworkers and 
Area Committees of Refusals of Criminal Legal Aid Applications' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), Access to 
Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
488 Legal Action Group, A strategy for justice: publicly funded legal services in the 1990s (Legal Action Group 
1992).  
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ǯǡ489 which proved to be the catalyst for many lawyers refusing to 
undertake duty solicitor work.490  
This phase marked the beginning of a new stage of neoliberalism in which 
greater control was sought over state funded institutions. This trend was ǯ
system via measures thaǯ
making by juxtaposing business needs and practices. Such demands did however 
also indirectly increase defendant marginalisation as lawyers were required to 
balance business and professional needs Ȃ a dilemma that now appears constant in 
the process of summary criminal justice, as was evidenced by comments made in my 
interviews with defence solicitors. This trend can be set in the context of New ǯ. 
ǯǢfficiency 
 Both Cape and Moorhead and Hynes and Robins identified an increase in 
summary criminal legal aid claims in the late 1990s.491 New Labour regarded this as 
economically inefficient, and decided that the number of firms providing legal aid in 
criminal cases should be limited by a franchising system.492 From that point, firms 
                                                          
489 
ǡ	ǡǲǡ
more work than is covered by the higher standard fee being paid on a fee-per-ǥǯǳȋ
ǡ	
and Rickman N, 'Controlling Lawyer's Costs through Standard Fees: An Economic Analysis' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice. Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 193). See also Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal 
Action Group 2009). 
490 Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992). 
491Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005); Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to 
Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 112 
492 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005). Legal 
Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action Group 1992);  ? ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ǡǲ
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who wished to provide publicly funded advice in criminal proceedings would have to 
hold a contract for those services issued by the LAB.493  ǡǯǡ	
failed to sufficiently regulate legal aid expenditure494 ǲ
administrative overheads of funding a large number of firms Ȃ many of which did 
only a small amount of criminal legal aid work each year - were placing an Ǥǳ495 In 1999, the LAB was replaced by the ȋǮǯȌ ? ? ? ?Ǥ
charged with developing and maintaining criminal legal aid funds under the Criminal ȋǮǯȌǤ ? ?
the number of firms providing legal advice in criminal proceedings, 496 which 
resulted from the fact that those firms who only conducted a very small amount of 
criminal defence work were unable to meet the practice management contracting 
criteria. Those criteria evidenced a desire for greater regulation of lawyer behaviour. 
From 2001, only firms that demonstrated competence in criminal proceedings to the 
satisfaction of the LSC would be awarded contracts to conduct publicly funded 
criminal defence work.497 
Solicitors had protested against the introduction of CDS, but were offered 
their first pay rise in eight years and assurances that the payment scheme for police 
                                                                                                                                                                                    Ǯ-ǯǤǮǯ
elevated to the status of politǤǳȋ
ǡ ?
Delivery Models: Viewing International Experience from a British Perspective' (1998) 5(1) International 
Journal of the Legal Profession 7; 8) 
493 Hynes, S and Robins, J The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009) 
494 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
495 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005); 9 
496 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009) 
497 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
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station work would remain the same as incentives to sign the new contracts.498 This 
also serves to demonstrate that the competitive nature of private practice can be 
used to government advantage to control cost. Ultimately firms needed to agree to 
sign contracts to remain in business and the fragmented, competitive nature of 
criminal defence services provides the government with a significant advantage in 
restraining cost. 499  
Such problems are compounded if one accepts  Hynes and Robins suggestion ǲǡȏȐǤǳ500 As franchising 
regimes were introduced, managerial influences took greater control over advocates, 
because the contracts devised by the LSC required lawyers to adopt specific working 
practices which the LSC (and not necessarily the firm) regarded as appropriate.501 
This represented a challenge to the lawyer/client relationship.502 Wall notes that, ǲǡǥǤ
                                                          
498 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009)  
499 Amidst government concerns that lawyers were obstructive, four publicly state funded public 
defender offices were created, but proved to be less efficient and cost the government more than firms 
operating in private practice (Bridges, L. Cape, E. Fenn, P. Mitchell, A. Moorhead, R and Sherr, A. 
'Evaluation of the Public Defender Service in England and Wales' (2007) 
<http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/pds/Public_Defenders_Report_PDFVersion6.pdf> accessed on 05 
February 2012). While the offices that were created remain operative, there does not, as far as I am 
aware, exist any plans to expand that method of criminal defence service provision. 
500 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 29 
501 For example, the contract makes provisions about when defendants will qualify for representation by 
a duty solicitor, determines when claims for payment can be made and determines what tests shall be 
applied by lawyers when considering whether a defendant/suspect qualifies for representation (Legal 
Services Commission. 'Standard Crime Contract 2010' (2012) 
<http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/cds_main/Specification_2012_Part_B_Apr_2012_-_1_Apr_12.pdf> 
accessed on 28 September 2012.) 
502 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 23. 
See also Sommerlad H, 'Criminal Legal Aid Reforms and the Restructuring of Legal Professionalism' in 
Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Legal Aid: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone Press 1996). 
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ǳ503 ǲ
professionaǤǳ504 The result is that 
firms can take one of three stances; classical (a continuous service with intense 
lawyer involvement), managerial (routinised processes and reliance on unqualified 
staff) or political (opposition to managerialism and client-focused).505 Workgroup 
cultures that favour co-operation and routinisation are likely to result in managerial Ǥǯ
tend to adopt a factory-like approach to case progression506 in order to cope with 
government initiatives, thereby inadvertently increasing marginalisation 
experienced by defendants. As he further notes in his recent book, the idea of 
professional control is impugned by relinquishing responsibility to government.507 ǯ
efficiency were likely to lead to conveyor-belt type procedures and de-skilling508 
with significant reliance on unqualified support staff509 as firms struggled to remain 
profitable in the face of demands for efficiency.   
                                                          
503 Wall D, 'Keyholders to Criminal Justice? Solicitors and Applications for Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 115 
504 Wall D, 'Keyholders to Criminal Justice? Solicitors and Applications for Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 115 
505 McConville M, Hodgson J, Bridges L and Pavlovic, A, Standing Accused. The Organisation and Practices 
of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Oxford University Press, 1994). See also Sommerlad H, 'Criminal 
Legal Aid Reforms and the Restructuring of Legal Professionalism' in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access 
to Criminal Legal Aid: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
506 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
507 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
508 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
509 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). Wall ǯre increasingly reliant on support staff to complete applications for 
legal aid, and found that they tended to be less thoroughly completed and more likely to be rejected (Wall 
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ǯǲǡǳ510 between 1997 and 2005 spending on 
criminal legal aid increased by 37 per cent511 ǡǡǲȋǯǡ-standing advice and Ȍ
Ǥǳ512 Over the same period, the costs of 
running the criminal justice system (in terms of police, prison service, probation Ȍ ? ?ǯ
to deal with repeat offending and anti-social behaviour and to bring more offenders 
to justice.513 According to the Legal Action Group, however, the government did not 
recognise the degree of pressure placed on criminal legal aid as a result of frequent 
changes to the law and the administration of justice and instead placed the blame of 
rising costs on lawyers.514 Roger Smith, the then head of Justice, suggests that, as a 
result of misplaced attention to the source of rising costs, the government gave ǲǤǳ515 Both David Blunkett and Jack Straw, in their terms as Home Secretary, 
had blamed increased costs on defendants and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
D, 'Keyholders to Criminal Justice? Solicitors and Applications for Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. and 
Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 
1996)). 
510 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 35 
511 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
512 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005); 5 
513Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005). As ǡǲǥǯǮǯǳȋǡThe Justice Gap. Whatever 
Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 108).  
514 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 4. ǡǲ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?ǡ ? ?ǥ ?ǡ ? ? ?ȋȌǳȋ, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? 
(Legal Action Group 2009); 110)). 
515 Smith, R Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales. Response (Justice, February, 
2011); 3 
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 ǲǤǯ-making could 
contribute to pressures to process high numbers of guilty pleas on the courts Ǥǳ516   
 It seems therefore that increasing distrust of public service professionals and 
concerns with efficiency led to greater focus on case progression measures, which 
are less concerned ǯǤǡ
principles relating to access to justice become invisible in the context of political 
debate about efficiency, consumerism and individual responsibility, thereby 
contributing to processes of defendant marginalisation. This provides an example of 
the inadvertent nature of marginalisation (as highlighted in chapter one) which 
results, at least partially, from the way in which neoliberalism is responsive to crises 
and politics rather than an unbending, monolithic doctrine.  
            Against this background, the New Labour government sought to take 
measures that would stabilise, if not reduce, legal aid expenditure. In 2005, Lord 
Falconer extolled the virtues of legal aid in terms of protection for defendants,517 
while simultaneously providing incentives for concluding cases swiftly, thereby 
demonstrating commitment to the Treasury518 and further illustrating the tension 
that exists between due process and cost control. At the same time, it was recognised 
that practitioners need to be paid fairly for the work that is undertaken because ǲǥ
                                                          
516 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 
115 
517 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
518 Hynes and Robins describe the finǲǳ
lawyers being accused of maximising costs (Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to 
legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 109) 
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Ǥǳ519 However, Falconer, in line with New ǯ
preference for marketisation of public services, was of the view that legal aid 
remuneration rates should be determined by the operation of market practices 
rather than by central government.520  
            Lord Falconer instigated a review of legal aid to be performed by Lord 
Carter.521 ǯ
inefficient.522 Hǣǲ
practitioners and force them to restructure so we could get more control over the 
costs of ǳǡ523 ǯ
behaviour that was viewed as inefficient. Carter viewed legal aid provision in ǲ
quality, capacity and Ǥǳ524 Following his review, Carter recommended fixing fees ǡǯ
fees and a system of Best Value Tendering for high cost cases.525 
 ǯ professionals or the House of 
Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee526 ǯȋȌǲ-hearted faith in market 
                                                          
519Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005); 21 
520 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005) 
521 Carter, P Lord Carter's Review of Legal Aid Procurement - Legal Aid: A Market-based Approach to Reform 
(2006) 
522 Department of Constitutional Affairs 'Procurement of Criminal Defence Services: Market-based reform' 
(2006) http://www.legalaidprocurementreview.org.uk/docs/leaflet_pcapp.pdf accessed on 24 February 
2012 
523 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 53 
524 Leech, S. 'Solicitors 'Deserting' Legal Aid' (2006) 
www.http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/6115514.stm accessed on 20 
February 2012. 
525 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 55 
526 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009). 
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Ǥǳ527 Solicitors had protested that the Criminal Defence Service contracts which ǯadvice deserts but the majority of firms 
reluctantly agreed to sign the new agreements.528 ǯȋǮǯȌe 
firms bidding to perform certain services in certain areas.529 The BVT proposals 
proved to be extremely controversial and were repeatedly postponed.530 The Legal 
Action Group ǯ 
 ǲǮǯǤǮǯǡ
funded legal sector has evolved in a complex and haphazard fashion, and is one Ǥǳ531 
Nevertheless, the government announced proposals for significant, rapid change in 
April 2013, which initially included a revised form of BVT referred to as Price 
Competitive Tendering.532 Those proposals are further considered below.  
 Economist Peter Grindley was asked by the Law Society to assess the likely 
impact of the Carter proposals,533 and the issues he identified resonate with current 
concerns. Grindleyǯ noted that the reforms would require major 
                                                          
527 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 126 
528 Rozenberg J, 'New Deal Unlawful, Say Solicitors' The Telegraph (29 March 2007). 
529 Carter, P Lord Carter's Review of Legal Aid Procurement - Legal Aid: A Market-based Approach to Reform 
(2006) 
530 Baksi, C. 'Ken Clarke Postpones Legal Aid Reforms and Tendering' (2011) 
<http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/ken-clarke-postpones-legal-aid-reforms-and-tendering> accessed 
on 14 August 2012. Goriely notes that competitive tendering has been shown to be detrimental to the 
quality of representation as lawyers become motivated to perform too little work (Goriely T, 'Revisiting 
the Debate Over Criminal Legal Aid Delivery Models: Viewing International Experience from a British 
Perspective' (1998) 5(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 7.) 
531 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 57 
532 Ministry of Justice, Transforming Legal Aid: Delivering a More Credible and Efficient System (Ministry of 
Justice CP14/2013, 2013) 
533 Grindley, P Legal Aid Reforms Proposed by the Carter Report - Analysis and Commentary (LECG 
Corporation, 2006) 
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reorganisation of firms providing legally aided advice and rǡǲǥǤǳ534 His analysis ǡǡǲǯ
costs have fallen by 0.1 per cent per year and per case by 0.5 per cent. After allowing Ǥǳ535 These 
findings demonstrate the fragility of legally aided advice and assistance, which could 
suffer long-term problems with sustainability if radical reform is introduced.  
ǯroposals; Austerity 
 In 2010, the Ministry of Justice asserted that, while the introduction of fixed 
fees and means testing had stabilised legal aid expenditure, the way that services 
were delivered needed to be restructured in order to be sustainable.536 In the same ǡ ? ?ǯ
appearances were represented by a solicitor, and nearly all of them were publicly 
funded537 which suggests that the majority of defendants were still able to access 
state funded legal assistance. The Ministry of Justice indicated that it wanted to 
create a system which 
 ǲǥ
sustainable and stable marketǥ

                                                          
534 Grindley, P Legal Aid Reforms Proposed by the Carter Report - Analysis and Commentary (LECG 
Corporation, 2006); 3 
535 Grindley, P Legal Aid Reforms Proposed by the Carter Report - Analysis and Commentary (LECG 
Corporation, 2006); 4 
536 Ministry of Justice, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services (Ministry of Justice, 2010) 
537 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
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ǥǥǤǳ538  
 ǯǲrst priority is to reduce the ǥǳ,539 and that it was trying to ensure 
that the legal aid system ran as efficiently as possible. The LSC was replaced by the 
Legal Aid Agency, which has been specifically brought under the remit of the 
Ministry of Justice540 and has sought even greater control over legal aid expenditure. 
If efficiency becomes the only way in which the state is able to justify spending on ǡǯ
political discourse and this becomes more acute as greater pressure is placed on 
government spending targets. There is however a constant contradiction in the 
governǯǡ
key, and its desire to restrict access to legal aid. 
  
ǡǲ
cases need to brought before the court in the first place, and whether magistrates Ǥǳ541 This is unlikely to occur while, as ǡǲǥǡrt, because the Government 
lacks a genuine commitment to equal access to justice that the scope of legal aid 
                                                          
538 Ministry of Justice, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services (Ministry of Justice, 2010); 
10 
539 Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Reform: Legal Aid Remuneration (Criminal). Impact Assessment (Ministry 
of Justice, 2010); 14 
540 Baksi C, 'MoJ Ushers in Coates to Head Legal Aid Agency' (2013) (4 March) Law Society Gazette 2. 
541 Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992); 116. At the same time, however, solicitors bemoan the introduction and increased use of 
diversionary measures (discussed in subsequent chapters) which, although there are real concerns about 
their appropriateness, also reduced the amount of work available.  
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remains so restrictiveǳ.542 Legal aid has become more restricted since that statement 
was written Ǯǯ.  This ǯ
approaches to publicly funded representation has swung back in favour of cost 
control and efficiency and away from due process and individual rights.  
 Additionally, this period of government saw the appointment of the first non-
lawyer Lord Chancellor, Chris Grayling, demonstrating further a commitment to 
market, rather than traditional legal, principles. Grayling made clear his distrust of 
lawyers and his time as Lord Chancellor saw the introduction of further measures 
designed to regulate lawyer behaviour, such as a (self-assessed) quality assurance 
scheme543 and a requirement for all publicly contracted criminal defence firms to 
obtain a quality practice accreditation.544 Notably, those accreditation schemes 
relate largely to how the firm operates as opposed to the quality of advice given and 
provide an example of government commitment to management of criminal defence 
services rather than the quality of access to justice. These issues provide additional 
evidence of the way in which neoliberal politics adapts to crisis in that the Coalition ǯ
executive to adopt policies that placed even greater reliance on market-based 
practices rather than traditional legal values. 
                                                          
542 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 6 
543 See 'Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates' <http://www.qasa.org.uk/> accessed on 29 December 
2014. 
544 See 'Specialist Quality Mark' (2014) <http://www.sqm.uk.com/> accessed on 29 December 2014. 
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  The latest legislation to alter the terms of publicly funded representation is the ǡ ? ? ? ?ȋǮǯȌǤ545 So far as 
criminal legal aid is concerned, Section 17(2) re-states the Widgery criteria to be 
considered when determining the interests of justice test (subject to a power of 
amendment conferred on the Lord Chancellor) and Section 21 allows regulations to 
be made in relation to means testing. The Coalition government expressed a desire, 
through LASPO, to reduce criminal legal aid expenditure by eight per cent between 
2009/10 and 2014/15.546  In fact, the amendments are reducing criminal legal aid 
fees by a stated 17.5 per cent over two years, along with reduced police station fixed 
fees.547 This led Justice to accuse the government of focussing too much on inputs 
(funds) rather than outputs (justice).548 While the Ministry of Justice asserted that ǲded beyond its original ǡǳ549 Smith argued that its scope was drafted widely on purpose.550 The ǯǤ
It argued that it was legitimate to do so on the basis that the system of publicly 
funded representation had grown beyond its core aims, but the government did not 
                                                          
545 The provisions of LASPO have had a profound effect on civil legal aid provision and the provisions 
relating to criminal legal aid were less far reaching. The controversial proposal to introduce means 
testing for police station matters was abandoned (Baksi C, 'Means-testing Plan Abandoned' (2012) (2 
February) Law Society Gazette 2). 
546 Baksi C, 'Labour Would 'Rebalance' Justice System' (2012)(3 May) Law Society Gazette 3  
547 Ministry of Justice. 'Transforming Legal Aid - Next Steps: Government Response'(2014) 
<https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/transforming-legal-aid-next-steps> accessed on 
14 April 2014). The need to make cuts to this extent is questioned by lawyers and economists, who note a 
general decline in legal aid expenditure due to a number of factors, such as the widespread use of out of 
court disposals (Gazette Newsdesk, 'Research Bolsters Case Against Cuts' (2014)(13 January) Law Society 
Gazette 1) 
548 Smith, R 'Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill.' Second Reading Debate. Briefing on ǯȋǡ ?011) 
549 Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Reform: Scope Changes. Impact Assessment (Ministry of Justice, 2010) 
550 Smith, R Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales. Response (Justice. February 2011) 
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articulate what those aims were. In this way, the government was able to justify 
restricting access to legal aid while also maintaining the appearance of legitimacy. 
  Although the introduction of BVT was repeatedly postponed because the ǲ
the efficient, re-ǡǳ551 it has 
stated that the department remains committed to a scheme which would see 
contracts with larger scope being offered to a smaller number of firms, and thus 
proposes a more rigorous form of tendering.552 This was indeed the model proposed 
in 2013, and a similar model is now being implemented in the face of staunch 
criticism, albeit without a price competition element. Under this scheme, firms are Ǯǯǡ
there will be a limited number of contracts offered per county, and there will be fee 
cuts and requirements to provide wider area coverage.553  The High Court initially 
declared the consultation process unlawful but the government, after a further brief 
period of consultation, continued its position in relation to legal aid contracts.554 In 
December 2014, the process was made the subject of a stay by the High Court 
pending further judicial review555 but it is now being implemented. 
  Further cuts in the legal aid budget and implementation of the new contracting 
scheme will reduce the number of criminal defence firms. This would have a 
                                                          
551 Ministry of Justice, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services (Ministry of Justice, 2010); 3 
552 Ministry of Justice, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services (Ministry of Justice, 2010) 
553 Ministry of Justice. 'Transforming Legal Aid - Next Steps: Government Response' (2014) 
<https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/transforming-legal-aid-next-steps> accessed on 
14 April 2014. 
554 The Queen on the application of London Criminal Courts Solicitors Association and Criminal Law  
Solicitors Association -v -The Lord Chancellor  [2014] EWHC 3020 (Admin) 
555 The Law Society. 'Legal Aid Crime Duty Contracts Process to be Suspended ' (2014) 
<http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/news/press-releases/legal-aid-crime-duty-contracts-process-to-be-
suspended/> accessed on 29 December 2014. 
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negative effect on client choice,556 which is an important check to encourage a good 
level of service through competition.557 The Ministry of Justice acknowledges that 
firms are already asserting that criminal legal aid work is unsustainable and note ǲ
significant number. We cannot predict how quickly this might happen, or the impact 
on the provision of serǤǳ558 The effects of ongoing changes remain to be seen.  
Clearly the economic crisis requires the government to appropriately manage 
the resources available to fund public services, but those decisions must not be made ǲǳ559 about the necessity and operation of publicly 
funded representation. The Legal Aid Practitioners Group argues that the ǲǤǳ560 It seems that the Criminal Law Solicitors Association may be correct ǲ
ǳǤ561 Such 
observations highlight governmental preference for efficiency over due process. 
 The Coalition government appears therefore to have continued the move away 
from due process, welfarist principles of legal aid provision in favour of contracting 
legal aid via managerial techniques, which was justified by a distrust of lawyer 
                                                          
556 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
557 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
558 Ministry of Justice, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services (Ministry of Justice, 2010); 4 
559 Storer, C Legal Aid Practitioners Group Response to the Ministry of Justice Consultation: Proposals for the 
Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales (Legal Aid Practitioners Group, 2011); 4 
560 Storer, C Legal Aid Practitioners Group Response to the Ministry of Justice Consultation: Proposals for the 
Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales (Legal Aid Practitioners Group, 2011); 6 
561 Criminal Law Solicitors Association, 'Response to the Ministry of Justice Consultation paper " The 
Award of Costs from Central Funds"; 14 
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behaviour and austerity drives. While I have referred to particular points at which 
neoliberal approaches to legal aid have exhibited a distrust of lawyer behaviour, this 
topic merits detailed examination in its own right.  
Changes to legal aid and lawyer behaviour 
Traditionally, the professional paradigm of legal practice embodied a ǲǳǤ562 However, Newman observes that, in UK governments after the  ? ? ? ?ǡǲto the previous sympathetic professional portrayal, there ǳǤ563 This, coupled with the rise of consumerist  ? ? ? ?ǡǮǯǮǯǤ564 ǲǮǯǮǯǮǯǳǤ565 ǯǯǮǯǡ566 which 
resonates with comments made by the participants in my research. ǲǯrts by publicly-funded ǳǤ567 As a result, the government ǯ
                                                          
562 Sommerlad H, 'Criminal Legal Aid Reforms and the Restructuring of Legal Professionalism' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Legal Aid: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 293 
563 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013); 13 
564 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013); 87 
565 Sommerlad H, 'Criminal Legal Aid Reforms and the Restructuring of Legal Professionalism' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Legal Aid: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 23 
566 Sommerlad, H and Wall, D Legally Aided Clients and their Solicitors (The Law Society Research Study 
34, 1999) 
567 Young R, 'Will Widgery do? Court Clerks, Discretion and the Determination of Legal Aid Applications' 
in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone Press 1996); 140 
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proceedings but this did not produce the expected degree of cost control.568 Bridges ǯ
were stable between 1993 and 2001.569 At the same time, lawyers were accused of 
extending the time that cases took to be dealt with in order to cope with low annual 
increases in remuneration rates.570 ǡǲ
provoked an unprecedented level of debate about the merits and demerits of 
existing arrangements and the form which fǤǳ571  
ǡǲǤǳ572 Thus, in the mid-
1990s, the supplier induced demand theory became popular in policy circles, not 
least in relation to criminal legal aid provision.573 The theory suggests that lawyers 
construct the need for legal services by providing unnecessary services,574 and 
thereby aim to achieve a particular target income each year.575 Bridges576 and 
Goriely577 note however that the supplier induced demand hypothesis is unproven, 
                                                          
568 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
569 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005) 
570 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005) 
571 Young R and Wall D, Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone Press 1996); v 
572 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (ed), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 51 
573 
ǲ-ǥ
argued that professionals behave as economically rational individuals by seeking to maximise their Ǥǳȋ
ǡ ?ǣ
International Experience from a British Perspective' (1998) 5(1) International Journal of the Legal 
Profession 7; 14) 
574 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
575 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005) 
576 Bridges L, 'The Reform of Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: 
Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996) 
577 Goriely T, 'Revisiting the Debate Over Criminal Legal Aid Delivery Models: Viewing International 
Experience from a British Perspective' (1998) 5(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 7 
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ǲǤǳ578 Theories 
of this nature are consistent with the above-mentioned change in attitude towards 
public service professionals since the 1960s. As Le Grand notes, during this period 
neoliberal principles expressed concern about the inefficient, wasteful nature of 
public service institutions as those working within the apparatus of the welfare state 
"are no longer assumed to be...public spirited altruists (knights)...instead they are all 
considered to be in one way or another self-interested (knaves)."579  
ǡ	ǯresearch, conducted between 1988 and 
1994, suggested that solicitors reacted to fee changes by reducing the amount of 
work they did on cases that would clearly not exceed the threshold for a lower 
standard fee.580 They also found that firms were splitting case fees where there was 
more than one charge alleged so that two claims could be made.581 However, the 
evidence did not support the contention that solicitors would increase core costs to 
ensure that cases went beyond the standard fee categories.582 Stephen, Fazio and 
Tata found that following the reintroduction of standard fees, solicitors were putting 
                                                          
578 Tata, C and Stephen, F. ''Swings and Roundabouts': Do Changes to the Structure of Legal Aid 
Remuneration Make a Real Difference to Criminal Case Management and Case 
Outcomes?'http://staff.law.strath.ac.uk/staff/cyrus_tata/public/Swingsper cent20andper 
cent20Roundaboutsper cent20Draft106.pdf accessed on 10 April 2012; 2. See also Tata, C and Stephen, F. 
'The Impact of Fixed Payments: the effect on case management, case trajectories, and 'quality' in criminal 
defence work' http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/5420/2/impact_of_fixed_payments_Tata_and_Stephen.pdf 
accessed on 10 April 2012. 
579 Le Grand J, 'Knights, Knaves or Pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy' (1997) 26(2) Journal of 
Social Policy 149; 149 
580 
ǡǡ	ǡǮ	 ?ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ. 
581 See also Goriely T, 'Revisiting the debate over criminal legal aid delivery models: viewing international 
experience from a British perspective' (1998) 5(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 7. 
582 
ǡǡ	ǡǮ Analysis of Standard Fees in Magistrates' Court Criminal ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲǳ
the system, and are therefore sceptical about the claims made (Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced 
Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work (Legal Services Research Centre, 2005); 12) 
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ǲ
which are incorporated in the core payment of the standard fee and increasing Ǥǳ583 This 
behaviour allowed lawyers to increase the volume of cases taken, thereby 
demonstrating economically rational behaviour. 584  
Young and Wall describe the supplier induced deǲ-
simplistic model of human behaviour, in which actions are driven only by self-
interest, and which pays no regard to the social and institutional context shaping and 
constraining case-Ǥǳ585 Instead, Cape and Moorhead identify several 
non-supplier based factors which contribute to rising costs; increased case 
complexity, increased case length, heavy reliance on counsel, non-standard fee cases, 
changes in defence practice (such as more frequent requests for advance disclosure 
since the 1990s), prosecutorial decisions and generous approaches to the merits 
test.586 Newman, while critical of lawyer behaviour, also notes increased complexity 
in summary criminal proceedings, justifying greater levels of representation.587 As is 
discussed in chapter five, this appears to have increased the legalisation of 
proceedings.  
                                                          
583 Stephen, F. Fazio, G and Tata C, 'Incentives, Criminal Defence Lawyers and Plea Bargaining' (2008) 
28(3) International Review of Law and Economics 212; 213 
584Stephen, F. Fazio, G and Tata C, 'Incentives, Criminal Defence Lawyers and Plea Bargaining' (2008) 
28(3) International Review of Law and Economics 212; 213. See also Tata, C and Stephen, F. 'The Impact of 
Fixed Payments: The Effect on Case Management, Case Trajectories, and 'Quality' in Criminal Defence 
Work' <http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/5420/2/impact_of_fixed_payments_Tata_and_Stephen.pdf> 
accessed on 10 April 2012. 
585 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 18. 
Cape and Moorhead go further, stating that the model suggests that a large number of lawyers would be 
prepared to act in a quasi-fraudulent manner to secure income. (Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand 
Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work (Legal Services Research Centre, 2005)) 
586 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005) 
587 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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ǲ
criminal justice field by the level and frequency of reform, which means that the 
abilǤǳ588 However, they later 
report that a cost increase resulting from the duty solicitor at court scheme may 
have been supplier-ǲ-efficient mix of 
representation ǮǯǤǳ589 Despite this, profit 
costs only rose in line with RPI and at a lower rate than GDP until the introduction of 
the contracting scheme (described below), after which there was an initial increase 
in costs which then levelled out, contrary to the supplier induced demand 
hypothesis.590  
Both lawyers and the Legal Services Research Centre have raised concerns 
that frequent changes to legal aid are causing solicitors to leave the profession;591 
concerns about attracting qualifying solicitors; and concerns about the quality of 
work592 provided when there is no incentive to spend a significant amount of time 
on individual cases. Tata and Stephen found that solicitors believed remuneration 
                                                          
588 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005); 3 
589 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005); 39 
590 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005) 
591 See, for example, Leech, S. 'Solicitors 'deserting' legal aid' (2006) 
<www.http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/6115514.stm> accessed on 
20 February 2012. 
592 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011. 
Similar comments about remuneration and low status had been noted by McConville et al (McConville M, 
Hodgson J, Bridges L and Pavlovic, A Standing Accused. The Organisation and Practices of Criminal Defence 
Lawyers in Britain (Oxford University Press 1994)) and Grindley (Grindley, P Legal Aid Reforms Proposed 
by the Carter Report - Analysis and Commentary (LECG Corporation, 2006)). It is however important to 
note that, even in the 1970s, there were concerns that the provision of a lawyer would not necessarily 
protect defendants from unfair treatment (Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process 
(Routledge, 1976), Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976), McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, 
the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981)) 
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changes meant that they were spending less time on face to face contact with clients, 
and that this caused defence work to be less effective.593 This approach is coupled 
with an institutional desire for efficiency which forces defendants to enter pleas at 
the first hearing regardless of whether or not legal aid has been granted.594  This 
means that solicitors are pressurised into dealing with cases in routinised ways,595 
which is facilitated by the professional networks already used to conduct cases at 
speed, as set out in chapter two. McConville et al. found that such problems existed 
in the early 1990s,596 and they are likely to have worsened given that further drives 
for efficiency and cost cutting have occurred since that time. These problems were 
evident in my research, as is discussed in the following chapters. 
Concerns about quality of representation become acute when one considers 
that clients tend to assume a passive role in the lawyer-client relationship,597 as a ǲǡnd Ǥǳ598 Such passivity is encouraged by workgroup networks that 
                                                          
593Tata, C and Stephen, F. ''Swings and Roundabouts': Do Changes to the Structure of Legal Aid 
Remuneration Make a Real Difference to Criminal Case Management and Case Outcomes?' 
<http://staff.law.strath.ac.uk/staff/cyrus_tata/public/Swingsper cent20andper cent20Roundaboutsper 
cent20Draft106.pdf> accessed on 10 April 2012. See also Tata, C and Stephen, F. 'The Impact of Fixed 
Payments: The Effect on Case Management, Case Trajectories, and 'Quality' in Criminal Defence Work' 
<http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/5420/2/impact_of_fixed_payments_Tata_and_Stephen.pdf> accessed on 
10 April 2012. 
594 Riddle H, 'The Stop Delaying Justice! Initiative' (2012) (19 January) Law Society Gazette. 
595 Wall D, 'Keyholders to Criminal Justice? Solicitors and Applications for Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996) 
596 McConville M, Hodgson J, Bridges L and Pavlovic A, and others, Standing Accused. The Organisation and 
Practices of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Oxford University Press 1994). 
597 Tata, C. Goriely, T. Duff, P. Henry, A and Sherr, A. 'Does Mode of Delivery Make a Difference to Criminal 
Case Outcomes and Clients' Satisfaction? The Public Defence Solicitor Experiment' (2004) (Feb) Criminal 
Law Review 120. 
598 Tata, C and Stephen, F. 'The Impact of Fixed Payments: The Effect on Case Management, Case 
Trajectories, and 'Quality' in Criminal Defence Work' 
<http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/5420/2/impact_of_fixed_payments_Tata_and_Stephen.pdf> accessed on 
10 April 2012; 12 
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exacerbate the marginalisation of defendants. Tata and Stephen further, and 
significantly, note: ǲf 
defence work, the profession places itself in a bind which government can easily 
exploit. Policy officials know that the profession will not ever concede publicly Ǥǳ599 
As discussed above, in line with the neoliberal preference for market-based 
approaches to public services, there has been a move to market-based efficiency.  
The criminal justice system is not however a rational market.600 In this context, the 
National Audit Office noted in 2009 that the former Legal Services Commission was 
unable to understand its supplier base,601 ǲǳ602 ǲǤǳ603 ǲ
need for legal advice is an imprecise concept, making it difficult to quantify the Ǥǳ604 The LAA however operates in a 
monopsonistic605 way which enables it to try and control the market via price setting 
                                                          
599 Tata, C and Stephen, F. 'The Impact of Fixed Payments: The Effect on Case Management, Case 
Trajectories, and 'Quality' in Criminal Defence Work' 
<http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/5420/2/impact_of_fixed_payments_Tata_and_Stephen.pdf> accessed on 
10 April 2012; 21. In fact, the participants in my research did appear to acknowledge this.  
600 Edwards A, 'Will Defendants Survive Changes to Criminal Legal Aid?' (2011) 86 Criminal Justice 
Matters. 
601 National Audit Office 'C&AG Report on Accounts: Community Legal Service Fund and Criminal Defence 
Service accounts 2008-09' http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/lsc_accounts.aspx accessed on 24 
February 2012. 
602 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 1 
603 Law Society. 'Access to Justice Review' (2010) 
<http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/new/documents/2010/access-to-justice-review.pdf> accessed on 15 
August 2012; 3 
604 Steele J and Seargent J, Access to Legal Services. The Contribution of Alternative Approaches (Policy 
Studies Institute 1999); 67 
605 This situation arises when there is a single buyer of services (the Legal Aid Agency) and many 
suppliers, which enables the buyer to have a significant degree of control over the market (Hynes S and 
Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009)). 
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and work volume control.606 ǲinterests of defendants have rarely 
been uppermost in the minds of those who, at a macro and micro level, have been Ǥǳ607 
ǡǲ
be a fully free market when the government remains the sole procurer of services, 
where the client is likely to be ill-informed about the quality of the service and is not Ǥǳ608  
It is clear that neoliberal polices focused on managerialism and efficiency 
have made governments sceptical about the propriety of lawyer behaviour. 
Paradoxically, the government also recognised that the presence of lawyers in ǯǤ
government therefore remains, to an extent, reliant on lawyersǯ
summary criminal proceedings to achieve its aim of efficient case progression. This 
paradox is also manifest in the processes of obtaining legally aided representation, 
which serve indirectly to marginalise defendants further.  
Legal aid, bureaucracy and marginalisation 
            While applications for legal aid are written as if they are completed by 
defendants, it is common for applications to be filled in by solicitors609 who were 
adept at completing  such applications in ways which would try to second guess 
                                                          
606 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009). 
607 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (eds), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 52 
608 Grindley, P Legal Aid Reforms Proposed by the Carter Report - Analysis and Commentary (LECG 
Corporation, 2006); 9 
609 Wilcox, A. and Young, R Understanding the Interests of Justice. A Study of Discretion in the Determination 
of Applications for Representation Orders in Magistrates' Courts. Report to the Legal Services Commission 
(Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, 2005) 
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ǯǤ610 ǲ ?ǡ ? ? ?
for criminal legal aid studied by Wall and Wood, and the 1,201 examined by Young et 
al, were completed by clients themselves."611 Indeed, the Administrative Court has 
noted that the application process for legal aid in criminal proceedings is, for ǡǲ-Ǥǳ612   
This indicates the way in which bureaucratic procedures can increase the 
marginalisation of defendants. 
            Applications for legal aid were, until the beginning of the twenty-first century, ǯǤ
as the decision-making process was concerned, Justice co ? ? ? ?ǲ
have little doubt that the single most important element in decisions about 
representation is the approach of the clerk of the court to the unrepresented Ǥǳ613 Similarly, Young noted that clerks were given broad discretion when 
determining whether to grant legal aid,614 and he suggests that ensuring court 
efficiency influenced the frequent decisions to allow the application.615 High grant 
                                                          
610 Wall D, 'Keyholders to Criminal Justice? Solicitors and Applications for Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996) 
611 Wall D, 'Keyholders to Criminal Justice? Solicitors and Applications for Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 117.  
612 Jakub Stopyra Ȃand- District Court of Lublin, Poland, Stopyra Ȃand- The Regional Court of Ostoleka, 
Poland, Debreceni Ȃand- Hajdu-Bihar County Court, Hungary [2012] EWHC 1787 (Admin); para. 39 
613 Justice, The Unrepresented Defendant in Magistrates' Courts (British Section of the International Cmssn 
of Jurists, 1971); 41 
614 Young R, 'Will Widgery do? Court Clerks, Discretion and the Determination of Legal Aid Applications' 
in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone Press 1996). See also Young R, 'The Merits of Legal Aid in the Magistrates' Courts' (1993) 
(May) Criminal Law Review 336. 
615 Young found that clerks were prepared Ǯǯ
courtroom efficiency (Young R, 'Will Widgery do? Court Clerks, Discretion and the Determination of Legal 
Aid Applications' in Young, R. and Wall, D (Eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the 
Defence of Liberty ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌȌǤǲ
bureaucratic interest in ensuring high levels of legal representation as this assists in the administrative 
processing of their own case-ǳȋdges L, 'The Reform of Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
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rates relieved the clerk of some of the duties that must be exercised towards 
unrepresented defendants and allowed for more out of court negotiation between 
the prosecution and defence, thereby saving court time.616 Thus the presence of 
lawyers, as members of the professional network, assisted the smooth operation of 
the courtroom workgroup, but government distrust of professional discretion in 
public services may have been fuelled by high legal aid grant rates. 
 ǯǯnd the reintroduction of ǡǯ
proceedings.617 Lawyers argued that the Legal Services Commission failed to 
properly pilot and evaluate the re-introduction of means testing in the magistratesǯ
courts, which resulted in delay and uncertainty in terms of knowing if and when 
legal aid had been granted.618 That delay and uncertainty contributed to the 
marginalisation of defendants who were unable to play an active role in the process. 
            In addition, Wilcox and Young note that, as a consequence of efficiency drives 
in summary proceedings, there is often insufficient time to allow legal aid 
applications to be processed between arrest, charge and first court appearance.619 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 
282) 
616 Young R, 'Will Widgery do? Court Clerks, Discretion and the Determination of Legal Aid Applications' 
in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲ
accused consume sigǥǡ
criminal justice system depends on informal plea discussions that regularly go on between Crown and ǤǳǡǡJustice Denied. The Causes of BC's Criminal Justice System Crisis (BC Civil 
Liberties Association, 2012); 21, 22. These issues are discussed in both the preceding and the data 
analysis chapters. 
617 Provisions which allowed the reintroduction of means testing were made via the Criminal Defence 
Service Act 2006, which amended the Access to Justice Act 1999. 
618 ǡǤǡǡǮ ?ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
619 Wilcox, A. and Young, R Understanding the Interests of Justice. A Study of Discretion in the Determination 
of Applications for Representation Orders in Magistrates' Courts. Report to the Legal Services Commission 
(Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, 2005) 
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Applications for legal aid are now submitted to the Legal Aid Agency administration 
centres,620 along with numerous documents,621 and processed thereafter. The former 
LSC came under serious criticism for delay in processing applications, which left 
people unrepresented in serious cases.622 As District judge ǡǲ
LSC might be protecting its budget (but the administrative costs of processing and 
then rejecting these applications are not inconsequential) but more importantly it is 
doing so to the obvious detriment of other budgets."623 These issues demonstrate 
how the desire to manage legal aid expenditure has inadvertently exacerbated the 
marginalisation of defendants from the process of summary criminal justice by 
causing greater delay and uncertainty.  
            Soliciǲ
of the means test could be too onerous for some people and this could have the 
unintended consequences of restricting access for eligible applicants, particularly 
those who are vulnerablǤǳ624 Kemp further found that those who are self-employed 
particularly struggled to obtain legal aid due to the burdensome requirements about 
                                                          
620 Applications made in Kent are sent to the Legal Aid Agency team in Birmingham. 
621 Wage slips, previous convictions, charge sheets, and bank statements and, for self-employed 
applicants, full tax returns and accounts. 
622 Baksi, C and Hyde, J, 'LSC Debt Collection Tactics Slammed' (2011) (16 March) Law Society Gazette 1. 
The administration centres have also been criticised for delay in processing applications (Baksi C, 
'Djanogly Urged to Ease Legal Aid Backlog' (2011) (23 June) Law Society Gazette 3). See Jakub Stopyra Ȃ
and- District Court of Lublin, Poland, Stopyra Ȃand- The Regional Court of Ostoleka, Poland, Debreceni Ȃand- 
Hajdu-Bihar County Court, Hungary [2012] EWHC 1787 (Admin).   
623 Jakub Stopyra Ȃand- District Court of Lublin, Poland, Stopyra Ȃand- The Regional Court of Ostoleka, 
Poland, Debreceni Ȃand- Hajdu-Bihar County Court, Hungary [2012] EWHC 1787 (Admin); para 5. The 
system by which legal aid applications are processed has not, in practice changed since the establishment 
of the Legal Aid Agency. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognised that the triage service provided 
by the duty solicitor is often insufficient (Lukazewski v The District Court in Torun, Poland [2012] UKSC 
20). 
624 Mental illness, learning difficulty and language barriers seemed to be particular problems (Kemp, V 
Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011; 6) 
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the provision of evidence in support of an application for funding.625 As will be seen 
below, this finding was supported by comments made within my primary research. 
There is also concern that the funding thresholds for criminal legal aid are set too ǡǲ
presented by speakers during parliamentǤǳ626 The Criminal Law ǲ75 ǥǯǤǳ627 
 Furthermore, the transfer of the decision-making process from the court to the ǯ
vision of how legal aid should be administered, and is subject to little performance 
monitoring or supervision.628 This is of particular concern because  ǲ not as well placed as the court-based legal advisers to 
assess when a case is likely to involve legal complexity or result in a custodial Ǥǳ629 
Moreover, such administrative staff do not operate in the courtroom on a daily basis, 
which means that they do not form part of the ordinary courtroom workgroup and 
are less likely to be concerned about maintaining co-operative relationships than 
court clerks, who are likely to regard co-operation as beneficial to the court process. 
Administrative decision-making is also likely to increase marginalisation 
                                                          
625 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
626 ǡǮ-ǣǫǯȋ 
Policy Institute, 2006); 2 
627 Criminal Law Solicitors Association, 'Response to the Ministry of Justice Consultation paper "The 
Award of Costs from Central Funds"; 7 
628 Young R and Wilcox A, 'The Merits of Legal Aid in the Magistrates' Courts Revisited' (2007) (February) 
Criminal Law Review 109. 
629 Young R and Wilcox A, 'The Merits of Legal Aid in the Magistrates' Courts Revisited' (2007)(February) 
Criminal Law Review 109; 117 
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experienced by defendants as legal aid becomes harder to obtain while the 
complexity of proceedings increases. 
  Despite the reintroduction of means testing in 2008, Kemp notes that by 2010 ǲamined the impact of the change on defendants accessing legal ǳ630 ǯǤ-ǲ
defendants to plead guilty to avoid the fiǤǳ631 Lawyers in Kent 
described the system as discriminatory, unfair and unworkable.632 Lawyer led 
campaign groups felt that the reintroduction of means testing placed considerable ǡǲr the cost of administering ǳǡ
and liaise between the legal aid body and the client.633 This demonstrates that in fact 
governments remain, to an extent, reliant on lawyers to ensure the system continues 
to operate and thereby provides at least a veneer of legitimacy.  These issues are 
examined further in chapter six. 
                                                          
630 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010)accessed 12 December 2011; 16 
631 Justice, 'Crown Court Means Testing - JUSTICE response ' 
<http://www.justice.org.uk/resources.php/198/crown-court-means-testing-justice-response> accessed 
on 10 December 2011; 2.  
632 Baksi, C 'Abolish 'Unfair' Means Testing, say Criminal Lawyers' (2012) 
<www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/abolish-unfair-means-testing-say-criminal-lawyers> accessed on 11 
October 2012. Kemp notes however that the re-ǯǲ ? ? ?ǤǳȋǡTransforming 
Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011; 
69) 
633 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever happened to legal aid? (Legal Action Group 2009); 118 ǡǲ
pressures that cuts in legal aid have caused barrǤǳȋǡ ?	
Change Lawful' (2012)(5 April) Law Society Gazette 2) 
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Conclusion 
The present system of publicly funded representation developed throughout 
the last half of the twentieth century as initial concerns about the appearance of 
legitimacy and, later, welfarist approaches to government increased access to justice. 
As liberal welfarism became concerned to promote individual rights, due process in 
the criminal justice system and the provision of publicly funded representation 
became increasingly important. Further, political crises in the early years of 
neoliberal government meant that legal aid was promoted to legitimise state 
processes and enhance individualisation.  
Subsequently, neoliberal governments adopted management-oriented 
approaches as a result of a need to save money by reducing welfare expenditure, 
particularly after New Labour came to power. The preference for managerialism and 
distrust of public service professionals led governments to be concerned that 
lawyers were simply exploiting the system and so further measures were introduced 
to incentivise efficient working practices and cut costs. These measures have 
undermined access to justice, reduced the quality of that access which does exist and 
caused providers to feel resentment towards funding processes. These problems 
appear to have indirectly increased the marginalisation experienced by defendants. ǯes to publicly 
funded representation have resulted in a complex and fragile system from which 
defendants are increasingly marginalised.  
This, and the preceding chapters have demonstrated the complex nature of 
neoliberalism in summary criminal proceedings. I now turn to an empirical 
interrogation of those issues.  
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Chapter 4: Efficiency and Marginalisation in Summary Criminal Proceedings 
Introduction ǯ
in chapters one and two.  In this chapter, I will consider some of the issues that arose 
from the primary research in relation to demands for efficiency and how such 
demands have affected access to justice in terms of the ability of the defendant to 
participate effectively in the proceedings. 
As previously described, the demand for efficiency reflects the decline in 
welfare approaches to criminal justice634  and affects the way that prosecutors make 
decisions about how the case should proceed, the way that magistrates and clerks 
manage the throughput of cases as they enter the courtroom and the defence ǯǡǯ
progresses within the boundaries of the law. The effect could either facilitate or 
hinder access to justice for defendants, or the effects could be positive in some ways 
but negative in others. Ashworth and Redmayne have noted that policies which ǲ
necessarily determine treatment since the working practices of officials are what 
suspects and defendants actually experience. These practices may be more or less Ǥǳ635 
                                                          
634 Newburn, T and Sparks, R, 'Criminal Justice and Political Cultures' in Newburn, T and Sparks, R (ed), 
Criminal Justice and Political Cultures (Willan Publishing 2004). ǡǲǡǳȋZander M, Cases and Materials on the English 
Legal System (Oxford University Press 2007); 50) ǲake a virtue of ǳȋZander M, Cases and Materials on the English Legal 
System (Oxford University Press 2007); 57) 
635 Ashworth, A and Redmayne, M, The Criminal Process (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2005); 8 
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I have identified several ways in which efficiency drives appear to have 
manifested themselves in summary criminal proceedings. 636 The most significant 
appear to be a continued desire to process cases quickly and to reduce the number 
of court hearings per case, moves towards standardisation and an apparent increase 
in the use of district judges.  I will discuss each of these issues in turn, and consider ǯ
proceedings. Given that I have not interviewed defendants themselves, I intend to 
extract from the observations and interviews areas in which advocates feel their 
work has been affected and then consider the potential effect on the ability of 
defendants to participate in the proceedings.  
I suggest that external demands for efficiency disturbed the workgroups in 
the courtroom. Governments imposed policies designed to alter the conduct of court 
business, which has always operated with high degrees of co-operation among 
professional personnel. High degrees of co-operation tend to marginalise defendants 
from active participation in the proceedings.637 While the introduction of measures 
designed to improve efficiency caused disruption to the way that cases proceed, the 
culture of the workgroup appears to have adapted to accommodate the demands of 
initiatives such as CJ: SSS, which could further marginalise defendants. As work 
patterns are standardised in order to process cases as quickly as possible, the 
individual circumstances of defendants become less relevant.638 I will therefore 
                                                          
636 ǲǳ(E. Solomon, C. Eades, R. Garside and M. Rutherford, Ten Years of 
Criminal Justice under Labour: An Independent Audit (Centre for Crime and Justice Studies , 2007); 10) 
637 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). See also Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of 
Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World Review 203 
638 Howard, G and Freilich, J, 'Durkheim's Comparative Model and Criminal Justice Theory' in Duffee, D 
and Maguire, E (ed), Criminal Justice Theory: Explaining the Nature and Behaviour of Criminal Justice 
(Routledge 2007). 
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consider how and why external pressures can affect the behaviour of the courtroom 
workgroup. 
The findings generally support the idea that the criminal justice process has 
become increasingly subject to managerialist techniques of case progression, and 
highlight how some initiatives have affected summary criminal proceedings. I 
conclude by noting a surprising degree of cohesion and stability among court actors 
in east Kent even though there is also evidence to support the notion that different 
courtroom workgroups  actors prioritise and approach different goals in distinct 
ways.639 However, one element of the research also suggests that, when they feel 
that their hand is inappropriately forced, defence advocates will prefer solidarity 
with their clients to solidarity with their workgroup. I found that increased demands 
for efficiency may have further marginalised defendants, but defence advocates will ǡǡǯǤ
the reasons for this, I first consider court workgroup behaviour in general.  
How efficiency drives affect culture 
As is noted in chapter two, the courtroom operates as a field 640 in which 
professionals compromise in order to achieve particular ends. As such, workgroups 
are likely to modify their behaviour to absorb sporadic attempts at reform.641 This is 
likely to affect the way that defendants experience the proceedings given that they 
tend to assume a passive role in the lawyer/client relationship.642 Despite evidence 
                                                          
639 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
640 Bourdieu P, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38 (July) The Hastings 
Law Journal 805; 816 
641 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
642 McConville M and others, Standing Accused. The Organisation and Practices of Criminal Defence Lawyers 
in Britain (Oxford University Press 1994). 
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of socio-legal studies (discussed in chapter two) which confirmed that advocates 
acted in co-operative ways, governments remained concerned that defence lawyers ǲǡ-ǳ643 and were explicit about 
their desire to increase co-operation in the criminal justice system via various 
initiatives. I agree with ǯ
formal changes of law or policy and dilutes them in order to maintain the status 
quo,644 but there appears to be little actual resistance to such changes. 
When one of the primary aims of an initiative is to promote co-operation, it 
may mean that the interests of people beyond the immediate workgroup are Ǥǡǯ
reduced. Defence advocates tended to express the opinion that co-operation among 
advocates is important in order to maintain credibility with the court and CPS, and 
therefore be in a stronger position to negotiate.645 Similarly, Newman found that 
lawyers regarded good relationships with prosecutors as beneficial to clients.646 
Questions then arise as to whether defendants wish to negotiate, whether the ǯ
protected. This is likely to vary on a case by case basis and calls into question 
whether the use of negotiated outcomes assists speed and, if so, prioritises a desire 
for rapid case conclusion over defendant participation. Interviewee A acknowledged ǡǯ
facilitate the proceedings yet there seems to be a lot of scope for discussion to find 
                                                          
643 Faulkner D, 'Prospects for Progress in Penal Reform' (2007) 7(2) Criminology and Criminal Justice 135; 
136 
644 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
645 See, for example, interview K. 
646 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 
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ǲǤǳ647 ǡǯ648 ǡǡǯ649 
findings, the existence of professional compromise appears to remain a significant 
feature of summary criminal justice.  
Despite the fact that both shared and differing goals exist among the 
workgroup Ȃ see chapter two Ȃ all parties do however have an interest in 
maintaining co-operative relationships650 and dealing with cases expeditiously. It 
seems that relationships may become strained only at the occasional point at which 
shared and contrasting goals conflict. So, while defence advocates are prepared to 
co-operate with efficiency drives as long as they serve the purpose of maintaining 
co-operative relationships and dealing with cases expeditiously, when their 
particular goals are, they feel, unreasonably challenged they will employ specific 
legal provisions in order to place actor specific goals first Ȃ such as reliance on the 
burden and standard of proof in order to obtain full disclosure.651 As such, the 
ultimate source of power lies in recourse to legal provisions which form the basis of 
the criminal justice system, as is discussed below. Those provisions may be invoked, 
among other reasons, to protect client interests, which also serves a business 
interest in maintaining a good reputation. 
 The comments made by my interviewees may illustrate that, when push 
comes to shove, due process is the most important expressive goal to defence 
solicitors at the cost of the instrumental goal of speed. This suggests a desire to 
                                                          
647 Interview A; 8 
648 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
649 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
650 See, for example, interview K 
651 See, for example, interview E 
  
155 
 
ǯǡǤ
maintain the self-conception of legal professionals652 as service providers may also 
mean that advocates will behave in certain ways to maintain a particular image.653 In 
other words, as Young says, the effort used to preserve established work techniques 
may indicate that they are highly valued.654  This demonstrates the importance of 
particular goals in the maintenance of workgroup culture - even within the field 
itself.  However, it is also reasonable to conclude, based on both my observations and 
experience, that those cases in which reliance is placed on strict legal provisions are 
comparatively small in number. Thus, the evidence suggests a high degree of 
acceptance and co-operation among advocates, while a refusal to co-operate is 
exercised only in extreme cases. This may be demonstrative of Yǯ
interviews are more likely to uncover expressive as opposed to instrumental 
goals.655  Notably, however, my interviewees discussed the importance of both 
expressive and instrumental goals, in that they acknowledged a need for efficiency 
and co-operation among court personnel, as well as a desire to favour solidarity with 
clients over the court when necessary. Thus, interviewees appeared to be alive to a 
number of issues, some of which did not necessarily reflect well on their behaviour. 
All of the prosecutors interviewed656 felt that there is a good deal of co-
operation between defence advocates, the court and prosecutors. This appears to 
confirm that advocates tend to avoid antagonistic forms of behaviour. However, 
                                                          
652 Bourdieu P, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38 (July) The Hastings 
Law Journal 805 
653 On this point, see, for example, Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 
2013) and Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common 
Law World Review 203 
654 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203; 220 
655 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
656 Interviews H, J, L, M, N, P, Q 
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there was a tendency to think that co-operation among advocates has always been 
good,657 and that in fact the requirements of CJ: SSS antagonised those relationships 
because advocates felt that they were being unduly pressurised into premature 
decision making which challenged their professional standing in the workgroup and 
undermined co-operative relationships. Prosecutors experienced pressure from the 
court while pressure came from both the court and prosecutors for defence 
advocates. In order to combat those difficulties, advocates acknowledged that they ǲǡǡǡǳǤ658 ǯǡǲ
considǥǤǳ659  
It is important to note, at this juncture, the factor of local variation. 
Interviewees who had practised in London noted that there was less co-operation in 
the City as a result of the fact that advocates, as well as being arranged in an 
adversarial relationship, are less familiar with each other.660 Most criminal defence 
firms in east Kent are relatively small; the largest employ approximately 8 
advocates. This, along with the reasonably small geographical area in which they 
practise, may mean that advocates rarely exercise antagonistic behaviour as firms 
                                                          
657 This is evidenced by Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) and Bottoms, A and 
McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
658 Interview M; 8 
659 Newburn, T and Sparks, R, 'Criminal Justice and Political Cultures' in Newburn, T and Sparks, R (ed), 
Criminal Justice and Political Cultures (Willan Publishing 2004); 210 
660 See, for example, interviewees A and I. 
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compete with each other for clients and are keen to avoid being marginalised from 
local court culture.661 
The socially situated knowledge of summary criminal proceedings appears to 
be based on a high degree of co-operation among advocates, and always has been.662 
External disruption, such as the introduction of policy designed to increase 
productivity, to those predictable patterns causes a degree of tension until the new 
material has been absorbed and, where the group feels it appropriate, adapted.  
Interviewee J, a prosecutor, was of the view that there had never been any problem 
with co-ǲedure Rules came in and seemed to be 
ordering people to do this and do that and get down to the issues in the case but I ǳǤ663 This interviewee described an initial 
period of disruption to stable work patterns followed by acceptance and adaptation. 
All of the above supports Young's view that external influences are likely to result in 
an initial period of uncertainty, followed by acceptance of the requirement to make 
changes.664 This results in the establishment of amended norms for processing 
cases.665 It is in the process of adaptation that marginalisation of defendants may 
arise or be exacerbated as workgroup patterns are renegotiated. As advocates adapt 
to and accommodate change via compromise, the interests of defendants are at risk 
of becoming side-lined because that renegotiation is conducted in the context of 
ensuring that networks remain stable and experience as little disruption as possible. 
                                                          
661 McEvoy K, 'What Did the Lawyers Do During the 'War'? Neutrality, Conflict and the Culture of 
Quietism' (2011) 74(3) The Modern Law Review 350. 
662 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
663 Interview J; 11 
664 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
665 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
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This means that marginalisation and othering occurs as a by-product to the need to 
be efficient as opposed to being an explicit aim of the workgroup.  
Speed and reducing hearings  ? ? ? ?ǡǯ
that CJ: SSS had produced significant benefits in terms of reducing the number of 
hearings per case and reducing paperwork.666 In chapter six I discuss how the 
participants in my research felt that the magistrates' courts in east Kent are 
reluctant to adjourn proceedings in order for problems with obtaining publicly 
funded representation to be resolved, which means that defence advocates often 
conduct cases despite uncertainty about remuneration. While defence advocates 
bemoaned that situation, nearly half expressed the view that magistrates appeared 
to have no choice but to refuse applications to adjourn proceedings as a result of 
guidance contained in the provisions of CJ: SSS and Stop Delaying Justice!667 It seems 
that advocates expressed sympathy with the court, even though their own interests 
suffered and the interests of their clients were put at risk, which they attempted to 
absorb by continuing to provide a service. As will be seen below, advocates 
acknowledged that the adequacy of the service provided might be affected by this ǡǡǲǯto evaluate each case as ǥǯȂ and the two Ǥǳ668  
                                                          
666Straw, J. 'Magistrates' Association AGM' (2008) <www.justice.gov.uk/news/sp181108.htm> accessed 
on 19 July 2009. It should however be noted that E. Solomon, C. Eades, R. Garside and M. Rutherford, Ten 
Years of Criminal Justice under Labour: An Independent Audit (Centre for Crime and Justice Studies , 2007) ǲre has not been a significant step change in outcomes. Claims of success have been ǳȋ ? ?Ȍ 
667 Interviews A, B, C, D, E, G and O 
668 Rayner J, 'Duty Calls' (2009)(1 October) Law Society Gazette; 11 
  
159 
 
Furthermore, advocates acknowledged that, in conducting cases in this way, ǯess cases as quickly as possible. It seems 
therefore that advocates accepted that their continued co-operation enabled 
efficiency drives to succeed, even though they later expressed the view that 
premature decision-making reduced the quality of representation. Advocates 
appeared to justify their lack of resistance on the basis that the court had no choice 
but to refuse applications to adjourn proceedings. Clearly, however, advocates could 
have refused to represent clients unless they were sure of payment, which would 
have caused significant disruption to the courtroom and its level of efficiency.  By 
way of example, Interviewees A and D specifically noted that when means tested 
legal aid was initially reintroduced, it was relatively easy to secure an adjournment 
in order to resolve problems with publicly funded representation. Subsequently the 
courts were given guidance that they had to make progress in cases regardless of 
whether or not legal aid is in place and "some magistrates simply do what the clerk 
tells them and too many clerks simply say 'we're following the rules, you can't have 
an adjournment, there should be no adjournments simply because of legal aid 
problems.'"669  
Interviewee O also commented that after the introduction of CJ: SSS ǲ to lose their sympathies...They just had to straight away say 'I'm 
sorry we have to deal with this whether or not you've got legal aid.'"670 Two of the 
seven prosecutors interviewed also noted that the magistrates' courts were less 
likely to grant adjournments for legal aid to be resolved after CJ: SSS was introduced. 
                                                          
669 Interview B; 2 
670 Interview O; 2 
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Interviewee H expressed similar sentiments to the defence advocates who were 
interviewed in saying that the court used to be sympathetic but  
"unfortunately the current Criminal Procedure Rules have made the court be 
less sympathetic because the encouragement now is for the courts to make 
progress and therefore, despite them possibly being sympathetic, they feel 
compelled to make progress and therefore require the defence to press on".671  
There mǯ
refusing to act, including loyalty to the workgroup, loyalty to clients (by causing as 
little disruption as possible) and a desire to maintain their reputation by being seen 
to assist the court. The result is that defence solicitors assumed the problem of 
securing funding for representation but defendants still required advice at an early 
stage in the proceedings.672 It seems however that defence solicitors, for a variety of 
both altruistic and selfish reasons, have actually done little to resist that process 
because they continue to provide advice and assistance despite being unsure of 
payment, and those actions facilitate the volume processing of cases, which tends to 
limit discretion, as is discussed below. Solicitors displayed some awareness of this in 
accepting that they have acquiesced in the changes.673  
Advocates described the court as having no choice but to refuse to allow cases 
to be adjourned, and thereby displayed reluctance to criticise the workgroup itself. 
Interviewees tended to blame problems on the externally introduced policy rather 
than workgroup members. Interviewee C expressed the opinion that those who 
design initiatives such as CJ: SSS do not understand the causes of delay in 
                                                          
671 Interview H; 2 
672 Interview D. 
673 See, for example, interviews C and K. 
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magistrates' court proceedings, saying that such initiatives are imposed "in the 
flawed belief that delay in the court is caused by defence solicitors...most delay in my 
experience is caused by the CPS not being held to account for their time limits."674 As 
Ashworth and Redmayne previously noted, courtroom workgroups tend to take the 
view that externally imposed change reflected a lack of understanding by those who 
are not part of the workgroup. 675   
Further, interviewee F (a defence solicitor) was of the view that while CJ: SSS 
did encourage co-operation, it also imposed unrealistic timetables on defence 
advocates who are unlikely to have access to case papers before the first hearing 
date.676 	ǯminal ǲǡǤǳ677 This seemed to cause tension between the ǲ
very short period of time and then make decisions for which you can be criticised at ǳǤ678 Defence solicitors expressed some bitterness about being required to 
make decisions about cases at an early stage in the proceedings while the CPS and 
police had more time to prepare their files. Interviewee B commented that the 
defence side is forced into making decisions immediately which may not be in the 
client's best interests whereas the CPS and police have had time to consider the case 
while the accused was on bail pending the court appearance. Interviewee E further 
                                                          
674 Interview C; 6 
675 Ashworth, A and Redmayne, M, The Criminal Process (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2005). 
676 The findings of research conducted for my LLM thesis confirmed that advocates rarely received case 
papers in advance of the first hearing, and that case papers received were often deficient. This is contrary 
to the requirements of CJ: SSS as designed (Welsh L, 'Implementing Criminal Justice, Simple, Speedy, 
Summary in East Kent: Justice and Unintended Change in a Neoliberal Context' (2010)) 
677 Frost T, 'A Simple Solution' (2007) (27 September) Law Society Gazette; 1 
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ǲCJ: SSS ǥǥǯǥt up at the beginning actually makes it take ǳǤ679 Several interviewees680 commented that the relevant papers are often 
unavailable at the first hearing which leads defence solicitors to advise their clients 
to plead not guilty but later, when the relevant evidence has been received and 
reviewed, approach the prosecutor with a view to negotiating pleas. This increased 
the number of ineffective trial bookings along with increasing delay and uncertainty 
for both defendants and victims. 
It must also be noted however that defence advocates have an interest in 
processing cases at speed because fixed fees encourage the swift and easy disposal of 
cases; adjournments eat into the profit margin. There are other benefits to 
processing cases quickly for the defence, including reducing uncertainty and stress, 
particularly for defendants who are detained in custody.681 The idea that advocates ǯ
that lawyers aimed to work through their cases as quickly as they could, which 
Newman argues led to the dehumanisation of clients.682 This means that a 
relationship of co-operation and negotiation among advocates is useful to both 
business interests Ȃ volume processing maximises profits Ȃ but also to the 
courtroom workgroup in terms of expediency.  It seems however to undermine the 
interests of defendants in favour of efficiency because, in a desire for speed, complex 
or unusual issues may be avoided or remain unnoticed. This illustrates the tension 
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680 Interviewees B, F, G, and J 
681 Ashworth, A and Redmayne, M, The Criminal Process (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2005). 
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that can be generated by the existence of competing goals (efficiency versus client 
needs) among defence advocates. Government demands for greater efficiency 
increase tension between those goals. 
Further, interviewee B felt "CJ: SSS has led to a dilution of the quality of the 
work that we do. We're forced to make decisions far too soon and I think it leads to 
problems."683 However, it should be noted that it was not just defence solicitors who 
raised concerns about being forced to make decisions without the necessary 
documentation. Prosecuting interviewee J was of the view that CJ: SSS did not work 
because "you never really get everything you need for the first hearing...for that 
reason it failed miserably...I think you get a trial date quicker but you get a lot more 
cracked trials684 in my experience."685 Similarly, prosecutor interviewee M also 
noted that forcing the entry of a plea tended to mean that defendants entered not 
guilty pleas, which had a knock on effect for case management and trial listings.686 
Half of the defence solicitors687 and three of the prosecutors688 who were 
interviewed were of the view that this situation forces people into premature 
decision making which might not be in the client's best long term interests, as well as 
leading to more trial listings that Ǥǯ views are supported ǯ statistics in 2008 which indicated that the number of cracked trials 
had increased.689 Thus advocates did appear to be aware of a problem for 
defendants but conflict appeared to exist between accommodating the court's desire 
                                                          
683 Interview B; 5 
684ǮǯǤ 
685 Interview J; 10 
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to make progress in cases, maintaining good relationships in the workgroup and the 
defence advocate's duty to act in the client's best interests (which involves 
considering both the credit he or she may receive for entering an early guilty plea 
and considering the strength of the evidence served by the prosecutor).  
Half of the advocates interviewed felt that pleas are forced at a time when the 
appropriate evidence is not available. One prosecutor said ǲal with case management quicker. Ultimately, whether this ǥǡǯǤ
is some benefit in stepping back allowing for enquiries to be made for perhaps a 
more informed decision to be madǳǤ690 
Interviewee D also expressed the opinion that the Stop Delaying Justice initiative has ǲǯǤǳ691 Interviewee G 
expressed similar sentiments: ǲǤ ǯǤthree weeks ǥǤǯǮǯǤ  ǮǯǤ ǫǯǡǯǯ ǯǡǡ ǯǯǳ.692 
                                                          
690 Interview L; 8 
691 Interview D; 4 
692 Interview G; 12. See also interview A; 6 
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In addition, half of the defence solicitors and half of the prosecutors 
interviewed felt that the court's insistence on making progress at an early stage in 
cases leads to problems as the case moves through the court. There appear to be two 
problems. The first problem is a rise in the number of unrepresented defendants 
which reduces the speed at which cases can be conducted, even though this problem 
has been limited by defence advocates continuing to provide representation despite 
uncertainty over payment. Interviewee E commented upon this, stating that while 
the courts are being told to avoid adjourning cases for legal aid to be resolved, "all 
they're doing is building up longer proceedings for the court, taking up more time 
because people are unrepresented".693 Several interviewees felt that cases involving 
unrepresented defendants take longer to be processed. Such delay appears to result 
from the inability of unrepresented defendants to understand the nuances of 
courtroom behaviour, which confirms that the defendant is at a disadvantage as an ǮǯǤ 
The second problem raised by participants in my research related to the way in 
which a desire to process cases at speed restricts the ability of advocates to conduct 
cases in the way they might wish. Three of the defence solicitors interviewed694 felt 
that the court applies a desire to conclude cases at speed with too much rigidity, 
because the efficiency drive legitimised the view that defendants know whether or 
not they are guilty of a crime regardless of the need for legal advice,695 even though 
defendants should not be pressurised by the system.696 The idea that defendants 
know if they are guilty is contrary to the idea that defendants are often bewildered 
                                                          
693 Interview E; 2 
694 Interviewees A, F and K 
695 See, for example, interviews D, F, G and K 
696 Morgan, R. 'Summary Justice. Fast - but Fair?' 
<www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/summaryjusticefastbutfair.html> accessed on 20 August 2009. 
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by the process itself, let alone the legal provisions behind it, and tend to assume a 
passive role in court.697 Further, as Interviewee F noted, a client  
"may well know whether he did it or not but that's not really what the criminal ǯǫple into the dock and  ?ǡǫ ?ǯǤǯ
and understand the case against your client... and unless they're going to 
suddenly change the way in which the court operates to become an inquisitorial 
system there is no reason for the defence to change that as being their starting 
point."698  
The entry of a not guilty plea in such circumstances appeared to be one of the 
few ways in which defence solicitors resisted demands for efficiency. They exercised 
a right to rely on legal provisions - the burden and standard of proof - when they felt 
their client was being forced into an unfavourable situation. Interestingly, ǮǯǮǯǡ
as if the provisions represented a symbolic attack on due process. Interviewee E 
echoed those sentiments in explaining that advocates do not like to be told that a 
plea must be entered and generally react by telling the client to plead not guilty and 
require the attendance of all of the witnesses at the trial because the regime forces  
"you into a position from where you take the safest line for your client...whereas 
if they gave you a little bit of time to engage with your client, get some proper 
instructions, look at the paperwork...you may be pleading guilty or you may be 
                                                          
697 See, for example, Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) or McConville M and others, 
Standing Accused. The Organisation and Practices of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Oxford 
University Press 1994). 
698 Interview F; 10 
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saying 'alright it is a trial but these are the issues, it's only going to take two 
hours and we only need one witness.'"699 
 Therefore, when forced into what they regard as premature decision making, 
defence advocates may be less likely to behave in a co-operative way and encourage 
defendants to enter not guilty pleas. 
As Carlen700 and Young701 have noted, the smooth operation of summary 
criminal courts is dependent to a large extent on the ability of defence advocates to 
influence or control clients for the majority of the time. Thus, when they feel 
sufficiently threatened, the advocates will reject their usual conciliatory behaviour in 
favour of strict legal provisions, which in turn disrupts the proceedings. It is unclear 
when, and what causes, advocates to feel sufficiently threatened to behave in that 
way. The behaviour does however suggest that, while working in congruence with 
instrumental goals of efficiency and co-operation most of time, the expressive nature 
of justice via due process is in fact considered to be the most valuable goal; a kind of 
'trump card'.  As Carlen noted, a willingness to disrupt proceedings via strict 
adherence to legal principles places the challenger in a very powerful position.702 
For example, interviewee O, when speaking about being questioned over witness 
requirements said: ǲǥǫitness, ǯǥȂ the 
                                                          
699 Interview E; 7 
700 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
701 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
702 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
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magistrates and even the DJs because they do that very proactively even these ǡǮǫǯ
actually can they actually stop you if you put your foot down? They ǯǯ
wasting the next fiveǡ ? ?ǯǮfence lawyer, I do want this ǯǤǳ703  
These comments also illustrate the change in attitude towards professional 
judgement as detailed in chapter three Ȃ the court is required to check that 
advocates are not relying on technical points or being obstructive rather than 
accepting professional judgement.  
Unfortunately, interviewees did not explain what it was about these cases 
that made them take a less co-operative approach to case management. It could be 
that they were cases in which they had a genuine ǯǡ
that they felt affronted about the way the case was brought in that it challenged due 
process principles, that there were concerns about either missing or inappropriately 
obtained evidence or simply that they felt their, ǯǡ
unreasonably undermined. There could, of course, be several of these issues at work 
in any one case. Newman704 and Young705 may take the view that this forms part of a 
pretence performed by advocates in an attempt to persuade clients that they are 
acting in their best interests. However, it should be noted that the entry of a not ǯǤ
required, which may affect the profitability of the case and the advocate may be seen 
                                                          
703 Interview O; 10 
704 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
705 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
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as difficult and therefore undermine his/her reputation and workgroup stability. 
The consequences of entering a not guilty plea in these circumstances mean that it is 
unlikely to simply be about putting on a show. Thus it seems that defence solicitors 
are aware that efficiency drives seem to undermine due process provisions designed 
to protect defendants via the adversarial process. They also verbalised a willingness ǯns when they felt it 
necessary in the face of bureaucratic demands.  
However, as a result of the need to balance their own competing interests of 
reputation, business interests and workgroup cohesion, advocates may only be 
prepared to exercise such rights in extreme situations. Newman also found that the ǯ
best interests, but the preference is for speed over justice.706 Notably in 2008, Kent 
Criminal Justice Board reported that the number of guilty pleas entered had 
increased,707 and HMCTS repeated that fact in 2010.708 This suggests that ǯmay have been subordinated to 
demands for efficient case processing. Newman documents that solicitors he 
interviewed verbalised due process, client-centred concerns but acted in a way 
which is inconsistent with client needs709 and showed no remorse about doing so. ǯǡ
effectively 'toed the party line' potentially sets Newman's research in a slightly 
different context. Here, advocates appeared to distinguish how they would like to be 
able to act while also referring to constraints placed upon them by, among other 
                                                          
706 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
707 Kent Criminal Justice Board. 'Staff News Ȃ CJ: SSS Update' (2008) <www.cjsonline.gov.uk/kent> 
accessed on 8 July 2009. 
708 Her Majesty's Court Service, SE Kent Performance Report. February 2010 (2010). 
709 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
  
170 
 
things such as funding, the court's desire for efficiency above all else. In this way, 
they demonstrated some insight into their behaviour. 
One way in which both defending and prosecuting advocates have sought to 
relieve the pressure placed upon them by a bureaucratic demand for efficiency in the 
face of cost cutting measures is via plea negotiations. In support of the prominence 
given to managerial imperatives, Newman found that the firms in his study all 
exhibited a factory like approach to case processing, with one lawyer stating that 
business needs get in the way of idealism710 and, as a method of case disposal, plea 
negotiations can be seen as mutually beneficial, as discussed in chapter two. It is 
however important to note that client retention (the source of income) is also reliant 
on reputation and, consequently, defence solicitors must, when negotiating pleas, 
balance the client's wishes and interests with the workgroup desire for efficiency. 
Interviewee J (a prosecutor) spoke particularly favourably about plea negotiations, 
saying "At the end of the day it's all statistics driven for the court and the CPS. At the 
end of the day you just want to get a guilty plea, a good result on the file."711 Both 
prosecutors and defence advocates were in favour of plea negotiations. One 
prosecutor expressed the view  ǲǯǯ
clearly a plea negotiation with the defence is going ǳǤ712 
While all advocates who spoke about plea negotiations appreciated the 
opportunity to foreshorten the proceedings, defence advocates also mentioned that 
                                                          
710 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
711 Interview J; 15 
712 Interview J; 15 
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plea negotiations could be beneficial to clients in terms of resolving the issues as 
soon as possible and limiting the nature or number of charges.713 Interviewee J went 
further in indicating that plea negotiations tick the right boxes for the CPS while 
issues for the victims seem to be undermined because "statistics seem to be the 
important thing."714 This provides a further example of how workgroup behaviour 
has been disturbed by external pressure that calls for increased speed in case 
disposal, and how advocates have altered their behaviour in line with that 
disruption; by taking a particularly favourable approach to plea negotiations. 
Defence advocates expressed the view that plea negotiations may actually be helpful 
to defendants and therefore appeared to feel justified in using them. However, as 
Mulcahy715 notes, they also fulfil a desire for swift case resolution which may favour 
bureaucratic procedures over adversarial due process aims. The favouring of 
bureaucratic processes over adversarial principles may also be evidenced by 
procedures which standardise cases. 
Standardisation 
 Howard and Freilich are of the view that advocates, when dealing with large ǡǲǤǳ716 I 
have taken generalised procedures to mean those that encourage particular 
routines, reduce discretion and are applied to cases regardless of the particular 
                                                          
713 See, for example, interview I 
714 Interview J; 13 
715 Mulcahy A, 'The Justifications of `Justice': Legal Practitioners' Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements 
in Magistrates' Courts' (1994) 34(4) British Journal of Criminology 411. 
716 Howard, G and Freilich, J, 'Durkheim's Comparative Model and Criminal Justice Theory' in Duffee, D 
and Maguire, E (ed), Criminal Justice Theory: Explaining the Nature and Behaviour of Criminal Justice 
(Routledge 2007); 61 
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features of each case. Further, and of particular relevance to local context, familiarity 
and co-operation among a workgroup is also likely to lead to routinised practices.717 
  Advocates who were interviewed718 expressed the opinion that, as an example of 
rigidity and in a desire to process cases expeditiously, too many issues are reduced ǮǯǮǯǤ	ǡ
"everyone's got to fill in a form; everyone's got to tick a box to be audited and 
assessed to why you did that."719 The same interviewee went on to describe CJ: SSS 
as faceless bureaucracy which removed personal discretion at all levels and was 
"unnecessary other than to sort of crank up the speed machine."720 Newman also 
notes that, by focusing on a need to be efficient and meet targets, clients are often 
offered standardised services.721 ǲǯǥǳǤ722  ǲǤǳ723   
  I suggest that the forms used in criminal proceedings are evidence of the desire 
for standard procedures that result from a hope to conduct cases as expeditiously as 
possible.  For example, Interviewee O also expressed the view that "it's purely tick 
boxes at the moment...it's just so bureaucratic."724 This provides an example of how 
speedy case progression dehumanises defendants, whose cases are all managed 
                                                          
717 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
718 Interviews B, E, F, K and H 
719 Interview K; 3 
720 Interview K; 8 
721 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
722 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013); 96 
723 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013); 98 
724 Interview O; 2-3 
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subject to the same procedures even though they are likely to involve different 
issues and defendants are likely to have different priorities. 
 At least 16 types725 of form are now regularly referred to (either implicitly or ȌǯǤ ? ? ?ǡ
a total of 220 references to forms, but only 49 of those references were explicit.726 
This demonstrates that forms operate to regulate the behaviour of the workgroup, 
without necessarily directly involving the person who is actually subject to the 
proceedings. My observations suggest that the most frequent explicit references to 
forms involve case management forms. Case management forms are used when a 
defendant pleads not guilty. The advocates are required to record the matters that 
are in dispute and evidential requirements and then fix a trial date accordingly. The 
use of case management forms is further discussed in chapter five, because they also 
represent one way thaǯ
proceedings.   
 While nearly all prosecutors interviewed727 felt that case management is useful 
to focus the issues in the case, only three defence advocates728 expressed a similar 
view. Defence advocates seemed to be more likely to express the view that case 
management removes discretion and becomes routine.729 For example, interviewee 
K said  
                                                          
725 Police bail notices, MG5 (police prepared case summary), MG10 (prosecution witness availability), 
Court bail notice, case management forms, sentencing reasons forms, trial reasons forms, means forms, ǡǯǡ, form certifying 
committal procedures, TIC schedules, special measures applications, bad character and hearsay 
applications.  
726I have taken implicit references to mean when it is clear that a form will be used but it is not actually 
referred to during proceedings. 
727 Interviews H, J, Q, L, M, N 
728 Interviews D, R, S 
729 Interviews B, E, F and K 
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 ?ǯ ? ?
does that stand for and you know, they're so obsessed with this bureaucratic 
machine and moving it on...It [CJ: SSS] made the thing less case sensitive and it 
was very much a one size fits all mentality"730  
      ǯ731 view that the way that the forms are 
produced ǲǡǳ732 making it possible to 
detect a move towards standardised procedures. Demands for standardised 
procedures can be associated with the need to process cases quickly. As interviewee 
ǲǥǤǳ733 ǯ734 associates volume processing 
with effective case disposal at whatever cost but it is possible to link increased 
reliance on, and reference to, forms with Boǯ
model,735 which requires procedures that ensure justice is seen to be done - it is 
recorded on the form - but also requires volume processing so that the system does 
not become overburdened. Such practices result in standardisation, and, generally, ǲǤǳ736 Standardisation of routines seems to increase by the 
professionalisation of legal proceedings. A further example of this process is 
provided by the increased use of district judges to preside over summary criminal 
cases.  
                                                          
730 Interview K; 8 
731 Brenneis D, 'Reforming Promise' in Riles, A (ed), Documents. Artefacts of Modern Knowledge 
(University of Michigan Press 2006) 
732 Brenneis D, 'Reforming Promise' in Riles, A (ed), Documents. Artefacts of Modern Knowledge 
(University of Michigan Press 2006); 49 
733 Interview G; 2.  
734 Packer H, The Limits of Criminal Sanction (Oxford University Press 1968) 
735 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976) 
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District judges 
Interviewees were almost unanimously agreed that the presence of a district 
judge increases the speed at which proceedings are conducted. All seven 
prosecutors737 and eight of the defence solicitors738 interviewed asserted that the 
district judge is much more efficient than lay magistrates. As Young notes "Judges 
are the linchpins of courtroom workgroups, with formal responsibility for making 
decisions that affect the processing and outcome of cases, and for governing the 
conduct of the other members of the workgroup in court."739 The position is slightly 
different when lay benches sit because the decisions made are filtered via the court 
clerk, who also plays a greater role in governing courtroom behaviour in such 
circumstances. The court clerk plays a greater role in courtroom workgroup 
behaviour than district judges because they remain present in court while 
magistrates retire whereas district judges are more removed from the activities of 
other courtroom users. 
Interviewee Q asserted "district judges are way more efficient. I think they 
get through more work. I find magistrates retiring so laborious, it's just so 
tedious."740 Similarly, interviewee N was of the view that the district judge "is a lot 
swifter. He's less indecisive. He makes decisions and goes with it. He will get through 
a list in half the time."741 The majority of defence solicitors were of the same opinion, 
with interviewee R going so far as to say "if they want to save money, get rid of 
magistrates and employ district judges." My observations also suggested that the 
                                                          
737 Interviews H, J, Q, L, M, N and P 
738 Interviews B, C, F, I, K, O, R, S 
739 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203; 207 
740 Interview Q; 13 
741 Interview N; 10 
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district judge appeared to conduct proceedings with greater speed, perhaps because 
he rarely retired to make decisions Ȃ presumably at least partially influenced by the 
fact that he does not have to seek the agreement of his colleagues in decision making.  
Another influence may be the fact that he does not often have to pause to seek legal 
advice from the court clerk, who assumes a much more administrative role in the 
proceedings by performing tasks such as fixing hearing dates and completing forms 
such as Bail Notices. The speed with which district judges conduct proceedings has 
long been documented by, among others, Zander742 and Morgan and Russell.743  
Interviewees tended to attribute the expediency with which proceedings 
were conducted to the ability of the district judge to direct the proceedings to the 
issues that he (all of the district judges who then sat in east Kent were male) feels 
are important,744 and the fact that the district judge is legally qualified.745 The case 
management hearings that I observed provide an interesting case in point. If 
magistrates were presiding over a case management hearing, the court clerk tended 
to go through the case management form methodically with the advocates, 
confirming each part that had been completed but with little challenge to the issues 
raised. Conversely, the district judge did not go through the case management form 
openly, but only discussed issues contained thereon when he wished to challenge an 
advocate about points raised.  
                                                          
742 Zander M, Cases and Materials on the English Legal System (Oxford University Press 2007). 
743 Morgan, R and Russell, N. 'The Judiciary in the Magistrates' Courts' (2000) 
<library.npia.police.uk/docs/homisc/occ-judiciary.pdf> accessed on 08 February 2012. 
744 Interviews B, H, J, K, L, S, P 
745 Interviews I and R 
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The findings of my research thus confirm the findings of earlier studies, such 
as that by Darbyshire,746 that district judges are seen to be more efficient by court 
personnel. It seems therefore that if the government wishes to increase the speed at 
which cases are processed, the presence of a district judge may achieve that aim. 
There are some indications that the government does see the use of district judges as 
beneficial to the criminal justice process as, despite a decline in the number of 
prosecutions over the last four years, lay magistrates are increasingly being replaced 
by district judges.747 Advocates spoke very favourably about this trend. For example, 
interviewee R said ǲ
proper guidance whereas appearing before a DJ is how it should be.  Preparing 
for somebody who understands and knows how to apply the law in correct 
factual circumǳǤ748  
       ǲǯǡ
are professional lawyers and are therefore not going to say or do anything to leave Ǥǳ749 Similarly, prosecutor interviewee N 
was also of the view that the decisions made by the local district judge ǲǯǤǳ750   
Advocates seemed to favour district judges not only for their expediency but 
also because they felt the district judge is more likely to make a legally correct 
decision, which would be in the interests of defendants. It also seems that district 
                                                          
746 Darbyshire P, 'For the New Lord Chancellor - Some Causes for Concern About Magistrates' (1997) 
(Dec) Criminal Law Review 861. 
747 Hall, K. 'Lay Magistrate Numbers Continue to Fall' (2014) <www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/lay-
magistrate-numbers-continue-to-fall/503938> accessed on 15 January 2014. 
748 Interview R; 10 
749 Interview K;14 
750 Interview N; 10 
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judges are more efficient than lay benches and this suggests that advocates are not, 
in principle, resistant to increasing efficiency. It also suggests that there would be 
little resistance to the replacement of lay benches by district judges if it were 
proposed, even at the potential cost of the symbolic democracy of a lay Bench. 
Further, the presence of a district judge may mean that defendants are likely to be 
treated in ways more consistent with the law, but the addition of another lawyer in ǯ
because the law is more likely to be referred to in fleeting terms. This issue is 
discussed further in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
It is clear from this, and preceding chapters, that there has been an increased ǯ
decades.  This seems to have had the effect of undermining the position that ǲǥǯǥǥǤǳ751 ǯ
demands for efficiency demonstrate how the courtroom itself is a site of struggle 
among actors. Once a point of equilibrium is reached, it has the potential to become 
unbalanced by external influences (such as efficiency drives) which create new 
struggles.  
However, professionals are likely to "employ a set of established procedures 
for the resolution of any conflicts."752 Given that summary criminal courts have 
always relied on a good degree of co-operation among actors in order to process 
                                                          
751 Faulkner D, 'Prospects for Progress in Penal Reform' (2007) 7(2) Criminology and Criminal Justice 135; 
139 
752 Bourdieu P, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38 (July) The Hastings 
Law Journal 805; 819 
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cases smoothly, it is unsurprising that the established procedures resorted to by the 
workgroup consist largely of adaptation via compromise rather than aggressive 
forms of non co-operation. Maintaining and adapting relationships of compromise 
appears to exacerbate marginalisation experienced by defendants. In this case, there 
is some evidence that actors will resort to strict legal provisions to exercise power in 
the event of conflict, but only when they feel that attempts at compromise fail (such 
as refusals to adjourn) or that there is a power imbalance (such as the CPS having 
more time to prepare). In the majority of instances, conflict may be resolved via 
compromise learnt by way of "professional tools developed in response ǤǤǤǲ753 However, advocates did resort to pure legal theory754 (in this case 
the burden and standard of proof) at extreme sites of conflict and when expert 
knowledge of the roles of professional participants failed.755 
The evidence may demonstrate that, while the adversarial nature of the 
proceedings is largely eroded by high degrees of co-operation, defence advocates 
will ultimately (albeit in extreme circumstances) demonstrate loyalty to their clients 
above all else. This issue may arise because, in Young's view, 
"Judges and prosecutors value high disposition rates in order to transmit an 
aura of accomplishment...The position of defence lawyers is less clear cut. While 
delay might help them to win a case...most clients bring with them only modest 
fees... At the same time their institutional and market position requires them to 
maintain a reputation for effective representation...the defence may see justice 
                                                          
753 Bourdieu P, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38 (July) The Hastings 
Law Journal 805; 824 
754 Bourdieu P, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38 (July) The Hastings 
Law Journal 805; 824 
755 Bourdieu P, 'The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field' (1987) 38 (July) The Hastings 
Law Journal 805; 831 
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as putting the prosecution to proof, or securing a lenient sentence, whereas the 
prosecution may see it reflected in high conviction rates."756 
      It seems that recent concerns with efficiency in summary proceedings have been 
a possible site of struggle within the courtroom as workgroups grapple with their 
competing agendas. However, all parties seem to favour efficiency as a goal in itself 
for instrumental reasons. This, combined with a culture of co-operation among the 
parties, seems to have led advocates to acquiesce to the demands of policies 
designed to increase efficiency, both in terms of its existence and intensity. This 
occurs despite the fact that those initiatives appear to further undermine both due 
process rights and the traditionally adversarial nature of the proceedings. The 
marginalisation of defendants therefore appears to have been exacerbated by a 
culture of co-operation which has allowed efficiency drives to be successful in 
further promoting the volume processing of case management. That process has 
been assisted by the standardisation of case management, which has encouraged 
implicit reference to legal principles among professional court users.  
                                                          
756 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203; 209 
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Chapter 5: The Legalisation of Summary Criminal Justice 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the findings of my observation and interview data in 
relation to one particular and unexpected issue that arose during the course of the Ǥǯcourts have traditionally been regarded as courts which 
rely more on common sense than on complex legal provisions, I suggest that 
summary criminal justice has in fact become increasingly legalised. I further suggest 
that a non-participant observer would find it difficult to identify the legalisation of 
summary justice because the provisions and procedures which are most frequently 
utilised are referred to in implicit terms by a specialist group of actors within the 
proceedings; those who are legally trained. 
I will provide examples of the ways in which legal and procedural issues 
manifest themselves in summary criminal proceedings as they became apparent 
during periods of observation. I will connect these observations to issues that arose 
during the course of interviews which helped to provide both explanatory factors ǯǤǯ
courts operate. I will then consider the political context in which legalisation has 
taken place, specifically since New Labour assumed a form of neoliberal political 
agenda in 1997. Finally I will consider the effects of legalisation in summary criminal 
proceedings.  
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Law-less courts? 
Socio-ǯ
proceedings are processed quickly, with minimal due process protections, and give 
the impression that those advocates who refer to points of law are dismissed as 
inexperienced and/or time wasting.757 This theme appears to persist in summary 
criminal proceedings, as, according to Darbyshire, lawyers who raise so-called 
spurious legal issues are still regarded as a threat758 to what Carlen described as the 
uncomfortable compromise which typifies the relationships that exist between 
members of the court workgroup.759  As a result, one gains the impression that 
points of law are seldom referred to or, alternatively, that when legal issues are 
raised, they are treated as an inconvenience; as something which delays the volume 
processing of cases.760  
Notably, when Carlen,761 McBarnet762 and Bottoms and McClean763 conducted 
their studies, defendants tended to appear without the assistance of a solicitor and 
the police (rather than qualified lawyers) were the prosecutors. The CPS took over 
state led prosecutions in 1986 and, by 1986/87, four-fifths of defendants appearing ǯǤ764 Kemp noted that 82 per cent of ǯlegally represented, nearly all via 
                                                          
757 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976); Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the 
Criminal Process (Routledge 1976); McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice 
(Macmillan 1981). 
758 Darbyshire P, Sitting in Judgement: The Working Lives of Judges (Oxford: Hart 2011). 
759 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
760 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981). 
761 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
762 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981). 
763 Bottoms, A and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976) 
764 Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly Funded Legal Services in the 1990s (Legal Action 
Group 1992). 
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public funding.765 Despite increased levels of representation, as recently as 2011, 
Darbyshire reported that district judges took the view that legal argument should ǯǡǯǡǲǳǤ766 ǯ
view that advocates who were prepared to contest the proceedings by raising legal 
issues were in a strong position to challenge the usual process of case 
management.767 
Darbyshire does however acknowledge that the fact that legal argument is 
unusual does not mean that the law is not applied in summary proceedings, but 
rather that it is applied in routinised ways, and she referred to the fact that the 
district judge Ǯǯ
carried with him a file containing case law.768 She does not, however, develop this 
further or provide examples or reasons why law is only referred to in mundane 
ways, aside from brǯ
the Crown courts. My findings suggest that legal issues in fact arise frequently in 
summary criminal proceedings, albeit in routine ways. One  finding which 
demonstrates how frequently legal issues arise in summary criminal proceedings, 
and that their use has become routine, is that more than half of all advocates who 
were interviewed felt that proceedings involving unrepresented defendants take 
longer to conduct because the legal provisions involved need to be explained. 
Predictably, the majority of defence advocates indicated that they attempt to explain 
                                                          
765 ǡǮǣǯ
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
766 Darbyshire P, Sitting in Judgement: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart 2011); 171 
767 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976) 
768 Darbyshire P, Sitting in Judgement: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart 2011) 
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the law and procedure to clients before going into court. One defence advocate ǲǥǯǳǤ769 Thus, in the same way that professional practices 
become standardised via routinisation in order to cope with managerial demands for 
increased efficiency, the use of law also becomes routinised to assist speedy case 
progression. 
Therefore, while it may be correct to say that detailed or complex legal ǡǯs as ǮǯǤǲǳǡ770 it does not mean that references to particular legal 
provisions are insignificant. As Interviewee F explained: ǲ
you do sort of think to yourǡǮǯǡ
think in reality a lot of the day to day slog of criminal litigation is so well known ǯǮǯǯǡǡǯǳ771 
       If the law referred to is assumed to be a mundane part of legal practice in 
summary criminal proceedings, its implicit use is likely to mean that it is less 
detectable to non-lawyers. The implication of this customary, and often implicit use 
of law, is that it at least perpetuates, if not exacerbates, practices which exclude 
defendants from active participation in the proceedings. I therefore agree with 
McBarnet when she says that the view of the lower court as one which does not rely 
                                                          
769 Interview G; 19 
770 Darbyshire P, Sitting in Judgement: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart 2011); 171 
771 Interview F; 15. Indeed, Darbyshire reported the dismay expressed by one district judge that more ǯǤȋǡSitting in 
Judgement: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart 2011)) 
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on much law or require much legal expertise is inaccurate because empirical ǲǳǤ772 Indeed, the classification of cases as straightforward and/or 
uncontested is itself based on legal construction.  
At this stage it is important to acknowledge my role as participant-observer. 
By far the greatest advantage that the practitioner-researcher/participant-observer 
role gave me was my location in the same epistemic community as the research ǤǡǲǤǳ773 As a result of my previous training and 
experience, I was familiar with the meaning and significance of particular phrases 
used by court personnel. This enabled me to identify and analyse how law is used in Ǥǡǯ
courts much more frequently, and in more significant ways, than has previously 
been estimated.  
Given that this type of legalisation is largely identifiable only by reference to ǡǯ
of significant importance. A non-legally trained observer may not be able to identify 
such implicit references and may thereby remain as marginalised from the Ǥǯ
extremely important, and while it may carry risks of over-identification with 
research subjects, these findings demonstrate how immersion in the research field 
can highlight hitherto underestimated issues. 
                                                          
772 McBarnet D, 'Two Tiers of Justice' in Lacey, N (ed), A Reader on Criminal Justice (Oxford Readings in 
Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University Press 1994);198 
773 Bryman A, Social Research  Methods (Oxford University Press 2012); 465 
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I intend to demonstrate this by reference to three instances in which 
advocates appear to make implicit references to law with relative frequency. Such 
references appear to be common when defendants are being sentenced, when bail is 
being considered and during the course of case management. 
Evidence of legalisation 
My observations suggest that there are frequent references to particular points 
of law during the course of summary proceedings in both implied and explicit terms. 
These practices manifest in the ways that advocates support the representations 
that they make to the court. Furthermore, the majority of both prosecutors and 
defence advocates interviewed indicated that they do refer to points of law in the ǯǡ
tend to refer to the principles stated in authorities rather than the actual case or 
statute that is relevant to their case.774 This supports the findings of my observations 
that legal issues tend to be referred to in implicit terms but still employ the use of 
specialist language. An example of this is provided by one prosecutor who stated: ǲǡǡǮǯǯǤǯ
what I ǫǡǳǤ775 
       While some interviewees did express the view that points of law rarely arise in ǯǡed about changes to evidential provisions (see 
below) and sentencing guidelines as if they are part of routine rather than specialist 
                                                          
774 10 of the 12 defence solicitors and five of the seven prosecutors interviewed stated that they tend to 
refer to the principles rather than the authorities, particularly in front of a lay Bench. 
775 Interview Q; 12 
  
187 
 
legal provisions. By way of example, one advocate stated that it would be easy to go ǯǲǳǤ776 There was also a 
tendency for interviewees to suggest that legal issues are more likely to arise at trial, 
which is logical in the sense that a trial involves contested points. However, with 
reference to my observation findings discussed below, these comments betray the 
way that specialist issues become part of professional routines and ingrained in the 
workgroup culture. On the other hand, some interviewees seemed to be almost ǯ law free zones.777 Interviewee ǯǲǳǤ778 
One of the reasons that interviewees gave for the implicit use of legal provisions was 
a perception that it is appropriate to avoid bombarding a lay Bench with complex 
provisions because magistrates simply want to hear about the principles rather than 
the authorities.779 I
ǲǯǡǯǯǤǳ780 
The best evidence of references to legal provisions tends to arise when a 
particular outcome is sought such as a particular sentence or release on bail. My 
observations suggest that points of law are most likely to be referred to during the 
course of sentencing proceedings. Furthermore, the provisions of the Bail Act 1976 
are often implicitly referred to, while both implied and explicit reference to the 
                                                          
776 Interview C; 8. Interviewee I also talked about bad character and hearsay provisions while also stating 
that law is used relatively infrequently.  
777 	ǡǡǯǲǯǳ
(Interview E; 11).  
778 Interview B; 11 
779 See, for example, interviews D, G and K. 
780 Interview G; 22. Interviewee R described law as being the trade so failing to use the law would be like 
a surgeon failing to use his tools. 
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construction of charges and required evidence are also relatively common in the 
course of case management. I will therefore turn to particular ways in which legal 
issues arise in the course of such proceedings. 
x Sentencing 
So far as sentencing proceedings are concerned, points of law seem to manifest 
via reference to sentencing guidelines. My observations suggest that sentencing 
hearings involve frequent implicit reference to sentencing guidelines. This finding 
was supported by the interview data in which interviewees indicated that they 
tended to refer to principles contained in sentencing guidelines during the course of 
mitigation. Some interviewees, such as interviewees J, K, L and O, specifically 
highlighted the increased need to refer to sentencing case law and guidelines. The 
sentencing guidelines represent an example of measures designed to combat 
inconsistent decision making practices.781 The Sentencing Council states: ǲ
their approach to sentencing. Sentencing guidelines, which set out a decision-
making process for all judges and magistrates to follow, play an essential role in ǳǤ782 
 The sentencing guidelines are based on statute, case law and policy documents, 
and are based on particular legal provisions according to rules of precedent. Thus, 
while the guidelines are not strictly points of law, they represent a distillation of 
legal opinion about what factors are important in determining the severity of 
                                                          
781 Darbyshire P, 'An Essay on the Importance and Neglect of the Magistracy ' (1997) (September) 
Criminal Law Review 627; Davies M, 'A New Training Initiative for the Lay Magistracy in England and 
Wales Ȃ A Further Step Towards Professionalisation?' (2005) 12(1) International Journal of the Legal 
Profession 93. 
782 Sentencing Council. 'What Are Guidelines?' (2012) 
<http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/sentencing/what-are-guidelines.htm> accessed on 21 
February 2013. 
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offences. According to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the use of sentencing 
guidelines is mandatory unless it is not in the interests of justice to follow a 
particular guideline. Therefore, in order to determine the most appropriate sentence 
in any case, a working knowledge of the guidelines is advantageous Ȃ either to 
highlight specific aggravating and/or mitigating features or to argue that it would 
not be in the interests of justice to apply a particular guideline. Of 37 references 
observed to the sentencing guidelines,783 nearly half were made implicitly Ȃ for 
example, stating that a theft was opportunistic or an assault was provoked, which 
are matters specifically recorded as mitigating features.784 
Sentencing guidelines in their present form did not exist until 2003, when the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council was created by the provisions of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003.785 ǡǲ
nes are a relatively new innovation in ǯǡǯ
exist, judges look at previous similar cases for guidance on appropriate sentencing ǳǤ786 As such, the sentencing guidelines represent a coordinated effort to 
ensure greater consistency and thereby appear to introduce a greater degree of 
specialised legal knowledge into summary proceedings than has previously been Ǥǯs preference 
for management techniques which encourage efficiency via routine case 
management systems, as discussed in the preceding chapter. 
                                                          
783 There were 70 hearings in which sentencing could have been considered. 
784 Sentencing Guidelines Council. 'Magistrates' Court Sentencing Guidelines' (2012) 
<http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/MCSG_Update9_October_2012.pdf> accessed on 09 
February 2013. 
785 The Sentencing Guidelines Council became the Sentencing Council in 2010. 
786 Sentencing Council. 'What Are Guidelines?' (2012) 
<http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/sentencing/what-are-guidelines.htm> accessed on 21 
February 2013. 
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x Bail 
In terms of issues relating to bail, the fact of being placed on bail (with or without 
conditions) allows any criminal court to prosecute an individual who fails to attend 
court while subject to bail under s.6 Bail Act 1976. Therefore, every time a defendant 
is released on bail, at whatever stage in proceedings, he or she is effectively put on 
notice that there will be further charges if s/he fails to attend court as directed. The 
provisions of the Bail Act 1976 state that bail may be refused or bail with conditions 
may be imposed to ensure attendance at court, to ensure the defendant does not 
commit an offence while on bail or to ensure that the course of justice is not 
obstructed. Those exceptions to the right to (unconditional) bail appear to be 
referred to in implicit terms when prosecutors make applications to remand 
defendants into custody and when defence advocates apply for bail to be granted 
with conditions, because any conditions that are suggested are designed to meet 
concerns about the statutory exceptions to the right to bail. Examples include 
suggesting a condition to report to the local police at designated times to ensure a 
defendant does not abscond, or a condition not to enter retail premises to limit the 
risk of further offending in a shoplifting case. 
Furthermore, provisions of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 which came into force in December 2012 now state that the 
prosecutor can only apply for a remand into custody if there is a realistic prospect of 
a custodial sentence on conviction.787 Not only does this suggest that knowledge of 
sentencing guidelines is advantageous, but also my observations suggest that it is 
                                                          
787 There are certain limited exceptions to these provisions, such as where the allegation involves 
domestic violence. 
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now not uncommon to hear prosecutors stating that there is or is not a realistic ǯ
remand status. This is an implicit reference to particular legal provisions, the 
significance of which may not be understood by a non-lawyer. It should also be 
noted that particular provisions state that the decision to grant bail based on the fact 
that a custodial sentence is not a realistic sentencing option does not affect the 
power of the sentencing court to ultimately impose a custodial sentence.788 Again, 
these are matters that appear to post-date earlier socio-ǯ
courts proceedings, and are particular legal provisions, of which knowledge is 
advantageous in framing submissions to the magistrates. The tacit use of legal 
provisions is consequently significant in summary proceedings, and could result in 
misunderstanding to the untrained ear. The implicit use of those terms highlights, 
and perhaps more recently exacerbates, the paradox of summary justice in that it 
requires knowledge of procedural propriety but denies access to that knowledge by 
the unstated and unexplained use of legal provisions. Carlen identified a similar 
issue in relation to the use of jargon and signalling between advocates in ǯ789 but increased reference to legal provisions via procedures 
designed to encourage efficient case progression and via new legislation appears to 
have intensified this problem. 
x Case management 
A third type of hearing in which increased implicit reference to particular points 
of law appears to be made is during the course of summary case management. Case ǯ-trial review 
                                                          
788 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
789 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
  
192 
 
hearings may alleviate the volume of ineffective trial listings that occurred in ǯǤ790 Subsequently, in his review of the criminal justice system, 
Auld expressed concern about the number of pre-trial reviews that occurred, and 
believed that the parties should take a more co-operative approach to case 
management.791 Later, CJ: SSS (which sought to reduce perceived delay in summary 
proceedings) proposed the abandonment of pre-trial reviews in favour of more 
proactive case management outside the court.792 However, case management 
hearings remain in place in east Kent. 
The forms used in case management have both administrative and legal roles ǯǤ
in dispute, the witness requirements (and reasons why witnesses are required), any 
further evidence to be served and any legal argument that is envisaged. As such, they 
require the parties to narrow the contested issues at trial so that court time can be 
used in the most efficient manner. The forms are also used to prevent the Crown Ǯǯǡǯ
time and resources only on those matters that are disputed.793  
Case management forms are part of the eǯ
efficiency under the Cr.PR and therefore have an administrative function. Case 
management forms do also, however, have a role in potential legal argument about 
how evidential burdens are discharged and whether it would be just for trials to 
proceed. The form requires a defence advocate - the wording of the form assumes 
                                                          
790 Narey, M Review of Delay in the Criminal Justice System (Home Office , 1997) 
791 Auld, R. 'Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales: Executive Summary' (2001) 
<http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/auldconts.htm> accessed on 05 October 2008. 
792 Office for Criminal Justice Reform, Delivering Simple Speedy Summary Justice. An Evaluation of 
Magistrates Court Tests (2007) 
793 See comments made in DPP Ȃv- Chorley Justices and Andrew Forrest [2006] EWHC 1795; Malcolm-v- 
DPP (2007) EWHC 363 (Admin) 
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that the defendant has received advice - to indicate that a defendant has been 
advised that a trial can proceed in his or her absence if the defendant fails to attend 
court as directed,794 which is relevant to whether proceedings should continue in the 
absence of a defendant and whether a charge of failing to attend Court as directed 
can be laid.  
Furthermore, the answers provided on case management forms about the 
issues in the case can be used as evidence during the course of a trial as implied 
admissions to particular elements constituting an offence, such as presence at the 
scene.795 The majority of interviewees, particularly defence advocates, appeared to 
be acutely aware of the fact that what is recorded on the case management form 
could be referred to at subsequent hearings, and indicated that this led them to 
consider completion of the form very carefully. About half of defence advocates and 
half of prosecutors interviewed felt that legal knowledge is necessary to complete a 
case management form appropriately. 
The completion of case management forms represents an important 
convergence of law and bureaucratic measures designed to ensure consistency and 
efficiency, and provides an example of standardisation as questions are reduced to a 
series of tick box answers with limited space to explain the issues.796 There is a 
specific section of the case management form which asks whether the parties can 
agree a basis of plea or plea to an alternative charge. As discussed in the previous 
                                                          
794 See R (on the application of Drinkwater) Ȃv- Solihǯ [2012] EWHC 765 (Admin), R Ȃ
v- Jones [2002] UKHL 5 for indications about when it would be appropriate to proceed in the absence of a 
defendant. 
795 This practice is discouraged following the judgement given in R Ȃv- Newell [2012] EWCA Crim 650 but 
I have observed prosecutors putting the content of case management forms to defendants in cross 
examination. 
796 Examples of this include a yes/no answer as to whether the defendant has been advised about 
provisions which allow a reduction in sentence for entering an early guilty plea (incorporated in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003) 
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chapter, the interview data indicated that both prosecutors and defence advocates 
view plea negotiations as useful. Thus the form becomes a way of demonstrating that 
the parties are acting in an efficient, co-operative manner, as well as a document 
which, in order to be completed appropriately, requires knowledge of both the 
nature of the charge and the evidential burdens which the Crown must satisfy to 
prove its case. 
Explanatory factors 
The three examples provided above suggest that points of law arise more 
frequently in summary proceedings than has previously been observed. This seems 
to result from the increased legalisation of summary proceedings in a number of 
ways including a welter of legislation relating to the criminal justice process (see 
below). Greater complexity resulting from such legislation justifies an increase in 
levels of legal representation, and that representation has been increasingly 
professionalised. New Labour created more new criminal offences than preceding 
governments,797 many of which are designed to avoid proceedings being transferred ǯ
jurisdiction in cases in the name of efficiency.798  
x Diversion ǡǯǯ
                                                          
797 Baillie A, 'Can England and Wales Afford Both Justice and the Ministry of Justice?' (Open Lecture Series, 
University of Kent 7 December 2011); Ashworth A and Zedner L, 'Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections 
on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure and Sanctions' (2008) (2) Criminal Law and Philosophy 21. 
798 Darbyshire P, 'Strengthening the Argument in Favour of the Defendant's Right to Elect' (1997) (Dec) 
Criminal Law Review 911. 
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management techniques and statistics.799 This has resulted in the enactment of 
legislation which allows a number of low level, uncontested offences to be diverted 
from the criminal court process via the use of fixed penalty notices and conditional 
cautions,800 meaning that the cases which do come before the court are more likely 
to be complex or contested in some way. 
Most interviewees (both prosecuting and defending) felt that the introduction of 
fixed penalty notices and conditional cautions, along with the increased use of 
simple cautions, has resulted in a significant reduction in the volume of cases being ǯǤ-product of this, as noted by one defence ǡǯ
courts.801 Nine of the 12 defence solicitors interviewed believed that diversion was 
increasingly being used, and six of those interviewees were concerned that diversion 
was being used inappropriately for serious (and sometimes indictable only) 
offending. Interviewee B felt that diversions were being used for serious offences 
while Interviewee E used the example of diversion for an offence of unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a minor, G of diversion for rape and O of diversion for arson and for 
robbery. Interviewees C and I both said that numerous cautions were being given 
rather than a single caution following which any offenders would be sent to court for 
the commission of further offences.  The same concerns were only expressed by two 
of the five prosecutors (of seven interviewed) who felt that the police were using 
more diversionary measures. 802  
                                                          
799 Jones C, 'Auditing Criminal Justice' (1993) 33 British Journal of Criminology 187. 
800 Morgan R, 'Austerity, Subsidiarity and Parsimony: Offending Behaviour and Criminalisation' in 
Silvestri, A. (ed) Lessons for the Coalition: An End of Term Report on New Labour and Criminal Justice 
(Centre for Crime and Justice Studies 2010). 
801 Interview D 
802 Interviews N and P 
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Thus it seems that there is a tendency for police to avoid instigating formal 
proceedings even in serious matters. Francis provides recent evidence of Kent Police 
misrecording crime in order to meet targets.803 The point remains however that, as 
uncontested cases are increasingly likely to be dealt with by way of diversion, it 
seems that only more complex or contested cases will be put before the court. This 
means that legal issues are more likely to arise in those cases that are put before the 
Bench. 
Alongside the increased use of out of court diversionary measures, there has ǯ
Crown court since the late 1990s.804 So, while Darbyshire asserts that lawyers who 
wish to raise legal argument will, where possible, try to have the case dealt with in 
the Crown court,805 there are bureaucratic measures which seek to deter committal 
to the Crown court - not least the removal of committal fees and reduced guilty plea 
fees in the Crown court for advocates.806 This desire has resulted from the ǯǯ
courts tend to deal with cases more quickly than Crown courts. Sanders,807 and 
Ashworth and Zedner,808 note that a significant number of new offences created in 
the last two or three decades are strict liability matters, which are usually confined 
                                                          
803 Francis, P. 'Police officers face pressure to hit targets which stops them doing job, internal report 
reveals' (2013) <http://www.kentonline.co.uk/kentonline/news/thin-blue-line-stretched-by-4424/> 
accessed on 4 September 2013. 
804 Darbyshire P, 'Strengthening the Argument in Favour of the Defendant's Right to Elect' (1997) (Dec) 
Criminal Law Review 911. 
805 Darbyshire P, Sitting in Judgement: The Working Lives of Judges (Oxford: Hart 2011). 
806 Legal Services Commission. 'Summary of the changes to be implemented on October 3rd 2011' (2011) 
<http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/main/October_changes_summaryv5.pdf> accessed on 15 August 
2012. 
807 Sanders A, 'What was New Labour thinking? New Labour's approach to criminal justice' in Silvestri, A. 
(ed), Lessons for the Coalition: An End of Term Report on New Labour and Criminal Justice (Centre for 
Crime and Justice Studies 2010). 
808 Ashworth A and Zedner L, 'Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of 
Crime, Procedure and Sanctions' (2008) (2) Criminal Law and Philosophy 21. 
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to summary only proceedings and are easier to prove than those offences requiring 
mens rea. Six of the 19 interviewees were of the view that more cases are being dealt ǯǤThree of those 
six interviewees attributed this change to charging policy within the CPS, with one 
prosecutor saying that, if the prosecutor ǯ
powers could be considered sufficient: ǲǡǥǡǡ-ǡǯǯ
than six monǥǯǥǯǳ809  
 The same prosecutor also attributed the drop in cases being sent to the Crown 
court to more rigorous case review at committal stage.810 Another prosecutor 
similarly mentioned changes to CPS charging policy in order to explain that more ǯǡǯȂ the intimation being that there is no longer 
a financial incentive for lawyers to send cases to the Crown court.811  
In addition, the introduction of district judgeȋǯȌǡ
appear to be more efficient than a lay Bench in the eyes of interviewees, may also 
mean that advocates are more confident about dealing with legal points in the ǯǤ812 Interviewees 
                                                          
809 Interview J; 12 
810 Alternative reasons offered for avoiding committals to the Crown court included the presence of a 
district judge who is regarded as more competent to deal with complex cases and as more fair than lay 
Benches, the introduction of contributions towards legal aid in the Crown court and changes to legal 
remuneration rates.  
811 Interview Ǥǯ
prosecutors Ȃ Q and M. 
812 See, for example, Interview R 
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were certainly more complimentary about the way that district judges deal with 
legal issues when compared to lay Benches, as discussed in chapter four.  
x Case complexity 
In relation to those offences that remain in the summary criminal courts, case 
complexity has increased.813 In addition to the foregoing factors, this may result 
from a flurry of legislation. Robert Marshall-Andrews QC, MP described the ǲǳ814 when discussing the disproportionate number of 
statutes relating to criminal justice passed between 1997 and 2007. Approximately 
half of the defence advocates and half of the prosecutors interviewed cited the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 and Criminal Procedure Rules as responsible for increased 
evidential and case complexity.  
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced significant amendments to the rules 
in relation to evidence of previous convictions815 and hearsay.816 Both were 
previously subject to common law provisions  but the statute introduced complex 
guidelines and an application process in relation to the admission of both types of 
evidence, which encouraged the Crown to apply to admit these types of evidence 
much more frequently than prior to the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003. For example, one defence advocate described evidential changes in the ǣǲǯǤǡǤ
                                                          
813 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence 
Work.(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005) 
814 Marshall-Andrews QC, R. 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansard/cm071107/deb/text/71107-
0009.htm> accessed on 03/09/13. 
815 Section 101 Criminal Justice Act 2003 
816 Section 114 Criminal Justice Act 2003 
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ǡǳǤ817 Another advocate described proceedings as ǲǡǡǳ818 before the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003. 
Additional legislation introduced, which has often been poorly drafted 
(evidenced by the number of appeals),819 has not only created a number of 
summary-only offences but has also complicated sentencing proceedings. For 
example, since the 1997 election of New Labour, several mandatory minimum 
sentences have been introduced under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing)  ? ? ? ?Ǯǯ
(replaced by indeterminate life sentences under Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012) as well as amendments to provisions relating to 
suspended sentence orders contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This may ǯ are of 
increasing importance.  
Prosecutors appear equally perturbed by the complexity introduced by increased 
statutory intervention in summary criminal proceedings. Interviewee J expressed 
the opinion that, since the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 2003ǡǲǯall got a ǡǳ820 which means that cases probably take longer to 
prepare for trial. Another prosecutor asserted that the same statute  
                                                          
817 Interview F; 17 
818 Interview I; 11 
819 Baillie A, 'Can England and Wales Afford Both Justice and the Ministry of Justice?' (Open Lecture Series, 
University of Kent. 7 December 2011). 
820 Interview J; 22 
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ǲǡǡǯǡ a badly thought through piece of legislation... it is getting more ǳ821 
Baillie provides examples in which the higher courts have similarly lamented 
the complexity of recent statutory provisions,822 specifically in the cases of R Ȃv- 
Bradley,823 R Ȃv- Lang and others824 and R (on the application of the DPP) Ȃv- South 
East Surrey Youth Court (Ghanbari, interested party).825 In the last case, Rose LJ 
considered the amendments made by the PCC(S)A in relation to those classified as 
dangerous offenders and stated ǲǡ
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and the satellite statutory instruments to which ǥlittle comfort or assistance in the historic 
canons of construction for determining the will of Parliament which were ǥ
be found in legislation as a matter of course rather than exǳǤ 
While statutory provisions have become more complex, other measures to 
which interviewees attributed increased complexity included policies designed to 
regulate proceedings, such as the Criminal Procedure Rules. These, along with the 
removal of lǡǯ
diversionary processes were designed to increase efficiency in the criminal justice 
                                                          
821 Interview H; 13 
822 Baillie A, 'Can England and Wales Afford Both Justice and the Ministry of Justice?' (Open Lecture Series, 
University of Kent. 7 December 2011). 
823 [2005] EWCA Crim 20 
824 [2005] EWCA Crim 2864 
825 [2005] EWHC 2929 
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process,826 but also appear to have encouraged reference to points of law. This has 
exacerbated the marginalisation of defendants and highlighted their role as dummy 
players in the proceedings.  
The procedures introduced by the Cr.PR were also established to encourage co-
operative case management practices,827 ǯ
were ambushing prosecutors with legal argument at trial.828 Furthermore, the 
routine provision of case papers has enabled cases to be analysed in greater detail at 
an early stage in proceedings.829 However, as noted above, the practices which were 
introduced by those initiatives require specialist knowledge of legal and 
administrative provisions in order to engage with the process. Thus increased 
complexity has justified greater levels of representation, as is noted in preceding 
chapters. Increased levels of defence representation, along with the creation of the 
CPS, means that there are more participants who are more likely to refer to legal 
issues during the course of proceedings. The observations suggested that references 
to points of law were much more likely to be made when defendants were 
represented. Twenty-eight per cent of cases involving unrepresented defendants 
referred to points of law, whereas 73 per cent of cases involving represented 
defendants included references to points of law. Increased levels of representation 
justified by more complex and voluminous legislation is likely to have increased pre-
existing co-operative working practices as well as references to points of law, both of 
which are likely to have exacerbated the marginalisation of defendants. 
                                                          
826 Auld, R. 'Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales: Executive Summary' (2001) 
<http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/auldconts.htm> accessed on 05 October 2008. 
827 See for example Cr.PR 1.1 and 1.2 (Ministry of Justice. 'Criminal Procedure Rules' (2011) 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal> accessed on 1 June 2012.) 
828 See, for example, DPP Ȃv- Chorley Justices and Andrew Forrest [2006] EWHC 1795 
829 Cape, E and Moorhead, R, Demand Induced Supply? Identifying Cost Drivers in Criminal Defence Work. 
(Legal Services Research Centre, 2005) 
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The relationship between legalisation, efficiency and professionalisation 
appears to be complex. Ironically, it seems that, via processes of case management, 
measures designed to speed up the process of summary justice may have also 
encouraged more references to points of law. Given that most defendants are legally 
represented, it is arguable that those references to points of law would be less likely 
to arise if defendants were unrepresented, but the proceedings are likely to be 
slower as references to legal provisions need to be explained. This supports evidence 
which suggests that lawyers actually increase efficiency by negotiating pleas830 and 
co-operating with proceedings.831 Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, the 
majority of both defence advocates and prosecutors viewed plea negotiations as 
beneficial.  
It would not be possible to negotiate pleas without disclosing case details, 
understanding the burden and standard of proof and understanding the weight of 
prosecution evidence. It is therefore possible that the desire for mutually beneficial 
but also efficient outcomes has increased implicit references to points of law. Again, 
efficient working practices actually seem to increase specialist practices in which 
legal knowledge is advantageous. 
The legalisation of summary criminal justice therefore appears to have resulted 
from several factors. These include the professionalisation of representation, along 
with a proliferation of statutory provisions that have increased complexity alongside 
initiatives designed to ǯ
                                                          
830 Mulcahy A, 'The Justifications of `Justice': Legal Practitioners' Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements 
in Magistrates' Courts' (1994) 34(4) British Journal of Criminology 411. 
831 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, R and Wall, D (ed), 
Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996). 
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ǯ
from court completely.  
The relationship to neoliberalism 
The legalisation of summary justice appears to have occurred at least partly as a 
by-product of increased demands for efficiency in summary justice. Such demands 
for efficiency have taken form in regulatory practices which are designed to control 
the trial process through case management which affects the behaviour of advocates, 
courts and defendants. In this sense, the criminal justice system has become subject 
to greater regulation since 1997. Regulatory techniques are manifest in evidential 
and procedural rules via the Criminal Procedure Rules (as amended), and in the use 
of forms which compel structured decision making. One example of such a form is 
the sentencing reasons form which requires magistrates to state which factors they 
considered in reaching their decision in accordance with sentencing guidelines. The 
case management form provides a further example of this trend in that it directs 
court users to formally record the issues and evidential requirements in a case. 
The efficiency drive appears to result from neoliberal demands for the public 
sector to beǮ-ǯǤ
managerialism, criminal justice services have become ever more anxious about 
meeting narrowly defined performance objectives.832 The difficulty arises because 
managerialist principles incorporate commercial understandings of efficiency in Ǯǯ
                                                          
832 Bell E, Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
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effectiveness.833 Diversion of offences and relaxation of evidential principles, 
coupled with more punitive sentencing provisions provide examples of legislation 
that encourage efficiency, target low hanging fruit and increase the legalisation of 
proceedings by ensuring that only complex, contested cases are put before the 
Bench.  
It seems that initiatives designed to pursue a neoliberal drive for efficiency, 
such as increased co-operation between advocates, increased use of diversion and 
greater levels of case management, have inadvertently added to the legalisation of 
summary criminal proceedings. One factor, which does not immediately appear to be 
connected to a neoliberal agenda, is increased levels of representation and 
professionalisation. It is however arguable that professionalisation has enabled the 
government to introduce measures (such as case management) which 
unrepresented defendants would struggle to follow. Further, as detailed in chapter 
three, professionalisation in criminal courts signalled legitimacy in the early years of 
the Thatcher government. These issues, coupled with the strong professional 
network operating in the magistratǯǡ
defendants. It also contributes to the othering process because defendants are 
unable to play an effective role in the proceedings. 
Conclusion 
It seems that the frequency with which points of law arise in summary criminal 
proceedings has been either previously underestimated or those references which 
did occur were limited and there has been a change in the way courts refer to law. It 
                                                          
833 Sanders A, 'Reconciling the Apparently Different Goals of Criminal Justice and Regulation: The 
'Freedom' Perspective' in Smith, G. Seddon, T and Quirk, H (eds), Regulation and Criminal Justice: 
Innovations in Policy and Research (Cambridge University Press 2010); 52 
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appears most likely that increased levels of representation, alongside new legislation 
and procedural requirements have increased references to points of law in summary 
criminal proceedings. Earlier socio-legal studies of summary justice have drawn 
attention to marginalisation which is consequent to courtroom layout and signalling 
between personnel,834 as well as issues regarding the efficacy of legal 
representation.835 However, recent government interest in the criminal justice 
process has resulted in more legislation which creates new offences, amends 
criminal justice procedure or alters evidential provisions. This appears to add 
another dimension to the nature of marginalisation experienced by defendants. 
Many of the references to recent legal provisions are made in implicit terms and 
thus the increased legalisation of summary criminal proceedings potentially 
exacerbates marginalisation experienced by defendants. Significantly, defendants 
may not understand the importance of particular issues that tend to be referred to in 
implicit ways. The specialist use of language appears to prevent access to effective 
participation. Levels of marginalisation do however potentially decrease when 
defendants are represented because lawyers indicate that they do attempt to explain 
law and procedure to clients before entering the courtroom. Such explanations also 
appear, according to the data, to enable cases to be processed more quickly. That is 
not to say that co-operation and language do not marginalise defendants from 
processes in the courtroom itself, particularly given the passivity of most defendants 
in court,836 but is to say that defence advocates do have an important role to play. 
                                                          
834 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
835 McBarnet D, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (Macmillan 1981); Bottoms, A 
and McClean, J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
836 Tata, C. Goriely, T. Duff, P. Henry, A and Sherr, A. 'Does Mode of Delivery Make a Difference to Criminal 
Case Outcomes and Clients' Satisfaction? The Public Defence Solicitor Experiment' (2004) (Feb) Criminal 
Law Review 120. 
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Furthermore, the documents required to progress cases appear to require specialist 
knowledge to be completed appropriately. This suggests that greater levels of 
representation are to be favoured. However, difficulties with obtaining publicly 
funded representation remain, as are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6: The Effects of Changes to Legal Aid Provision in Summary Criminal Cases 
Introduction 
In this chapter I aim to show how the availability of, and procedure for 
obtaining, publicly funded representation in summary criminal proceedings ǡǯ
courts in east Kent. 
There have been important changes to the way in which representation in 
summary criminal proceedings is funded in the first two decades of the twenty-first 
century. The interests of justice test has remained largely unchanged since the 
criteria were introduced in 1966.837 However, the administration of the test has 
shifted from court legal advisers to non-legally qualified court support staff amid the ǯ
legal aid so that they would be relieved of some of their duties towards 
unrepresented defendants.838  
The removal of legal adviser discretion in granting legal aid was only one of a 
number of measures designed to reduce legal aid expenditure which were set out in 
chapter three. As has been noted above, means testing was reintroduced in 
applications for legally aided representation in criminal proceedings following 
concerns that its abolition had caused an increase in criminal legal aid 
                                                          
837 Chapter three sets out the interests of justice criteria in full. 
838 Young R, 'Will Widgery do? Court Clerks, Discretion and the Determination of Legal Aid Applications' 
in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone Press 1996) 
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expenditure.839 This occurred despite its abolition in 2001 because the system had 
been too costly to administer.840 Therefore, in order to obtain publicly funded 
representation in criminal proceedings, a defendant must pass both the merits 
(interests of justice) and means test.  
This chapter explores the effects of those changes that appear to have had ǯ
obtained from observations and interviews with advocates. The patterns which 
seem to emerge are significant in providing some explanation of the challenges faced 
by defendants in summary criminal proceedings, and provide support for some 
findings in earlier studies. 
I will highlight some of the issues that appear to have arisen in relation to 
publicly funded representation in summary criminal proceedings in recent years. I 
aim to consider the effect of changes to legal aid and suggest how these themes affect ǡǯǤǯisk taking 
behaviour relating to obtaining funding, remuneration rates affecting the service ǡǯ
process of actually applying for legally aided representation and delay caused by the 
reintroduction of means testing. Before considering those themes, I will discuss the 
general pattern of representation that I identified.   
                                                          
839 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
840 ǡǮ-ǯǣǫǯȋ
Policy Institute, 2006).  
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Levels and methods of representation 
Levels of representation in summary criminal proceedings remain high. Of 
183 cases observed during my fieldwork, only 40 defendants (22 per cent) appeared 
to be unrepresented, of whom 22 would have been entitled to representation under 
the duty solicitor or legal aid provisions.841 Of the 143 defendants (78 per cent) who 
were represented, the method under which representation was being funded is 
summarised as follows: 
Method Number of 
cases 
Representation Order (Legal 
Aid) 
          75 
Pro Bono842           23 
Duty Solicitor           23 
Unclear           17 
Privately fee paying            1 
Costs reimbursed from central 
funds843 
           1 
Appointed under statutory 
provisions844 
           3 
                                                          
841 I was unable to ascertain why those defendants did not take up that entitlement. 
842 In 11 of these cases, the defence advocate appeared to be making the application for Legal Aid at the 
first hearing, while in a further 5 cases legal aid had been applied for but not yet granted. The remaining 8 
cases are unaccounted for. 
843 A solicitor is able to make a claim for costs from central funds when a defendant is represented under 
a private fee paying agreement and the case is dismissed. In those circumstances, a solicitor can apply for ǯǤ 
844 See s.38 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 which allows the court to appoint a solicitor to 
cross examine certain witnesses if the court feels that it is in the interests of justice to do so Ȃ i.e. because 
it would be inappropriate for the defendant to cross examine the witness directly. Strictly speaking, the 
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My observations reflect a similar level of representation to that found by Kemp 
in 2010 (82 per cent) Ȃ a study also conducted after the reintroduction of means 
testing.845 Prior to the reintroduction of means testing, Wilcox and Young assessed 
grants of applications for legal aid in summary proceedings to be in excess of 90 per 
cent.846 While this does not necessarily reflect levels of representation prior to the 
reintroduction of means testing, I detected a general feeling during the course of the 
research that more defendants are appearing without legal representation. Six 
interviewees (A, E, F, I, M and S) specifically referred to a greater number of 
defendants appearing without representation since means testing was reintroduced. 
Several more generally asserted that proceedings take longer to conclude because 
things need to be explained to unrepresented defendants in greater detail Ȃ for 
example, interviewee J. During the course of a conversation observed between a 
barrister and legal adviser ǯ ? ? ? ?ǡ
that he thinks more people are appearing without representation since means 
testing was reintroduced. The legal adviser agreed with that observation and 
asserted that cases involving defendants appearing without representation take 
longer to be dealt with.   Despite these comments, the proportion of unrepresented 
defendants remained relatively low.  However, it seems that, although levels of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
role of court appointed advocates is limited to preparing cross examination points for trial, taking the ǯ
of the trial. Such advocates are not therefore obliged to attend preliminary administrative hearings (and 
are not allowed to claim payment for doing so), although there may be tactical advantages to doing so 
because the advocate will then be aware of any issues that have arisen, will be able to negotiate with the 
prosecutor, and will be able to gain the confidence of the defendant.  
845 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
846 Wilcox, A and Young, R Understanding the Interests of Justice. A Study of Discretion in the Determination 
of Applications for Representation Orders in Magistrates' Courts. Report to the Legal Services Commission 
(Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford, 2005) 
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representation remain high, lawyers are not necessarily confident about being 
remunerated for the service they provide. 
Uncertainty for lawyers 
 During the course of both observation and interviews (particularly in the 
latter) it became apparent that solicitors were representing defendants at financial Ǥǯ
aid while in court and solicitors complaining about being required to conduct case 
management hearings when they were not in funds. During the course of 
observation, I was approached by one defence advocate (who was not interviewed) 
who told me that his firm makes an application for legal aid in every case, even if 
they know it will be refused, in order to make a claim for pre-order cover847 (£49.70) 
or under the early cover scheme848 (£75 plus VAT) and thereby receive some 
remuneration.  
                                                          
847 ǲ-Order cover is available under the 2010 Standard Crime Contract and offers solicitors an 
additional safeguard. Where legal aid is refused on Interests of Justice grounds, regardless of whether the 
applicant passes or fails the means test, a claim can be made for a limited amount of work to an upper 
limit of £49.70 (national) or £52.55 (London). The conditions for Pre-Order Cover 
- A qualified Solicitor who is a Designated Fee Earner or a Crime SQM supervisor must have determined 
that the case meets the Interests of Justice Test. 
- Documented reasons for the determination are on file. 
- Work done appealing against the refusal can be Pre-Order Cover providing the capped amount is not ǤǳǤ ?-order cover Criteria' (2013) <http://www.justice.gov.uk/legal-
aid/assess-your-clients-eligibility/crime-eligibility/payment-before-legal-aid-is-granted/pre-order-
cover-criteria> accessed on 23 October 2013. 
848 Early Cover is available under the Standard Crime Contract. A fixed fee of £75 + VAT is available. 
The criteria for Early Cover are: ǲ- A properly completed legal aid application has been received by HMCTS by 9am on the sixth working 
day following the date of first instruction (provided that the date of first instruction is on or before the 
date of the first hearing); and 
- the application has not been granted or refused by the start of the first hearing; and 
- the first hearing moves the case forward and any adjournment is justified; and 
- the application satisfies the Interests of Justice (IoJ) test but does not ǤǳǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ ?http://www.justice.gov.uk/legal-aid/assess-your-clients-
eligibility/crime-eligibility/payment-before-legal-aid-is-granted/early-cover-criteria> accessed on 23 
October 2013 
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 Similar sentiments emerged during the course of interviews, with interviewee 
S saying that work is conducted when remuneration is uncertain 
 ǲǡǤǯǡ
roughly for example at least one of them would be a bit of a wing and a prayer ǯȏȐmetimes you should, I do ǯǡǤǳ849 
  Three of the seven prosecutors interviewed (Q, L and P) did not notice 
advocates working when they were unsure if they would be paid but all of the other 
19 interviewees described this as a relatively common occurrence since the 
reintroduction of means testing. While defence solicitors predictably had the 
strongest views about this issue (see below), prosecutors also commented that they 
had a sense of defence solicitors doing work when they were unsure about payment 
a lot of the time850 or every time they had conduct of a court list.851 
  Defence solicitors spoke of conducting cases when they were unsure of Ǥǲǳǡ852 others described it as a daily occurrence853 and several talked about 
attempting to secure payment via legal aid in terms of  taking a risk854 or a 
gamble.855 Interviewee F explained that when there are problems with legal aid ǲpro bono by solicitors who, you know, have ǡǡǯ
                                                          
849 Interview S; 4 
850 Interviews J and N 
851 Interviews M and N 
852 Interviews C, D, E and S 
853 Interviews F, G, R and S 
854 Interviews E and O 
855 Interviews D and R 
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ǤǯǯǤǳ856 
 ǯȋ
providing free representation) as a result of pre-existing relationships. The nature of 
that mitigation may however be limited by remuneration levels, as is discussed 
below. Potentially, in the future, when such relationships have not been established, 
more defendants will appear in court without representation.  
 It must also be recognised that there may be other reasons why solicitors 
represent defendants on a pro bono basis, including to maintain good working 
relationships with the court and prosecutors. As discussed in chapters two and four, 
a high degree of co-operation exists between court personnel, and that co-operation 
seems to be crucial to the smooth running of busy courts. Acting in a co-operative 
way also enables defence solicitors to maintain credibility and therefore remain a 
member of the exclusive group857 of personnel who work in summary criminal 
courts. Furthermore, defence solicitors may be of the view that, by conducting a 
degree of pro bono work, they will maintain a good reputation with (potential) 
clients, as is alluded to below. 
 However, defence advocates recognised that, by taking risks in relation to the 
likelihood of payment, they are playing into the hands of a system that considers 
efficiency to be of extreme importance. For example, interviewee K said  ǲeason to adjourn 
and again solicitors were not, I think a) because we are professional and care 
                                                          
856 Interview F; 2 
857 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976); Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest 
for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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Ȍǯǯǡ
tǤǯǯǯǤǳ858 
 ǯ
willingness of advocates to take that risk and take advantage of that behaviour.859 
Thus, by failing to resist the difficulties they encounter, solicitors become complicit 
in their own subordination.860 
 However, even when publicly funded representation is in place, the way that fees 
are paid has the potential to affect the way that defendants experience the ǯǤǡ
are paid by way of fixed fee. The method and rate of payment may both explain ǯ861 and may affect the level of 
service received by defendants.  
The effect of fixed (or standard) fees 
 Fixed fees had been scrapped in favour of payment by hourly rate in the 1960s 
because the government felt this was a fairer way of remunerating advocates,862 but 
they were reintroduced in the mid-1990s because legal aid costs had risen by 300 
                                                          
858 Ǣ ?ǤǲǯǯǳȋǢ ?Ȍ 
859 Interview G 
860 Newman took the view that criminal defence solicitors do regard themselves as subordinate to other 
members of the legal profession, and that they attempt to justify poor service that they provide as a result 
of the attack on their egos (Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 
2013)). Solicitors may be more tempted to provide a limited service if they are uncertain about receiving 
payment. 
861 As long as legal aid is eventually granted, payment at the same rate would be received as if legal aid 
had been in place at the outset and so little is actually lost 
862 Falconer, C. A Fairer Deal for Legal Aid (Department for Constitutional Affairs Cm 6591, 2005). 
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per cent.863 ǡǡǲǤǳ864 Kemp goes further 
and states that there has been no research (as at 2010) in England and Wales that 
has examined how fixed fees affect the decisions that criminal defence solicitors 
make about cases.865 While my research findings are based on data from a relatively 
small interview and observation sample that has not been corroborated with file 
examination, the views expressed by solicitors about the effect of working under a 
fixed fee scheme seem to be surprisingly candid. 
 Seven of the 12 defence solicitors866 interviewed expressed an opinion about the 
level of payment received under the fixed fee scheme.  Most of those interviewees 
indicated that the fixed fee payment scheme was in principle acceptable Ȃ either ǲǳ
the straightforward ones,867 ǲǤǳ868 ǲǯǡǯǳ
because it is possible to break out of the fixed fee system and be paid per hour in 
lengthy or complicated cases.869 All of these issues were considered by interviewee 
F, who summarised the situation as follows: 
                                                          
863 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996) 
864 Tata, C and Stephen, F. ''Swings and Roundabouts': Do Changes to the Structure of Legal Aid 
Remuneration Make a Real Difference to Criminal Case Management and Case Outcomes?' 
<http://staff.law.strath.ac.uk/staff/cyrus_tata/public/Swingsper cent20andper cent20Roundaboutsper 
cent20Draft106.pdf> accessed on 10 April 2012 
865 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011; 
110  
866 Interviews A, C, F, K, O, R and S 
867 Interview A; 4.  
868 Interview S; 4 
869 Interview O; 5 
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ǲǤ
payable for guilty pleas, for summary only and either way offences are fine.  I ǯ
and roundabouts and, in any standard fee situation, there are going to be cases Ǥǯ, obviously ǯǡ
would be some cases where I would be putting in a bill for less than £50.  So on a 
swings and roundabouts basis I think that fixed fees are fine.  I think that it is a 
very good thing when you go outside standard fees you are paid for what you do 
and that that is looked at by the Legal Aid Agency and they will tax it down if ǯǯor because that 
incentivises two Ǥ	ǯǯǤǯǤǯ
very much complaint or ǯǯ- Ǥǳ870 
  ǡǲǳ871 due to the 
fact that there has been no rise in the fees paid since the late 1990s and payment 
rates are too low. Both the Law Society and National Audit Office have criticised the 
low remuneration rate in publicly funded criminal defence representation.872 Kemp ǲadequately paid for the 
                                                          
870 Interview F; 5 
871 Interview C; 3. Interviewee I made a similar comment. 
872 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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services they provided and they felt this would have a detrimental impact on the Ǥǳ873 Interviewee K was similarly disparaging in saying: ǲǡ
roundǯǥ	ǯǡǯ
question of the rates of remuneration that have not increased for I forget 
however many years.  The cuts that have been sustained, the abolition of ǯ
be an item for payment or rolled into the standard fees and so I think the whole 
system is underfunded and does not act as an incentive to more or less provide 
quality and good service.  Whereas I was brought up for most of my career to ǮǯǯǯǡǤǳ874 
  Interviewee K was clearly of the view that the level of remuneration received 
under legal aid affects the service that defendants receive. However, raising defence 
advocate remuneration rates is politically difficult, as much media attention focuses 
on the very small percentage of advocates who earn considerable sums conducting 
legally aided work.875 Most of the defence solicitors interviewed did generally 
acknowledge that payment via the fixed fee system provides an incentive to work 
less thoroughly on cases than if payment were made by the hour, including the 
                                                          
873 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011; 
107 
874 Interview K; 6 
875 Hynes S, 'Social Welfare Law and Public Opinion' (LSRC International Research Conference 2012. 
Rights and Wrongs: Developments in Access to Justice. Oxford 12 September 2012). 
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advocate who agreed with the system in principle.876 Interviewee I gave an example 
of a firm drawing up case plans which incorporated how much a case was worth and 
only working to that value.  
Prosecutors made no similar comments, but largely confessed to knowing 
little about the way that defence advocates are paid. One prosecutor erroneously 
believed that defence solicitors are paid for every hearing and lawyers would 
therefore be pleased when cases are adjourned.877  
Of those defence solicitors who did acknowledge that payment via fixed fee 
could mean that less time would be spent on case preparation than if hourly rates 
were paid, three were keen to say that the system did not affect the way that they 
personally work,878 while also acknowledging that their resources are somewhat 
stretched. The remaining defence solicitors tended to acknowledge that fixed fees 
provide a disincentive to put in extra work on a case, but in general terms Ȃ such as ǲǯǡ ǯ        ǳ879 - rather than indicating that it 
affected their behaviour personally.  
By way of example, interviewee A, noting that the initial contact with clients 
is focused on how to get paid, and that this taints the relationship, said: ǲǯ         Ǥ ǯ 
between doing something properly which is what you want to do and...Working 
for minimum wage.  You think, what is the point in going through this in any      ǯ    ǡ     
                                                          
876 Interviews A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, K, O   
877 Interview Q 
878 Interviews C, E and I 
879 Interview B; 4 
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          ǯ e thing that I find most ǥǯǯ    ǡ ǯ    ǯ  ǯ   ǯǤǳ880 
      Another interviewee spoke of the struggle between the professional obligations 
of the job as against trying to run a profitable business: ǲǯ
looking at your watch and you start thinking how much are we actually being ǥ
is running a business. And there comes a point where on a fixed fee structure   Ǯǡ ǯ ǯǤ    ǯ  Ǯ ǯ ǯ    ǯ        ǡ ǡǥǡǯ
and, yes, we are supposed to be providing a professional service but thǯǯǡǯǯǯǤǳ881  
      Interviewee D similarly commented that less staff have to do more work to 
balance the books, which places additional pressure on case preparation. This ǯ
as possible882 ǡ  ǲ sustain themselves, many lawyers insisted that 
they were forced to compromise their behaviour; discontinuous representation was 
                                                          
880 Interview A; 4-5 
881 Interview F; 6-7 
882 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013); 78 
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   ǳǤ883 ǡ  ǡ   ǲ  
provide any discernible sense of regret at behaving  ǳǡ884 my Ǯǯ885 between their duties to the client and 
business needs. They expressed insight into the difficulties this can cause defendants        Ǯ ǯ886 or perform as little work as 
possible in order to maximise profit.887   
These comments appear to specifically undermine the theory that lawyers 
provide services that are unnecessary in order to maximise income by claiming 
higher fees.888 Instead, and in line with managerial demands for efficiency, lawyers 
seem to generally work to volume. Thus, the comments made by advocates in my 
sample do not support the supplier induced demand theory discussed in chapter 
three. Instead, advocates seem keen to conduct cases with maximum efficiency (or 
minimum effort) even at potential (recognised) harm to the client. This supports the 
findings of Gray, Fenn and Rickman which suggested that defence solicitors tended 
to reduce the amount of time spent on cases that would clearly not break out of the 
lower standard fee category.889 In fact, the comments made by advocates entirely 
support the findings of Stephen, Fazio and Tata in Scotland, who noted that the 
introduction of fixed fees meant that solicitors put less effort into conducting cases 
                                                          
883 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013); 86 
884 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013); 87 
885 See interview A  in particular 
886 See, for example, interview B 
887 ǡ ǡ 
Ǥǡǯǲ
cliǳȋǡLegal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice 
(Hart Publishing 2013); 96) 
888 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996) 
889 Gray A, Fenn P and Rickman N, 'Controlling Lawyer's Costs through Standard Fees: An Economic 
Analysis' in Young, R. and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice. Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of 
Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996) 
  
221 
 
  ǲ         Ǥǳ890  
It was apparent that advocates felt constrained by the business circumstances 
in which they found themselves, and that this caused some conflict with their 
professional duties. Young and Wall had earlier noted that the contracting scheme 
under which standard fees were introduced was likely to lead to conveyor-belt type 
case processing as firms struggled to remain profitable.891 The contractual terms of           ǯ   
flexible, autonomous decisions,892 ǡ  ǡ ǲ 
of a direct relationship with the state raised the possibility of managerial control     Ǥǳ893 It seems that Young and Wall were correct to predict  ǲ              ǡ ǡ      ǳ894 as lawyers are 
pressurised into dealing with cases (rather than clients) in standardised ways.895      ǡ    ǯ   ǲ
                                                          
890 Stephen F, Fazio G and Tata C, 'Incentives, Criminal Defence Lawyers and Plea Bargaining' (2008) 
28(3) International Review of Law and Economics 212; 213 
891 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996) 
892 Sommerlad H, 'Criminal Legal Aid Reforms and the Restructuring of Legal Professionalism' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Legal Aid: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996). 
893 Sommerlad H, 'Criminal Legal Aid Reforms and the Restructuring of Legal Professionalism' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Legal Aid: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 297 
894 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 12 
895 Young R and Wall D, 'Criminal Justice, Legal Aid and the Defence of Liberty' in Young, R. and Wall, D 
(eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996) 
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conflicting professional age       ǳǤ896 The            ǯ       ǡ  ǯ     ǯ     business. In response, firms 
demonstrated a tendency to adopt a managerial stance involving volume 
processing.897  
However, advocates did express some discomfort with that position, 
suggesting that they would prefer to take a political stance (which involves a more 
robust, resistant approach to bureaucratic procedures in favour of client-centred 
approaches) 898 if the pressure of running a business were not present. This builds ǯǤ899 He was of the view that lawyers expressed a client-
ceǯǤ900  ǯǡ
that my interviewees openly recognised the difficulties in representing clients in this 
way while Newman took the view that solicitors were in a form of denial about their 
behaviour.901 Newman was of the view that lawyers actively embraced the working     ǡ        ǲ
disregard for their cliǳǤ902 It is clear however that Newman was hoping to find 
lawyers who remained committed to public service ideals of civic morality, and was 
                                                          
896 Wall D, 'Keyholders to Criminal Justice? Solicitors and Applications for Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 115 
897 McConville M, Hodgson J, Bridges L and Pavlovic, A, Standing Accused. The Organisation and Practices 
of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Oxford University Press, 1994)) 
898 McConville M, Hodgson J, Bridges L and Pavlovic, A, Standing Accused. The Organisation and Practices 
of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Oxford University Press, 1994)) 
899 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
900 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
901 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
902 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013);87 
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    ǯ     
business practices that they felt constrained them.903   ǯ904 nor my own research suggests however that lawyers 
did not do their best for clients in terms of their advocacy when they were actually in 
the courtroom, and I suggest that one must view their behaviour outside the 
courtroom in a somewhat different way Ȃ although I would not endorse the 
behaviour observed by Newman as best practice.905 While I did observe the 
alienation of defendants in the courtroom via jargon, professional networking and 
courtroom layout, I did not observe defence advocates denigrating their clients in 
the way that Newman suggests occurs among colleagues outside the courtroom.906    ǯ ǡ       
recognise that payment by fixed fee incentivises volume processing of cases over 
spending a significant degree of time examining the fine details of any given case. 
The implications of this are obvious Ȃ points may be missed meaning that relevant 
evidential or legal points may not be pursued.  
This clearly has the potential to place defendants at significant risk of 
inadequate access to justice in the proceedings. However, the complexities of the 
legal aid system do not just affect the way that lawyers approach cases. As well as 
the possibility of defeǯ    
                                                          
903 Newman does not however conduct a thorough analysis of the potential for alternative models of 
practice, nor of behaviour in court or at the police station Ȃ arguably the most important parts of legally 
aided representation. Newman decries the level of client care outside the courtroom as clearly 
substandard and asserts that lawyers seemed to positively embrace their behaviour in order to maximise 
profit (Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013)). On the other hand, 
my interviewees seemed conscious of the crossroads at which they had been placed Ȃ the business or the 
client.  
904 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
905 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
906 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). I conducted my 
observations inside the courtroom only. 
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 ǡ      ǯ   
early stage in the proceedings. There appeared to be a tendency for interviewees to 
attribute the uncertainties  involved in applying for legal aid to what are perceived 
as burdensome bureaucratic requirements (such as the need for self-employed 
applicants to provide business paperwork907 or problems with the correct 
information being held by the Department of Work and Pensions).908 Given that 
many defendants have somewhat chaotic lifestyles, they struggle to comply with 
administrative demands placed upon them as part of the legal aid application 
process.909  
Defendants, lawyers and the legal aid application process 
  Most interviewees felt that specialist legal knowledge is necessary in order to 
appropriately complete an application for legal aid. This results from the need to 
understand whether or not a case will meet the interests of justice test.910  Kemp also 
noted that the discretionary nature of the interests of justice test alongside the ǲ
                                                          
907 Interview I, K and Q for example. Kemp also found defence solicitors expressing concern about the 
administrative burdens placed on self-employed defendants who attempt to apply for legal aid (Kemp, V 
Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011) 
908 Ǥǯ
Allowance, Employment Support Allowance or Income Support they should be automatically entitled to 
legal aid, subject to the interests of justice test. Whether or not that entitlement exists is checked via Ǥǯd similar 
problems in accessing information held by the Department of Work and Pensions (Kemp, V Transforming 
Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011) 
909 Interviews C, E and I in particular 
910 Both the interests of justice test and the means test must be passed in order to secure legally aided 
representation. The interests of justice test allows the court to test whether the case is one in which a 
defendant requires specialist (i.e. legal) assistance to properly advance his or her case. The criteria are set 
out in chapter three. 
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ǡǳǤ911 Half of 
defence solicitors912 and two of the seven prosecution advocates interviewed also 
felt that defendants struggle with the additional information that is required to 
satisfy the means test as well as the interests of justice test.913 By way of example, 
interviewee F described the legǲǥǡǳǤ914  
 ǯpleting 
legal aid applications as mutually beneficial to both the client and the lawyer.  He 
explains: ǲ	ǡǥǡthe 
application form and, in the solicitor's experience, tend to leave the application 
to the last minute or to forget about it altogether. Thirdly, the clients prefer to 
leave the application to the solicitor because of the complex legal knowledge 
and expertise required to complete it. Fourthly defendants are encouraged by ǥǤǳ915 
      As well as concerns about bureaucracy surrounding the procedure, defence 
solicitors felt that they had been misled about the degree to which they would need 
to assist in resolving problems with legal aid Ȃ stating that, when means testing was 
                                                          
911Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf>  (2010) accessed 12 December 2011: 
66 
912 Interviews A, D, F, O, R, S  
913 Interviews H and Q 
914 Interview F; 3 
915 Wall D, 'Keyholders to Criminal Justice? Solicitors and Applications for Criminal Legal Aid' in Young, R. 
and Wall, D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone 
Press 1996); 117 
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initially reintroduced, they were told that any problems that arose would be 
resolved between the court and the applicant. Despite this, advocates felt that they 
are expected to liaise between the court and the applicant in order to assist the legal 
aid application process.916 ǯ
test had added to the administrative burdens placed on them.917 The Legal Services 
Commission (now replaced by the Legal Aid Agency) recognised, when means 
testing was reintroduced, that solicitors would probably be required to complete the 
means information required on a legal aid application on behalf of defendants.918 
Hynes and Robins had already noted that defence solicitors had been expected to 
assist defendants in completing forms, gathering evidence for the means test and 
liaising between the legal aid provider and the client.919  This demonstrates how the 
executive has been able to transfer the cost of administering the legal aid system to 
lawyers, although this is not a new feature of the English and Welsh legal aid 
system.920 
 Defence solicitors appeared to be of the view that the procedure for obtaining 
legal aid was too bureaucratic and too onerous on defendants and that this delayed 
case progression. They generally appeared to be of the view that magistrates are 
unsympathetic to those problems (although they also tend to allow unrepresented 
defendants more leeway in court, as below) and that the court process forces them 
                                                          
916 See, for example, interviews C and E 
917 Kemp, V Transforming legal aid: Access to criminal defence services 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
918 Legal Services Commission, 'Focus on CDS' (2004) 16 (December) 
919 Hynes S and Robins J, The Justice Gap. Whatever Happened to Legal Aid? (Legal Action Group 2009). 
One prosecutor similarly blamed the court process for delay and complexity in obtaining publicly funded 
representation Ȃ stating that the court does not seem to be able to sort out legal aid very quickly and the 
whole system seems like it could be greatly simplified (Interview L). 
920 	ǡǮǯ
scheme referred to in chapter three. 
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into action  - partly because magistrates are aware that advocates are prepared to 
take the risk of non-payment in a proportion of cases. Interviewee F expressed ǲ a lack of understanding on the Bench, particularly ǡǳ921 as a result of 
the bureaucracy surrounding the form.922 These views were, to some extent, 
supported by prosecutors. It also seemed to be the case that advocates felt a sense of 
duty to both the court and to clients, but further felt that those duties were hindered 
by the difficulties that exist in applying for and obtaining legal aid.   
 Notably, however, interviewee S was of the view that, if the magistrates are told 
everything that has to be done in order to obtain legal aid, then they tend to be more 
sympathetic to requests for adjournments. This suggests that magistrates have little 
understanding of the procedure for applying for, and obtaining, publicly funded 
representation. It also suggests that, when the court is informed about the 
requirements of that procedure, magistrates demonstrate compassion towards both 
defendants and their solicitors who are attempting to obtain funding. Such 
demonstrations of compassion may indicate that magistrates, when told about the 
procedure for obtaining legal aid, also believe that it is onerous.  
 The data demonstrated that advocates believed that the reintroduction of means 
testing had a negative effect on defendants. While only two prosecutors expressed 
the opinion that defendants find it difficult to comply with the conditions required to 
obtain legally aided representation, four of the seven were of the view that 
defendants tend to have vulnerabilities which affect their ability to participate 
                                                          
921 Interview F; 2 
922 Interviewee O also commented that the procedure for obtaining legal aid is very bureaucratic and 
obtaining the required proof of income from clients who are not particularly organised can be 
problematic. 
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effectively in the legal aid application process, or that their motivation is not 
sufficient to enable effective participation.923 Interviewee H said that many 
defendants have not had a great education, while interviewee L stated that the 
majority of defendants either have learning difficulties or literacy problems. 
Interviewee J similarly expressed the opinion that a defendant might be able to ǲ write in the first place ǥǯǡǯǥǯǯǳǤ924 Newman found Ȃ as did I Ȃ defence solicitors ǯy to understand the 
process.925 He however took the view that these opinions demonstrated an Ȁǯǲǡǳ926 a bad category 
of citizen. This fails to acknowledge that the private views expressed by defence 
solicitors about their clients may not reflect the way that they actually act in court Ȃ 
something which, as a non-lawyer, Newman acknowledges that he cannot assess.927 
It may also simply be a fact of the criminal justice system that many defendants do 
suffer educational, emotional and/or health difficulties. Similarly, while Newman 
criticises the way in which defence solicitors advise clients and act in court, as a non-
lawyer he is not able to assess the appropriateness of the advice or behaviour in 
legal or evidential terms. 
 While prosecutors highlighted literacy or educational difficulties as a hindrance 
to defendants successfully applying for legal aid, defence solicitors noted additional 
                                                          
923 Interview H, J, L, P 
924 Interview J; 5 
925 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013).  
926 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013); 46 
927 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 
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ǯ
the legal aid application process.928 ǡǲ
understand that the clients make no effort whatsoever to get legal aid sorted but ǡǡǯǳǡ929 which also highlights how procedures and culture ǮǯǤǡǯ
cǡǲ
bureaucratic requirements of the means test were too onerous when they were 
dealing with people who lead chaotic lifestyles, have severe mental illness, or have 
little or no EǳǤ930  
 An acute example of these issues was provided via observation at one court 
hearing. A defendant appeared before the court after breaching his bail conditions, 
which had been imposed at the Crown court. He was represented by the duty 
solicitor who explained that the defendant was not legally represented in the 
proceedings because he had failed the means test. He had failed the means test 
because he had been hospitalised numerous times as a result of mental health 
problems and could not therefore provide the necessary income information to the 
legal aid department. The Crown court judge was reportedly extremely concerned 
that the defendant was not legally represented and had adjourned the case a number 
of times to try and resolve the problems but the defendant remained without 
publicly funded representation, even though he would have passed both the means 
                                                          
928 See interviews A, B, C, D, K, 
929 Interview C; 2 
930 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011; 71 
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and merits test.931 This case illustrated how a defendant's inability to engage with 
the application process might cause delay in the proceedings and risk inadequate 
access to justice.   
 While this may be an extreme example, observations provided numerous 
examples of situations in which a defendant's case had been hindered because legal 
aid was not in place. This appeared to result in delay in the proceedings, which was 
also commented upon during the interviews. 
Delay 
 As noted above, the administrative requirements of the legal aid application 
procedure, coupled with personal difficulties faced by many defendants, mean that it 
is difficult to know if or when legal aid will be granted. Defence solicitors also 
complained that it might take as long to try and resolve issues with legal aid as it 
would to actually prepare the case.932  Three quarters of defence solicitors933 and 
five of the seven prosecutors934 interviewed felt that problems with obtaining legal 
aid cause delay in summary criminal proceedings.  
 Defence advocates raised concerns that delay in obtaining legal aid not only 
means that they cannot start preparing cases as early as they would wish to, but also 
that the inability to prepare properly means that defendants are sometimes forced 
into situations which are not necessarily beneficial to them.935  For example, 
interviewee B expressed concern that it was difficult to know how far to take 
                                                          
931 While this is perhaps an extreme example, it does not appear to be an isolated one. Baksi noted in 
2011 that the LSC received criticism for delay in processing legal aid applications and leaving people 
without representation in serious cases (Baksi C, 'Djanogly urged to ease Legal Aid backlog' (2011)(23 
June) Law Society Gazette 3) 
932 See, for example, interviews G and I 
933 Interviews A, B, C, D, E, I, K, O, R  
934 Interviews H, J, L, M, N  
935 See, for example, interviews A, B, C, E and O 
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instructions unless or until legal aid is in place and, as interviewee E noted, forcing 
defendants to enter a plea before the advocate is prepared forces solicitors to advise 
defendants to enter a not guilty plea, because the burden of proving the case remains 
with the prosecution.936 One prosecutor noted that demanding efficiency when legal 
aid is not in place causes delay at later stages; ǲ
can get legal aid but it got very difficult for peoǥ
forcing a plea always forced a not guilty at an early stage which would have an 
impact on the case management hearings and on CJ: SSSǳǤ937 
  Interviewee H, another prosecutor, similarly commented that the reintroduction 
of mǲǳǤ938 Interviewee C commented that the courts 
require decisions to be made about the conduct of cases at a time when advocates ǲǯly have the opportunity to go through the papers as much as we ǡǡǳǤ939 
Interviewee K expressed some criticism of this behaviour, as noted above, in stating ǲt of legal aid and so solicitors continue to facilitate the 
system to run at speed by allowing cases to be progressed, representing people ǯǤǳ940 The fact that this is noted by prosecutors and 
defence advocates suggests that it iǮǯ
                                                          
936 As is, however, noted in chapter four, the entry of a not guilty plea in these circumstances does not 
occur very frequently. 
937 Interview M; 7.  
938 Interviewee H; 1 
939 Interview C; 8 
940 Interview K; 2. This was particularly noticeable in the course of observing cases that were due to be 
committed to the Crown Court. Payment for committal proceedings was abolished in 2012 (Baksi, C ǮǮǯ ? ? ? ?ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍȋ ?Ȍ
Gazette).  
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relation to due process as Newman suggests.941 As is discussed in chapter four, 
forcing pleas at too early a stage in the proceedings is detrimental for all 
participants. The difficulty appears to result from a combination of delay in ǡǯȋ
means that applications for adjournments are less likely to be tolerated by the Ȍǯ-operative workgroup 
behaviour.  
 Both defending and prosecuting942 interviewees therefore expressed the view 
that, by refusing to adjourn cases when legal aid is not in place, cases ultimately take 
longer to be dealt with. This is because pleas are entered prematurely and because, 
according to the data, cases involving unrepresented defendants take longer to be 
processed Ȃ and, as a result of the reintroduction of means testing, there appear to 
be more unrepresented defendants appearing ǯǤ943 Kemp 
similarly found that the number of defendants appearing without legal 
representation had increased since the reintroduction of means testing.944 This issue 
adds another dimension to the way in which the presence or otherwise of publicly 
funded representation constructs summary criminal proceedings.  I therefore turn to 
consider some of the issues that arose during the course of observation and 
interviews in relation to unrepresented defendants. 
                                                          
941 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
942 See, for example interviews J and M 
943 See, for example, interviews J and M 
944 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf>  (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
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Unrepresented defendants 
  As discussed in chapters two and four, evidence suggests that lawyers in 
summary criminal proceedings actually increase efficiency (and reduce delay) by 
negotiating pleas945 and co-operating with proceedings.946 Interviewees were 
similarly of the view that cases involving unrepresented defendants take longer to ǤǡǡǲǯǤǯhey cross-ǳǤ947 This comment supports earlier studies of unrepresented ǯǡǡ
to understand the proceedings and unfamiliar with procedures.948 Again, Kemp ǲndants who were unrepresented had less understanding of what is ǳǤ949 The increasingly 
legalised nature of the proceedings, as discussed in chapter five, is likely to intensify 
that problem for unrepresented defendants. 
 To that end, five of the seven prosecutors950 but only four of the 12 defence 
solicitors951 interviewed felt that magistrates and district judges try to be helpful to 
unrepresented defendants. Approximately a third of interviewees, both prosecuting 
                                                          
945 Mulcahy A, 'The Justifications of `Justice': Legal Practitioners' Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements 
in Magistrates' Courts' (1994) 34(4) British Journal of Criminology 411. 
946 Goriely T, 'The Development of Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales' in Young, Richard and Wall, 
David (ed), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 
1996). 
947 Interview B; 9 
948 Justice, The Unrepresented Defendant in Magistrates' Courts (British Section of the International Cmssn 
of Jurists, 1971); Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
949 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011; 79 
950 Interviews H, J, M, N and P 
951 Interviews B, E, O, S 
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and defending952 were of the view that unrepresented defendants are treated more ǯ
the proceedings that would not generally be allowed (such as hearsay). However, 
one of those prosecutors953 and three defence solicitors954 felt it was painful to 
watch unrepresented defendants in court because ǲǯ
Bench is constantly trying to keep them quiet in the court room because they ǡǡǯǯǤǳ955 
One of the defence solicitors further commented  ǲǯ       ǲ  ǯ ǳǡ Ǯǯǯ ǮǫǯǡǤǤǤǯ           ving Ǥǳ956 
     The above concerns were demonstrated during the course of observing 
sentencing hearings that involved unrepresented defendants. When unrepresented 
defendants were asked if they wanted to say anything to the court about the offence, 
they tended to provide extremely brief answers to specific questions that the court 
clerk or magistrates asked, in stark contrast to the speeches made by defence 
solicitors that were often directed to offence mitigation in terms of sentencing 
guidelines and offender personal mitigation. In one instance, an unrepresented 
                                                          
952 Interviews A, B, J, M, S 
953 Interview J 
954 Interviews A, F and K 
955 Interview J; 17 
956 Interview A; 12 
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defendant essentially admitted that he had committed the same offence on several 
previous occasions even though there was no record of the commission of those 
offences. Although the court did not act on that admission (and the defendant did not 
actually suffer any adverse consequences), it is highly unlikely that it would have 
occurred if the defendant had been represented.  
Duty solicitors at court 
One way in which the legal aid scheme has sought to mitigate problems 
experienced by unrepresented defendants is via the duty solicitor scheme. As 
mentioned in chapter three, all defendants who have either been charged with a 
potentially imprisonable offence or who appear while detained in custody are 
entitled to instruct the duty solicitor.  
When the duty solicitor scheme was expanded by the Law Society in the 
1970s and early 1980s, Ashworth describes it as considerably improving the 
provision of legal aid.957 About a third of my interviewees958 felt that the duty 
solicitor scheme generally provides a good service. Interviewee D said that the duty 
solicitor scheme is useful because a duty solicitor can help people make a sensible 
decision about plea, saying  ǲǯl advice before going to court, a lot of people are 
disorganised and, frankly, getting to court on the right day and on time is 
represented as a success for them... All the more so given the problems in 
getting funding for that legal advice in advance of the court.  So I think the duty 
solicitor scheme plays a vital role in ensuring that people who turn up to court 
                                                          
957 Ashworth A, 'Legal Aid, Human Rights and Criminal Justice' in Young, R. and  Wall, D (eds), Access to 
Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press 1996); 64 
958 Interviews D, C, K, S for the defence and Q and P for the prosecution 
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ǡǯ
them.  There have been many occasions where people have walked in saying ǮǯǡǯǯǮǯǯǤǳ959 
      However, several interviewees were of the view that the scheme does not 
operate well.960 Both prosecution and defence advocates expressed the view that the 
duty solicitor is often over-burdened. This results in delay in the proceedings as 
courts wait for the duty solicitor to be ready.961 This could also have a detrimental 
effect on the service that defendants receive as duty solicitors struggle to cope with 
workloads. This provides a further example of the conflict between a desire for ǯ
degree of delay because the solicitor needs to review evidence and take instructions. 
However, when the duty solicitor is over-burdened with cases (which is more likely 
as the availability of legal aid is limited by means testing) he or she may be unable, as 
a result of time pressure, to provide as thorough advice and assistance as a solicitor 
who is instructed via a full legal aid Representation Order. The duty solicitor in these 
circumstances becomes somewhat of a triage service, only capable of providing ǡǮǯustice. That said, I did not, 
during the course of courtroom observation, notice any discernible difference in the 
way that duty solicitors made representations to the court compared to advocates 
who were funded either privately or via a Representation Order. 
                                                          
959 Interview D; 8 
960 Interviews C, J, L, M, N, O 
961 See, for example, interviews J, L, M  
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Conclusion 
The ways in which the reintroduction of means testing has affected the 
summary criminal justice process are complex. The remuneration regime causes 
concern about the quality of criminal legal aid defence services. The changes brought 
about by reintroducing means testing appear to have exacerbated difficulties in the ǯǤ 
The fixed, or standard, fee system pre-dated the reintroduction of means 
testing. However, my findings support previous research which demonstrates that 
the payment scheme appears to incentivise standardised case progression which 
advocates recognise may hinder access to justice.  Thus relationships between 
lawyers, clients, the courts and the executive had already been placed under strain 
by the increased influence of managerialism, which encourages volume processing 
in the proceedings. My findings do not support the supplier induced demand thesis. 
Rather, it appears that access to justice has been further eroded by governmentsǯ
marketised approaches to legal aid in summary criminal courts. 
Despite evidence which shows that levels of legal representation remain high 
in summary criminal cases, the reintroduction of means testing appears to have 
placed further burdens on the dynamics of the relationships that exist between 
lawyers, their clients and the courts. Interviewees appeared to believe that the legal 
aid application process is too onerous on defendants, the majority of whom have 
significant socio-economic problems.  Defence solicitors and prosecutors alike 
regard the legal aid application process as unnecessarily complex and bureaucratic. 
These difficulties appear to result in delay when one is trying to obtain publicly 
funded representation (if it is obtained at all) and uncertainty for lawyers in 
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securing remuneration. Such delay and uncertainty affects the lawyer/client 
relationship in that it limits the ability of a solicitor to provide full advice at early ǡǮǯo cut corners already 
brought about by the fixed fee system. Although defence solicitors may try to 
alleviate some of these problems by acting even when payment is uncertain, they 
also acknowledge that the level of service provided in those circumstances is limited. 
This may be exacerbated by the apparent feeling that defence lawyers have been 
over-burdened in the requirement to assist during the application procedure itself.  
Further, although the duty solicitor scheme may alleviate some of the above 
issues, many interviewees also felt that this system was overly burdensome on 
defence advocates, and caused delay in court. Overwhelming duty defence solicitors 
with cases may also encourage limited advice given in haste. 
It therefore appears that changes brought about to publicly funded 
representation in summary criminal courts have constructed relationships between 
lawyers, defendants and the courts in a way that advocates consider to be 
excessively bureaucratic and detrimental to both client and business needs. Unlike 
Newman,962 I found that solicitors recognised, and expressed regret about, the 
competing interests that affected access to justice for defendants. 
Publicly funded representation is therefore a facility that, despite existing as a 
way to avoid defendants being treated only as dummy players,963 has faced 
challenges in remaining easily accessible and in enabling lawyers to provide a high  Ǥ       ǯ  
apply marketised approaches to access to justice. 
                                                          
962 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 
963 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 
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Conclusion 
Analysing the issues ǯ
courts that defendants have always experienced marginalisation as dummy players 
in the process of summary criminal prosecution. This outcome is a result of the 
specialised nature of the process, court personnel behaviour and the ǯdesire 
to process cases at speed. 
As is seen in chapter three, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth 
century that governments recognised that unrepresented defendants might be at a 
disadvantage in criminal proceedings, and that this might be politically problematic. 
At this time, governments began to acknowledge that the technical nature of the 
proceedings put unrepresented defendants at a disadvantage in being able to 
effectively put their case to the court. Once the executive identified that 
unrepresented defendants might not be able to fully exercise their role in the 
process, liberal approaches to government had to recognise that access to justice 
should be encouraged to maintain a sense of legitimacy in processes of state led 
prosecution.  
Despite this recognition, the expansion of legal aid was resisted, based on 
governmental concerns that by increasing levels of legal representation, more cases 
would be contested and proceedings would be slower. It was not until the post-1945 
welfarist government came to power that, ideologically at least, the executive 
recognised a need to expand legal aid provision. As such, legislation was introduced 
which was designed to enable more people to access publicly funded legal 
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Ǥǡǯ
courts remained low because governments continued to be concerned about funding 
in the criminal justice system. Governments have remained apprehensive about the 
cost of legally aided representation but also needed to allow access to publicly 
funded lawyers to give the appearance of legitimacy in summary criminal 
proceedings. As a consequence of cost concerns, governments limited the scope of 
legal aid eligibility and did not publicise the scheme widely, as detailed in chapter 
three. 
However, as a result of reports such as that of the Widgery Committee964 in 
the mid-1960s and structural changes to the provision of legal aid (such as 
centralised funding), the number of defendants appearing in court with the 
assistance of a publicly funded defence advocate increased from the 1970s. At this 
stage, government began to accept that defence advocates could facilitate speedy 
case progression. At the same time, socio-legal scholars were conducting research ǯ- specifically the speed 
and technical nature of the proceedings Ȃ marginalised defendants and meant that 
they were unable to play an effective role in the proceedings. The presence of 
defence advocates therefore fulfilled a dual role for the executive; they increased 
courtroom efficiency while also providing at least a sense of legitimacy to the state 
led criminal justice process.  
Just as levels of legal representation were significantly increasing in 
magistraǯǡ ideology of government fell into 
crisis as a result of economic difficulties maintaining the welfare state, recession and 
                                                          
964'Report of the Departmental Committee on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings' (H.M.S.O. Cmnd 2934 
1966). 
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rising crime rates. This paved the way for neoliberalism to emerge as the dominant 
political ideology in Britain. I argue that, because neoliberalism is both crisis 
responsive and lacks clear, universal definition, it has been able to adapt to 
challenges faced by governments and remains the ideology upon which modern 
policy initiatives are based. My interrogation of liberalism and neoliberalism in 
chapter three demonstrates that neoliberalism is not a clear, inflexible, monolithic 
philosophy. There are, however, identifiable themes in British approaches to 
neoliberal governance that have persisted since 1979. 
Neoliberalism viewed those services that remained under state control as 
inefficient and wasteful. The preference for private sector managerial techniques 
resulted in increasingly intrusive forms of regulation of the criminal justice process 
via efficiency drives and legal aid contracting schemes, which encourage defence 
advocates to act in increasingly standardised and more co-operative ways Ȃ to the 
detriment of adversarial principles. At the same time, the social displacement that 
resulted from the preference for the market as social regulator pushed vulnerable Ǯǯ.  
Neoliberalism legitimised the view of such groups as responsible for their 
own situation by encouraging individualism and consumerism, thereby removing 
any ideological need to provide any more than minimal levels of state funded 
assistance. While authors such as Wacquant,965 Bell966 and Squires and Lea967 have 
alerted us to neoliberalismǯ tendency to produce precarious, demonised and 
                                                          
965 Wacquant L, Punishing the Poor. The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Duke University Press 
2009) 
966 Bell E, Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
967 Squires P and Lea J, 'Introduction: Reading Loic Wacquant - Opening Questions and Overview' in 
Squires, P and Lea, J (eds), Criminalisation and Advanced Marginality. Critically Exploring the Work of Loic 
Wacquant (The Policy Press 2012). 
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criminalised groups, my findings demonstrate that the same processes of 
marginalisation can be seen within the process of summary criminal prosecution. 
Demands for efficiency and alterations to funding, which effectively oblige lawyers 
to work to volume in order for their firms to remain viable, have exacerbated ǯ inability to play an effective role in the proceedings and thereby 
emphasised their status as precariat members of society.  ǯ
defendants, who are Ȃ as Carlen968 noted Ȃ unable to fully engage in the proceedings 
as a result of a number of factors including courtroom layout, and jargon and 
signalling between court personnel alongside bureaucratic requirements to process 
cases at speed. Neoliberal techniques of government have intensified the demand to 
deal with cases quickly because government not only viewed public services as 
inefficient but also began to view the activities of public service professionals with 
suspicion. Those views led to the introduction of legislation and initiatives that were 
designed to encourage more efficient working practices. Furthermore, by 
introducing a franchising scheme for legal aid funding, the government created a 
new type of legal professional which pushed lawyers away from altruistic service 
provision towards Ǯknavishǯ behaviour via managerial imperatives.  
Governmental distrust of public service professionals justified not only 
greater intrusion in the system of publicly funded representation, but also the 
introduction of fixed fees for legally aided representation and, as austerity measures 
took greater hold, reduced payment rates which restrict the ability of lawyers to give 
                                                          
968 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
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cases and clients as much time as they might like. ǡǯ969 and 
research conducted by Stephen, Fazio and Tata970 indicate that fee cuts have 
resulted in lawyers reducing the level of service provided. This has exacerbated 
defendantsǯmarginalisation from the proceedings.  
The workgroup adapted to demands for efficiency as procedures became 
routinised and references to legal provisions and case management techniques 
became ingrained in the culture and language of courtroom proceedings. Legal 
representation does undoubtedly assist defendants who would otherwise suffer 
even greater marginalisation as they would remain unable to be involved in the 
jargon and signalling that would persist. Representation does not however, as 
Carlen971 and McBarnet972 predicted, operate to completely rectify the defendant's 
exclusion from the process because of the way in which laws and procedures 
designed to encourage efficiency became absorbed in workgroup culture. These 
procedures appear to have reinforced the professional networks operating in the 
courtroom via greater recourse to, for example, the completion of standard case 
management forms and the use of plea negotiations as a method of case resolution. 
These developments intensified the marginalisation of defendants, who are unlikely 
to be able to understand the increased implicit reference to legal provisions. The use 
of such implicit references and demands to work at greater speed also serve to 
strengthen the professional networks in the workgroup, who share the common 
                                                          
969 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
970 Stephen F, Fazio G and Tata C, 'Incentives, Criminal Defence Lawyers and Plea Bargaining' (2008) 
28(3) International Review of Law and Economics 212. 
971 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
972 McBarnet D, 'Two Tiers of Justice' in Lacey, N (ed), A Reader on Criminal Justice (Oxford Readings in 
Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University Press 1994). 
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goals of working at speed and maintaining their professional reputation. As a result, 
defendants suffer further exclusion as non-members of that professional network. 
The implicit reference to provisions introduced by neoliberal governments 
(including, for example, CJ: SSS and the Criminal Justice Act 2003) not only means 
that technical points are reduced to mundane professional practices but also that the 
use of jargon increases. This acts as a form of gate keeping to entry into the 
professional network. 
Defence solicitors adapted to and incorporated neoliberal policy initiatives, 
rather than resisting them, for a number of reasons; to maintain good working 
relationships, maintain reputation, which is seen as useful for negotiating power, 
and to assist business needs. ǯǡ973 ǯ974 ǯǮǯ
which professionals will develop tools to manage, and adapt to, external 
intervention.975  All of the reasons that solicitors cite for adaptation to politically 
motivated intervention can also be seen to be beneficial to clients, who will 
presumably want their advocates to be able to wield some power and have a good 
reputation in front of the magistrates. Solicitors also view some of these goals as 
beneficial to clients even though they also acknowledge that demands for efficiency 
and difficulties in obtaining, as well as levels of, funding can act counter to 
defendantsǯ interests and encourage solicitors to make case management decisions 
prematurely. As a result, by absorbing rather than opposing initiatives designed to 
                                                          
973 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203 
974 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
975 Bourdieu P, The Logic of Practice (Stanford University Press 1990). 
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improve efficiency, defence advocates, perhaps inadvertently, bolstered professional 
networks and thereby increased defendant marginalisation. 
There is clearly a complex set of practices at work in which a number of 
competing interests jostle for priority. It seems that defendants are expected to put 
their trust in the professional decision making that accompanied the view of public 
service professionals as benevolent and altruistic, despite the change in 
governmental attitude to such professionals. The networks that operate in ǯgovernmental change in attitude towards public 
services but the patterns of behaviour attributed to those networks by earlier 
research Ǥǯ
remains strong in the face of political change. As such, the network continues to 
operate in such a way that the defendant is obliged to submit to the technical 
knowledge of the professional workgroup.  
It is clear that defence advocates feel that they are operating as best they can 
in an increasingly challenging environment. Solicitors interviewed expressed both 
regret about, and insight into, the processes which mean they are required to 
expedite cases in a way that favours liberal bureaucratic principles, and ǯǤ
Solicitors tend to blame externally introduced policy for that suffering but also 
acknowledge that they have not strenuously resisted neoliberal demands in relation 
to fees and case management because of the need to maintain a business and 
professional reputation Ȃ both of which advocates view as being to the long term 
benefit of clients. The existence of competition between criminal defence firms 
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serves to encourage efficiency and reduces the risk that solicitors will rebel against 
the needs of the court and, indeed, executive decision making. 
However, as I write this, lawyers are refusing to accept conduct of cases at 
legal aid rates that were introduced on 1 July 2015 in protest at relentless budget 
cuts to publicly funded criminal defence services.976 Resistance of this nature is 
extremely unusual in the legal profession and indicates that lawyers regard the 
proposed contracting scheme implemented under the Coalition government as 
something that will ruin both their business interests and any semblance of access to 
justice for defendants. It seems that lawyers have reached a point where they are 
prepared to risk their business interests in favour of taking a stand against cuts that 
will further hinder effective access to justice. The recently appointed Conservative 
Lord Chancellor, Michael Gove, has indicated that the Ministry of Justice intends to 
proceed with the new contracting system977 but the long term effects of both the 
protest and the new contracting system remain unknown.  
In essence, as seen in chapter two, defendants have always suffered ǯǤ
rise in popularity of neoliberalism (and particularly since ǯ
1997) have focused on demands for efficiency in public services. Such demands 
intensified as austerity took hold during the Coalition ǯ time in power. ǯ
                                                          
976 Bowcott, O. 'Lawyers to refuse criminal cases in protest against cuts in legal aid fees' (2015) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jun/25/lawyers-to-refuse-criminal-cases-in-protest-at-cuts-
to-legal-aid-fees> accessed on 3 July 2015; Fortado, L and Croft, J. 'Solicitors prepare to strike over legal 
aid cuts' (2015) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ee938770-1f07-11e5-aa5a-
398b2169cf79.html#axzz3epXodL5X> accessed on 3 July. 
977 Bowcott, O. 'Lawyers to refuse criminal cases in protest against cuts in legal aid fees' (2015) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jun/25/lawyers-to-refuse-criminal-cases-in-protest-at-cuts-
to-legal-aid-fees> accessed on 3 July 2015. 
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the demonisation of precariat groups has meant that concerns about the 
maintenance of due process have been ideologically devalued as efficiency, rather 
than just processes, becomes the main priority. Thus advanced marginality appears 
as both an effect and a by-product of the implementation of neoliberalism.  
This premise is further supported by evidence of the legislation which is 
designed to standardise proceedings and manage uncertainty and risk. The 
workgroup culture has absorbed such legalisation and uses it in implicit terms that 
accommodate the workgroupǯ needs. This fǯ 
inability to participate in the proceedings. The evidence also indicates that lawyers 
will take risks with funding in order to suit the needs of the court even though they 
recognise that uncertainty about, and reductions in rates of, pay decreases the 
quality of the service that they are able to provide. Thus lawyers tend to ǯ
undermined, which serves to strengthen the professional network and in turn 
further reduces the ability of defendants to effectively participate in the process of 
summary prosecution.  
Lawyers have been encouraged to accommodate the workgroup demands 
because they depend on the government for funding and various governments have 
paid insufficient ǯimprove access to justice. It is not the 
case that lawyers, by their very nature, exacerbate defendant marginalisation, but 
that the political and cultural environment in which they operate encourages 
practises that worsen marginalisation. As is argued in chapter three, lawyers have 
multiple identities and governments have, in recent decades, seen lawyers as 
potential drivers of efficiency rather than as champions of access to justice. This 
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view undermines thǯ
encourage access to justice are neglected in policy design. This view has meant that 
the initiatives which have been developed in summary criminal proceedings, by 
which lawyers must abide to remain economically successful, do not pay sufficient 
regard to defendantsǯǤresources, 
defence solicitors are, through those initiatives, discouraged from practising in such 
a way that prioritises defendant needs.  
Generalisability  
The research has been conducted on a small scale in one court area and thus 
the results may not be generalisable. However, the fact that my data is relatable to 
similar studies suggests that the propositions advanced have broader applicability 
across the summary criminal justice system. 
So far as neoliberalism is concerned, writers such as Garland,978  Bell979 and 
Squires and Lea980 have identified a tendency for modern politics to criminalise 
precariat groups and demonise them via the apparatus of the criminal justice 
process by the use of quasi criminal orders (such as Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, 
now replaced by Criminal Behaviour Orders).981 I argue that such processes of 
demonisation continue in the summary judicial process itself by the removal of 
traditional due process protections, such as reducing the availability of legally aided 
representation. This is an original way of analysing current issues in criminal justice, 
                                                          
978 Garland D, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (University of 
Chicago Press 2002). 
979 Bell E, Criminal Justice and Neoliberalism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
980 Squires P and Lea J, 'Introduction: Reading Loic Wacquant - Opening Questions and Overview' in 
Squires, Peter and John Lea (eds), Criminalisation and Advanced Marginality. Critically Exploring the Work 
of Loic Wacquant (The Policy Press 2012). 
981 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 
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but the ideas presented by academic writers on the phenomenon of advanced 
marginality appear to be transferable to the apparatus of the criminal justice system.   
It is clear that governments influenced by neoliberalism have introduced 
several administrative changes to summary criminal justice nationally, such as CJ: 
SSS and the Criminal Procedure Rules, and it is possible that other workgroups have 
reacted to those changes in different ways. In this regard, it is important to note that 
my findings are congruent with those of Newman, in his recent examination of firms 
in a large city elsewhere in England.982 He identified similar issues among the 
courtroom workgroup that he studied, even though I disagree with parts of his 
analysis of those findings.983 This does however suggest that there are indeed broad 
themes that can be identified across adversarial courtroom cultures.  
Further, ǯ984 findings in relation to the system of legal aid in summary 
criminal courts resonate with my own. Solicitors operating in another part of the 
country and advocates in east Kent spoke of similar concerns about 
bureaucratisation in the legal aid system as well as pressure to process cases 
quickly, which further suggests that my findings may be representative of difficulties 
in obtaining legally aided representation generally. It also suggests that, although the 
workgroups operated in different areas of England and Wales, common concerns 
exist among magistratesǯǤǯ
processes noted that the speed at which cases were processed, coupled with the 
complexity of court proceedings and jargon used by the workgroup, meant that 
                                                          
982 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
983 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
984 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
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defendants were unlikely to fully understand what was happening.985 These findings 
lend weight to the transferability of my own findings, in that further demands for 
speed, coupled with incrǯ
proceedings have been absorbed into workgroup behaviour across a range of 
summary criminal courts. Given that advocates have been trained via the same 
procedures, by lawyers who operate in a system where the patterns of behaviour 
appear persistent, it is unsurprising that similar forms of implementation would 
occur nationally.  
So far as courtroom culture is concerned, Carlen986 identified, several decades 
ago, that the use of signalling and jargon among court personnel operates to exclude 
defendants from the proceedings. As identified in chapter five, that interpersonnel 
signalling is exacerbated by the ways in which law is used within the workgroup. 
Both Young987 and Newman988 identified similar patterns of behaviour among court 
personnel in their recent studies, both of which were conducted in different areas of 
England and Wales. This suggests that my conclusions are applicable beyond east 
Kent and lends support to the premise that it is possible to identify common themes 
in summary criminal justice nationally. In fact, it was possible, as noted in chapters 
two and four, to identify patterns of adversarial behaviour consistent with studies by 
                                                          
985 Kemp, V Transforming Legal Aid: Access to Criminal Defence Services 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-
analysis/lsrc/TransformingCrimDefenceServices_29092010.pdf> (2010) accessed 12 December 2011 
986 Carlen P, Magistrates' Justice (Martin Robertson 1976). 
987 Young R, 'Exploring the Boundaries of Criminal Courtroom Workgroup' (2013) 42 Common Law World 
Review 203. 
988 Newman D, Legal Aid, Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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Sudnow,989 as well and Eisenstein and Jacob,990 in northern America. This suggests 
that the findings could be relevant across adversarial criminal justice systems.  
The data further provides a source of information from which others may 
make judgements about the transferability of the findings to other settings.991 The 
work might thereby be able to contribute to a meta-analysis of summary criminal 
proceedings and provide information that could be useful for comparative studies. 
One obvious avenue for further research is to seek the views of defendants about 
their experience of ǯǤ 
Reflections on the work 
I appreciate that some of the participants in my research may not be pleased 
by my findings, particularly in relation to the prioritisation of court needs over 
defendants' interests. I have suffered a degree of Ǯstandpoint ǯ992 in relation to 
my role as practitioner. I have felt discomfort at reporting some of my findings and 
have been forced to reflect on my own behaviour as a defence advocate.  I accept that 
my own experience of working in the criminal justice system for a number of years 
could have affected what I regarded as important when analysing the data. My ability 
to empathise with the defence advocates may also have affected both data collection 
and data analysis.993 I do however believe that the fact that prosecutors were 
concerned about similar issues to defence advocates mitigates that difficulty to a 
                                                          
989 Sudnow D, 'Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office' (1965) 
12(3) Social Problems 255. 
990 Eisenstein. J and Jacob. H, Felony Justice: An Organisational Analysis of Criminal Courts (Little Brown 
1977). 
991 Bryman A, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2012). 
992 Wakeman S, 'Fieldwork, Biography and Emotion. Doing Criminological Autoethnography' (2014) 54(5) 
British Journal of Criminology 705. 
993 Wakeman argues that it is very important for researchers to confront their life histories and the ways 
that this may affect how research findings are presented (Wakeman S, 'Fieldwork, Biography and 
Emotion. Doing Criminological Autoethnography' (2014) 54(5) British Journal of Criminology 705.) 
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degree. I recognise that my biography is likely to have influenced my research and 
so, in order to try and present rigorous academic work, I have attempted to support 
my findings by reference to literature provided by other socio-legal scholars, 
particularly in relation to the professional networks that exist among the courtroom 
workgroup. Happily, I found that many of my findings are congruent with their 
conclusions and predictions.  
I hope however that the participants in my research will see that, by their 
own acknowledgement, there has been little resistance to processes which have 
further marginalised defendants. I further appreciate (and indeed understand) that 
solicitors operate in a very difficult and complex area in which there is a constant 
struggle to balance competing interests even though they are acutely aware that 
their professional roles are being devalued. I hope that defence advocates will be 
able to accept my view that processes of neoliberalisation have effectively forced 
them into situations where, not only does government  view their role with 
scepticism, but also further undermines their ability to act as altruistic public 
servants via demands for efficiency. I am keenly aware that the system of summary 
criminal justice is in a particularly volatile state of change as I write, and hope that 
the current crisis will result in effective dialogue between the agencies of criminal 
procedure to improve access to justice for all concerned.  
Suggestions for improving access to justice 
The task of improving access to justice is clearly an extremely difficult one 
given the complex political and cultural factors that have exacerbated defendant 
marginalisation in summary criminal justice for many years. It is of course unlikely Ǯtrickle ǯchange to 
  
253 
 
some structural factors might, alongside some awareness training, gradually alter 
some cultural practises of the workgroup. I preface what follows with the 
recognition that, given the current economic climate, very little of what I suggest is 
likely to occur in the foreseeable future.  
Firstly, it seems clear that governments need to alter their approach to policy 
design by recognising that lawyers are able to improve the legitimacy of criminal 
proceedings as well as being able to improve courtroom efficiency. Indeed, 
governmental distrust of professional behaviour is somewhat incongruent with trust 
in market forces for regulation in the field of criminal defence services. Criminal 
defence firms have evolved in such a way that defence advocates operate in a 
competitive market to retain the goodwill of clients and of the court. As such, the Ǯǯself-regulation in pure neoliberal Ǥǡǯof professionals working in public services 
led to greater bureaucratic intrusion which has left lawyers feeling undermined and 
unable to properly exercise professional judgement. That intrusion has also 
increased their workload by requiring that particular forms be completed and 
procedures be followed. At the same time, income has reduced via the 
reintroduction of fixed fees and the removal of categories of work from the fixed fee 
payment scheme. In short, government distrust of professional behaviour has 
increased demands on lawyers who are increasingly expected to perform more work 
for less money. As such, reducing bureaucracy in summary criminal proceedings has 
the potential to produce several positive outcomes.  
Firstly, it could promote mutual trust between government and the 
workgroup, thereby encouraging the possibility of meaningful debate. While 
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governments could be concerned that reducing bureaucratic, standardised 
procedures would encourage inefficiency, I argue that it would in fact allow 
resources to be directed to the most appropriate services and the competitive nature Ǯǯate behaviour. It should be noted 
that the market, such as it is, only began to take shape in the mid to late 1970s while 
efficiency drives began to be introduced with gusto in the 1980s, meaning that the 
way in which services were provided was not perhaps as fully developed as it might 
now be. This means that service provision might in fact already be more efficient 
than earlier governments perceived it to be. 
Secondly, reducing bureaucratic procedures would ease defence advocatesǯ
workload, meaning that there would be more time within the fixed fee system - 
which advocates did not in principle disagree with - to devote to client needs. 
Increasing fixed fee payments in line with inflation would retain an incentive to 
work efficiently while also allowing lawyers more flexibility in the way they work 
and greater control over their resources because profit margins would not be so 
strained. This might also rebalance professional relationships so that lawyers feel 
less compromised between business and client needs. This, in turn, could mean that 
lawyers would be better able to meaningfully negotiate and engage in greater 
discussion between workgroup personnel and executive agencies in policy design.  
 Another effect of reducing bureaucracy would mean that defence solicitors 
would have more time to take defendant needs into account which could, albeit 
slowly, start to shift professional culture so that greater priority is given to 
protecting defendant needs. I argue in chapter four that the use of forms encourages 
collaborative working practices and so the removal of that manifestation of 
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bureaucratic procedures could reduce the need, or desire, to work co-operatively in 
an adversarial system. Although it may seem like a trite point to make, a further way 
of encouraging professionals to engage with defendant interests in preference to 
workgroup interests would be by training. Advocates seemed to be aware of some of 
the ways in which their behaviour might marginalise defendants but did not appear 
to consider the extent to which courtroom layout and interpersonnel jargon could 
further marginalise defendants. It would be appropriate for lawyers to be made 
aware of these issues during training and development. 
 Essentially, defendant marginalisation appears to be exacerbated as a result of 
the competing rationales between the executive and the workgroup, and among 
members of the workgroup itself. Many of these problems seem to exist because 
governments have compromised ǯ decision making powers with 
ever greater demands for efficiency. In short, governments ǯ
ability to increase efficiency and undermined their ability to improve access to 
justice. If those demands for efficiency were relaxed, it would relieve some lawyersǯ
workloads, thus allowing more time to focus on defendant needs. It also has the 
potential to encourage meaningful dialogue between the agencies of criminal justice. 
Such dialogue can only be generated if government is prepared to modify its view of 
lawyers and pay greater attention to advocatesǯ.   
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Appendix 1: Freedom of Information Request 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
Reference No: FOI-88467 
   February 2014 
  
Freedom of Information Request 
 
 
Your request has been handled under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA). 
 
I can confirm that the department holds information that you have asked for, and I 
am pleased to provide this to you.  
 
Our data team supplied incorrect data for questions 1 and 2, all cases excluding road 
traffic cases, or summary motoring. We in fact supplied the total for summary 
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motoring rather than the total cases excluding them. I have therefore answered the 
questions for 2010, 2011, 2012 and for January to September 2013.  
 
Data for the final quarter of 2013, October to December, cannot be released until 
Thursday 20 March when data for that period is published as Official Statistics in 
Court Statistics Quarterly. 
 
Turning to your specific questions: 
 
 ?Ȍǯ
Kent (not including Road Traffic cases) 
 
2) Total number of adult criminal cases at each of the ǯ
courts (not including Road Traffic cases): 
I. Folkestone 
II. Dover 
III. Canterbury 
IV. Margate 
V. Maidstone 
VI. Medway 
VII. Dartford 
VIII. Sevenoaks 
 
Question 1 & 2 - Adult Criminal Completed Proceedings Excluding Summary 
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Motoring Offences 1 2 3 
Year 2013 6 2012 2011 2010 
Kent 22,284 30,693 28,482 26,965 
LJA: Central 
Kent 4 5 6,438 8,491 8,486 7,796 
LJA: East Kent 4 
5 8,163 11,614 10,367 9,903 
LJA: North Kent 
4 5 7,683 10,588 9,629 9,266 
Notes: 
1. Includes Indictable Only, Either Way, Summary Non-Motoring & Breaches 
2. Data are taken from the HMCTS Performance Database and provides the number 
of completed proceedings during the time period. 
3. Data used in providing these figures is taken from a more recent extract of the 
data than that used in published Official Statistics and, therefore, may differ. 
4. Magistrates' courts are managed within local justice areas. Each LJA manages its 
workload in relation to a local framework designed to meet local business needs and 
geographical requirements.  Some LJAs have centralised administrations with a 
number of court houses being used as hearing centres, others may have 
administrative functions at each site. For these reasons data can only be accurately 
collated and reported at LJA level. 
5. Central Kent LJA includes ǯǢǡǡ	ǯǢǯǤ 
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6. Data for 2013 are January to September only, October to December, cannot be 
released until Thursday 20 March when data for that period is published as Official 
Statistics in Court Statistics Quarterly. 
 
3) Total number of imprisonable adult criminal cases appearing at 
ǯǤ 
 
Data is not held in a way that allows us to collate it for all imprisonable offences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice. 'FOI-88467' (2014) <http://www.gov.uk/.../excluding-
road-traffic-cases-number-adult-criminal-cases-at-specific-magistrates-courts> 
accessed on 9 September 2013. 
  
326 
 
Appendix 2: Freedom of Information Request 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
www.gov.uk 
   
   
    
  
 
 Your reference:  
 Our reference: FOI-82425 
 
  May 2013  
 
 
 
Your request has been handled under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA). 
Q1: Total number of Adult Criminal cases during 2012-appearing at Magistrates Court across Kent 
(not including Road Traffic cases) 
I can confirm that the department holds information that you have asked for, and I 
am pleased to provide this to you. The information you have requested is in the table 
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below. I have included figures for 2010 and 2011 because, in the paragraph ǡǲǥȂ  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǥǳ
 
Adult Criminal Completed Proceedings, excluding Summary Motoring 
Offences 
 
201
2 
201
1 
20
10 
Kent 
11,7
49 
13,8
98 
16,
22
8 
 
For background information about these figures, please see the Explanatory Notes 
 
Q2: Total number of Adult Criminal Cases at each of the following Magistrates Courts (not including 
Road Traffic cases):  
x Folkestone x Canterbury x Maidstone  x Dartford  
x Dover x Margate x Medway x Sevenoaks 
 
I can confirm that the department holds some of the information that you have 
requested, and I provide this to you in the table below. 
 
Adult Criminal Completed Proceedings, excluding Summary Motoring 
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Offences 
 
201
2 
201
1 
20
10 
LJA: Central Kent 
i.e. Maidstone and Sevenoaks 
4,19
7 
5,17
0 
5,8
18 
LJA: East Kent 
i.e. Canterbury, Dover, Folkestone and Margate 
3,71
9 
4,49
5 
5,1
96 
LJA: North Kent 
i.e. Medway (Chatham) and Dartford 
3,83
3 
4,23
3 
5,2
14 
 
For background information about these figures, please see the Explanatory Notes 
Q3: Total number of imprisonable Adult Criminal cases appearing at Magistrates Court across Kent 
I can confirm that HMCTS does not hold the information that you have requested. To 
establish whether the information was held I made enquires with a colleague in our 
Performance Directorate, whose responsibilities includes statistical work.  I have 
been informed that data is not held in a way that allows us to collate it for all 
imprisonable offences. When assessing whether or not information was held, 
adequate and reasonable searches where made of statistical data. 
 
 
I have suggested below the public authority which you may wish to direct your 
request to because they may hold information as they have the policy lead/or 
responsibility for the issue enquired about.   
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You can also find more information by reading the full text of the Act, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents.  
 
However, you may wish to contact Kent Police as they may hold some of the 
information you have asked for.  You can contact Kent Police at the following 
website: 
 
http://www.kent.police.uk/about_us/foi/formal_request/Makeper 
cent20a%20Request%t20for%20I.html   
 
Alternatively, I have provided below, contact details for the Freedom of Information 
team 
 
Freedom of Information Team 
Data Protection Unit  
Kent Police, Force Headquarters  
Sutton Road 
Maidstone 
Kent, ME15 9BZ. 
 
freedomofinformation@kent.pnn.police.uk  
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You may also wish to contact the Crown Prosecution Service to see if they hold the 
information you have asked for.  You can contact the Crown Prosecution Service at 
the following website: 
 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/foi/index.html  
 
Alternatively, you can contact the Crown Prosecution Service as follows: 
 
The Freedom of Information Unit 
CPS Headquarters 
Rose Court 
2 Southwark Bridge 
London 
SE1 9HS 
 
FOIUnit@cps.gsi.gov.uk 
Q6: In reference to question number one, please confirm  
i) the percentage of cases where Magistrates accept jurisdiction  
ii) percentage of cases where jurisdiction was declined 
iii) percentage of cases where the defendant elected Crown Court Trial 
 
Magistrates decide whether to accept or decline jurisdiction in either way cases 
where the defendant has not pleaded guilty at a mode of trial hearing. If they accept 
jurisdiction the defendant can elect to be sent to the Crown Court for trial. A 
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proportion of the cases referred to in Question 1 are not subject to a mode of trial 
hearing, so it is not possible to break them down in the way you have requested. 
Q7: Details of the boundary areas for each of the Courts in Kent as Listed above 
I have made enquires with the Crime Directorate (a part of the Ministry of Justice), ǯǯǤ 
 
Having done so, I can tell you that Magistrates are appointed to LJAs and can only sit 
in those LJAs. Magistrates have jurisdiction to deal with any offence in England and 
Wales, but by convention deal with offences committed or charged in their LJA. I can 
also tell you that the LJAs in Kent comprise the geographical areas served by the 
local authorities listed in the table below:   
 
  
For Central Kent LJA, the 
ǥ 
For East Kent LJA, the area 
ǥǥ 
For North Kent LJA, 
ǥǥ 
Tunbridge Wells Borough 
Council 
http://www2.tunbridgewells
.gov.uk/ 
Canterbury City Council 
https://www.canterbury.gov.
uk/ 
Medway Council,  
http://www.medway.go
v.uk/  
 
Sevenoaks District Council 
http://www.sevenoaks.gov.u
k/ 
Thanet District Council 
http://www.thanet.gov.uk/ 
Gravesham Borough 
Council 
http://www.gravesham
.gov.uk/  
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Maidstone Borough Council 
http://www.maidstone.gov.u
k/ 
Ashford Borough Council 
http://www.ashford.gov.uk/ 
Dartford Borough 
Council 
http://www.dartford.go
v.uk/  
 
Tonbridge and Malling 
District Council 
http://www.tmbc.gov.uk/ 
Dover District Council 
http://www.dover.gov.uk/H
ome.aspx 
 
Swale Borough Council 
http://www.swale.gov.uk/ 
Shepway District Council 
http://www.shepway.gov.uk
/ 
 
 
 
We do not hold records (maps, for example) that I can provide to you.  If the 
information was held by HMCTS, or MoJ, it would have to be held by the Crime ǡǯǯǤ
information is not held by HMCTS, or MoJ, because there is no legal or business 
requirement to hold the information.  
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I have been able to release this information to you under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA).  I hope you find this information helpful to you.  You can also find more 
information by reading the full text of the Act (available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice. 'FOI - 82425' (2014) http://www.gov.uk/...data/.../adult-
youth-criminal-cases-by-area accessed on 8 September 2014.  
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Appendix 3: Observation Template 
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Observation Field Notes 
Date: 
Courthouse: Canterbury Thanet      Folkestone   Dover 
 
Bench composition: Magistrates  District judge 
   Male Ȃ1 2 3  Female Ȃ 1 2 3 
 
Virtual Court:  Yes No If yes,   Police station  Prison 
 
Defendant present? Yes No   If no, why?........................................... 
 
Defendant on bail: Yes No 
 
Defendant DOB or approximate age: 
 
Multiple defendants? Yes No 
ǡǯǥǥǥǤǤǤ 
 
Defendant:  Male Female 
 
Alleged Offence: 
 
Purpose of hearing: Plea Mode of trial Committal Case Management 
   Trial Sentencing Bail/Remand      ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤ 
 
Interpreter required:  Yes No 
 
Plea:    Guilty  Not Guilty 
 
Defendant Represented: Yes No 
As: 
 
The proceedings: 
Was defendant generally well prepared for court?  Yes No Somewhat 
Did defendant appear confident?    Yes       No Somewhat 
Did defendant appear confused?    Yes No Somewhat         
Did defendant appear to be listening?   Yes No Somewhat         
Was the defendant respectful to the Judge and other court personnel?  
Yes     No       Somewhat 
Did clerk/magistrates recommend the services of a solicitor? Yes  No N/A 
If yes, did the defendant want legal advice?    Yes No N/A 
If yes, did the court adjourn for advice to be obtained?  Yes No N/A 
If yes, for how long?       ............................................ 
Did clerk intervene?       Yes No 
Did a legal representative intervene?    Yes No 
If yes, how? 
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Did defendant/representative explicitly refer to a point of law/statute/case?  Yes   No 
 
Did prosecutor explicitly refer to a point of law/statute/case?                Yes   No 
Was the defendant representative able to explain the defendant's case clearly? Yes  No  
Did defendant/representative appear to have case papers?         Yes No 
 
If defendant unrepresented: 
Court (clerk or magistrates) mentioned forms incomplete/wrong  Yes No 
Court mentioned need for evidence or witnesses    Yes No ǯ     Yes No     N/A 
Needed clarification of legal terms      Yes No 
Court clarified terms       Yes No     N/A 
Presented documents/evidence that court would not look at  Yes No 
Court told defendant to be quiet      Yes No 
Reprimanded by court during hearing     Yes No 
 
Approx. length of hearing (minutes)........................................................ 
 
Outcome: 
Adjourned for:  Trial Case Management/ Directions Sentence Further Remand  
   Committal Plea Missing Evidence (defence/prosecution) 
  
Legal Aid ȋȀȀǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤȌ ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤ  
Bail granted/refused Acquitted Convicted (plea/after trial) Warrant issued 
Discontinued  Committed to crown court  Sentenced  
 
If sentenced, sentence type:  Immediate Custody     Suspended Sentence Community 
Order      
Fine      Conditional Discharge Other....................................... 
If  Suspended Sentence/Community Order, requirements:  
Unpaid Work          Curfew          Supervision         Treatment Programme (details below) 
Specified Activity (details below)  
 
Ancillary Orders: 
Costs              Compensation             Forfeiture and Destruction           Victim Surcharge                
Restraining Order              ASBO               Driving Ban              Penalty Points             ǥǥǥǥǥǤǤǤ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
337 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
While magistrates present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While magistrates in retirement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
338 
 
Appendix 4: Interview Schedule 
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Interview Schedule 
 
Preliminary Questions 
What is your job role? 
Approximately how long have you worked in that role? 
Legal Aid 
1. Do you think that the re-introduction of means testing has had any effect on 
proceedings in the magistǯǫ 
2. Are the magistrates sympathetic to difficulties that may occur when obtaining 
funding? 
a) How is the view manifested? 
b) Why do you think this is? 
3. Are clerks sympathetic to difficulties that may occur when obtaining funding to 
represent clients? 
a) How is this view manifested? 
b) Why do you think this is? 
4. What do you think about the procedure for obtaining legal aid?  
5. Do you think a defendant would be able to complete the form effectively without 
assistance? Why or why not? 
6. How often do you conduct cases when you are not sure that you will be paid for the 
work involved? 
7. How often would you say that you conduct work that you are not in fact paid to do? 
8. What do you think about the fee structure in relation to legally aided 
representation? 
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9. Are those services affected by changes to payment rates such as the introduction of ǯ
courts? 
10. Have you observed any changes in the number of advocates who are appointed by 
the court to conduct cross examination in trials? 
a) If yes, what do you think this might be attributable to? 
11. Have you observed any changes in the number of applications for payment from 
central funds? 
a) If yes, what do you think this might be attributable to? 
Practises in magistrǯ 
1. ǯǫ 
2. Do you think that initiatives such as CJ: SSS and Stop Delaying Justice have had any 
effect on summary criminal proceedings? 
3. The Cr.PR, CJ: SSS and Stop Delaying Justice are designed to increase co-operation 
among advocates and the courts. Do you think this has occurred? 
If not, why not? 
If so, has this had any effect on court proceedings? 
4. Have you observed changes over time in the number of cases committed to the 
Crown Court? 
5. Do you think that the introduction of diversionary measures such as fixed penalty ǯ
proceedings? 
6. What is your view of plea negotiations? 
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7. What role do you think forms (case management, ineffective trial, sentencing 
reasons) play on the proceedings? 
8. Have you observed the role of forms change over time? 
9. How much thought goes into completing forms?  
10. Do you think forms are useful? Why or why not? 
11. Do you think magistrates treat unrepresented defendants differently from 
represented defendants? 
12. Do you think legal advisors treat unrepresented defendants differently from 
represented defendants? 
13. Do you think District judges treat unrepresented defendants differently from 
represented defendants? 
14. Do you try to explain law/procedure to clients before they go into court? 
15.  Do you refer to points of law in open court? 
a) If so, how often? 
16. If you refer to points of law, do you refer to the provision/authority or the just the 
principle? 
17. Have you observed any change in case complexity in recent years? 
18. Have you observed any differences in appearing before magistrates or District 
judges? 
19. What do you think about the court duty solicitor scheme? 
20. ǯsals to 
introduce PCT? 
 
